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The thesis is composed of four stand-alone essays analyzing economic prob-
lems pertinent to social insurance and allocation of resources in three applications
to development, education and labor. The first essay investigates co-operative
patterns of farmers in rural India engaging into informal insurance and public
irrigation provision. I demonstrate theoretically, empirically and quantitatively
that these two margins of co-operation reinforce each other, if the irrigational in-
frastructure is managed by local societies. On the other hand, management by
external government agencies is associated with excessive crowding-out of infor-
mal insurance.
The second essay investigates constrained efficiency of a model with educa-
tional investments subject to uninsurable dropout risk, moral hazard and an en-
dogenous college wage premium. I show that the laissez-faire equilibrium is con-
strained inefficient and is characterized by under-education. To this end, I show
that an optimally designed student loan program with graduation-contingent re-
payment rates can attain the allocative efficiency of second best.
In the third essay, I show in a simple model of lumpy educational invest-
ments that subjective pessimism over returns to education can be self-confirmed
in equilibrium. This leads to two empirical implications: (i) both the degree of
human capital concentration and the degree of educational investments misallo-
cation may be increasing in the rigidity of the education system’s design; and (ii)
commonly pursued methods may not identify the true underlying skill distribu-
tions.
The fourth essay uses a quantitative model of labor search with unemploy-
ment insurance and voluntary quits to study welfare consequences of a policy-
reform giving entitlement to workers quitting their jobs in the US. Structural re-
sults show that pursuing a generous entitlement policy for quitters may allow for
significant welfare gains through improved insurance and allocation of workers.
Moreover, I employ the assumption of monetary search costs and show that it can
explain the empirically documented unemployed search behavior.
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1 Sharing Risk to Avoid Tragedy in Village Economies
1.1 Introduction
Farmers are exposed to a plethora of shocks affecting their crop yields, investment
decisions and, ultimately, income. Some of these shocks are idiosyncratic in their
nature such as pests, human, animal, crop diseases, machine breakdowns or un-
employment. For the vast majority of farmers who are located in the least- and
less-developed parts of the world, self-insurance is usually very limited - either
due to poverty or lack of formal credit markets. Unsurprisingly then, rural soci-
eties have developed systems of informal mutual insurance arrangements aimed
at mitigating these risks (Udry, 1994; Townsend, 1994). Surprisingly, however,
although repayments in such informal insurance arrangements are in principle
completely voluntary, they have proved robust to excessive default rates. The
main reason for this is arguably the repeated nature of interactions within these
societies and the possibility of punishing deviators by shutting off their access to
credit in the future.
At the same time, the major aggregate risk faced by these farmers is erratic
rainfall resulting in droughts. Fortunately enough, the impact of such weather
shocks can also be mitigated to some extent thanks to modern irrigation systems.
Needless to say, the best outcomes can be achieved either if the degree of co-
operation between affected households is high, or if enough of the necessary in-
frastructure is provided by central authorities. Given that investments reducing
the level of aggregate risks can reduce demand for informal insurance, and that
access to informal insurance may be used to elicit higher degrees of co-operation
over these investments, these two institutions may be very interrelated. Investi-
gating this cornerstone relationship is at the heart of this paper.
In particular, I extend the canonical model of risk sharing with limited com-
mitment developed by Kehoe and Levine (1993), Kocherlakota (1996) and Ligon,
Thomas and Worrall (2002) in order to study joint determination of risk sharing
against idiosyncratic risks and co-operation over public investments reducing ag-
gregate risks in the presence of limited commitment constraints. I first demon-
strate theoretically that if villagers have a possibility to exclude non-cooperators
(or deviators) from the local informal insurance market and the local irrigation
system, the two institutions reinforce each other. On one hand, risk sharing im-
proves the efficiency of irrigational investments through two channels. First,
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state-contingent risk sharing transfers reduce the degree of uninsured idiosyn-
cratic risk distorting farmers’ investment decisions by more than self-insurance
(see e.g. Arrow, 1971). Second, risk sharing facilitates efficient co-operation over
irrigation by providing resources for investment (and consumption) to house-
holds that may otherwise be on the verge of breaking out of the irrigational co-
operation agreement.
On the other hand, co-ordinated investments into irrigational infrastructure
reduce the aggregate risk affecting co-operating households, while keeping the
prospect of leaving this co-operation unappealing (due to available punishments).
This dynamic implies that the extent of risk sharing transfers sustainable in equi-
librium is enhanced by the irrigation margin.
Importantly, however, interventions providing irrigation to rural villages may
backfire if this infrastructure is owned and managed by central authorities that
cannot condition access to it on other dimensions of the intra-village co-operative
patterns (such as e.g. repayments on informal insurance contracts). This is pre-
cisely due to the fact such interventions provide irrigation to every household in
the village (including the ones that decide to default on their credit obligations
towards others) and so may excessively reduce the extent of sustainable local in-
surance contracts.
Using two waves of the ICRISAT panel dataset collected in 1976-1984 and
2001-2004 combined with Minor Irrigation Censuses conducted by the Indian
Ministry of Water Resources, I provide empirical evidence for the mechanism
studied in the case of three Indian rural societies co-operating over the two in-
stitutions.1 In particular, I first document how the size of irrigation infrastructure
available has increased and the aggregate risk faced by farmers has decreased
between the two waves. Then, I show that (i) conditional on a share of govern-
ment ownership of irrigation units, an increase in the share of land with access
to village-owned irrigation is associated with a significant improvement in risk
sharing; and that (ii) an increase in the government share in ownership of the irri-
gation units is associated with a reduction in risk sharing, in line with predictions
1Ostrom (1990) gives many examples of rural societies that both co-operated over the common
resources/goods and various forms of risk sharing. For instance, Swiss villagers insured each
other by dividing the village’s cheese production or rebuilding houses destroyed by avalanches
together. In the case of Spanish societies co-operating over irrigation, the contract on the water use
also contained water sharing rules in times of droughts. In particular, the crops in most need of
water were given priority. In case of the Filipino farmers, the way of dividing land was symmet-
rical in the sense of everyone having some land closer to and some further away from the water
source; and during dry periods all the farmers collectively decided how to share the burden and
assign the water rights, again with priority for the crops in most need.
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of the theory presented. I also discuss further studies supporting the mechanism.
Building on these findings, I calibrate a quantitative version of the model to
the setting of the three villages analyzed in order to conduct a number of exper-
iments. First, performing the exercise of accounting for empirically documented
changes in aggregate risk faced by the villagers suggests that investments into
irrigation constitute a very effective way of insuring villagers’ against the risk
of weather fluctuations. Second, comparing models with various degrees of co-
operation confirms significant reinforcing effects between the two institutions of
risk sharing and irrigational co-operation, valued by villagers by up to 6% of con-
sumption in every year. Third, although improving villagers’ well-being by a
simple reduction in the size of government-owned infrastructure is not possible,
shifting resources from the latter to subsidies on investments made by villagers
can achieve significant welfare improvements, while holding the size of overall
expenditures constant. In particular, such a reform strengthens the within-village
co-operation by improving both the informal insurance (achieving a reduction in
consumption elasticity w.r.t. idiosyncratic shocks of up to 67%) and the efficiency
of irrigational investments (achieving a reduction in variance of aggregate risk of
up to 11%). As such, villagers value these reforms by up to 3% of consumption in
every year.
The research question pursued in this paper is particularly important in light
of the Indian government’s heavy involvement in irrigation provision with the
aim of improving the wellbeing of rural societies. For instance, in 2016 Indian gov-
ernment spending on irrigation amounted to approx. 5.5 billion USD, or 8.5% of
total budget expenditures. Given the trade-off associated with central ownership
and management of such investments, policy makers should carefully consider
the general equilibrium effects of their actions on the welfare of rural societies.
This paper seeks to guide such policies.
1.2 Literature review
The joint determination of risk sharing and irrigation provision at the heart of
this paper speaks to the macro-development literature studying interactions be-
tween productivity or investment decisions and the (access to insurance against)
underlying risks.2 Buera, Kaboski and Shin (2011) show quantitatively that finan-
cial development may affect allocation of capital and entrepreneurial talent across
2See survey by Buera, Kaboski and Shin (2017).
9
tradable and non-tradable sectors and as such it may also affect the aggregate
productivity. In the context of village economies, Cole, Gine and Vickery (2014),
Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2012) and Karlan, Osei, Osei-Akoto and Udry (2014)
conduct experiments in India and Ghana showing that access to formal insurance
products induces farmers to shift production towards higher return but higher
risk cash crops. Similar conclusions are found in Cai, Chen, Fang and Zhou (2015)
studying the case of sow production in southwestern China. Lastly, Emerick, de
Janvry, Sadoulet and Dar (2016) show that the adoption of modern flood tolerant
rice varieties in rural India increases investments and co-operation through more
labor-intensive planting, employment of larger farming areas and increased usage
of fertilizer and credit. In what follows, I present a mechanism through which in-
formal risk sharing may endogenously lead to productivity gains in the presence
of public goods affecting productivity.
Anthropological evidence in Wade (1988) and Bardhan (2000) documents that
central provision and administration of irrigation in rural villages in South India
has been widespread since the 1970s and has been associated with lower social
co-operation in many dimensions as compared with those provided and managed
by local communities. In this paper, I develop a general equilibrium framework
where these effects arise endogenously. Then, using data sources independent
from the latter studies, I provide empirical evidence (i) supporting the mecha-
nism; and (ii) allowing me to calibrate the structural model in order to quantify
the impact of centralized interventions on co-operative patterns in rural commu-
nities.
This paper is also related to literature on risk sharing with limited commit-
ment studying its interaction with other institutions affecting the value of the
outside option. For instance, Abramitzky (2008) studied the influence of capital
investments on collective communities living in kibbutzim. Attanasio and Rios-
Rull (2000), Thomas and Worrall (2007) and Kruger and Perri (2010) examine the
interaction of such insurance with other public or private insurance programs.
Relating to this literature, I consider an endogenous choice of public insurance
against aggregate shocks and show that if an appropriate excludability technol-
ogy is available to the community, the two forms of insurance reinforce each other.
As regards the idea of joint determination of the two institutions at the heart
of this paper, Morten (2018) and Meghir et al. (2019) conduct a related investiga-
tion of interaction between risk sharing and temporary migration in Indian vil-
lages. Both my own work and theirs shares the feature of one institution having
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an impact on the other and vice versa. Moreover, the feedback-effect of irriga-
tion investments on consumption smoothing presented in this paper is similar to
the one due to the presence of public-storage-like institutions studied in Abraham
and Laczo (2018).
Finally, the theoretical mechanism studied here can be also applied to the case
of fiscal unions. Thus, this paper provides theoretical and empirical underpin-
nings for the mechanism interactions discussed in the recent report “Reconciling
risk sharing with market discipline: A constructive approach to euro area reform”
by Benassy-Quere and co-authors (2018). In particular, in a parallel project, I de-
velop a similar model to the one developed below where countries co-operate
over common goods having impact on the level of aggregate productivity and
show that in the presence of production or investment externalities accruing to
all member states, the optimal design of such a public risk sharing institution3
should be combined with an institution combatting the externality-related effects,
such as the institutions regulating common (labor or trade) markets or, in this
case, environment as e.g. the EU ETS.
Structure
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.3, I introduce the model envi-
ronment and Section 1.4 discusses the associated allocations with various degrees
of co-operation over risk sharing and/or irrigation. In Section 1.5, I present sup-
porting empirical evidence. Based on this evidence, in Section 1.6 I calibrate the
model and use it to answer the research questions stated above. Finally, Section
1.7 concludes with a policy discussion and future research outlook.
1.3 Model economy
Preferences and production technology
Consider a dynamic infinite-horizon village-economy with N ex-ante identical
farming households. All households are risk averse, discounting future at the rate
of β, enjoying consumption c according to utility function u (c) with uc,−ucc > 0.
All information is publicly held and common knowledge.
In any period t, farmers receive crop output according to:
yi,t = φt · θi,t (1)
3See Abraham et al. (2018a) and Abraham et al. (2018b) for analysis of unemployment insur-
ance and optimal Financial Stability Fund designs for the European Union, respectively.
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The output is a function of both aggregate φ and idiosyncratic θ shocks real-
ization. Moreover, (i) kt = [k1,t, . . . , kN,t] is a vector of village-owned irrigation
investments that are co-financed by the government at the rate of sk,4 (ii) ωt is the
irrigation investment provided and owned by central authorities, subsidized at
the rate of sω. Irrigational capital depreciates at the rate of δ.




, 0 < θ1 < ... <
θNθ < ∞ stands for idiosyncratic productivity shocks following transition matrix
πθ with a strictly positive probability for realization of all productivity levels and
the two first (long-run) moments of µθ = E (θ) and σ2θ = Var (θ). These shocks
should be interpreted as machine breakdowns, pests, human, animal, crop dis-
eases or unemployment affecting the well-being of villagers in an idiosyncratic
fashion.5
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where f var is a function of irri-
gational investments translating the impact of weather shocks into crop output
fluctuations. I assume it to be a decreasing and convex function of the current pe-
riod’s irrigational investments of all N households kt+1 and government ωt+1.6
These investments should be thought of as investments into irrigation infrastruc-
ture benefitting the whole community by reducing the risk of droughts (e.g. wells,
canals or tanks).7
To be more precise, I assume that there are two Markov processes governing
the aggregate risk: a “good” and a “bad” one, with the former first order stochas-
tically dominating the latter. The transition matrices πGφ and π
B
φ are assumed to
be symmetric with a common persistence parameter ρφ.
Given this, higher irrigational investments increase the probability of the ran-
4I focus only on irrigation investments and ignore investments in private production capital,
machines etc. as these are usually very small among the small-holder farmers in developing coun-
tries. Nonetheless, the mechanism and results derived below generalize to a setting with a more




, with ki and kp standing for irrigation and production
capital (respectively).
5See Townsend (1994) for a more detailed description of idiosyncratic risks faced by villagers
in rural India.
6While it is clear that in reality such investments benefit not only the farmers pursuing these
investments, the degree of benefits to others may vary depending on the exact type of investment.
In order to keep things simple, this analysis assumes that the benefit of farmer i’s investment to
every farmer in the village is equal.
7Interpreted more broadly, they can also be thought of, to some extent, as constructions pre-
venting floods (field bunds, drainage canals etc.). See Section 1.5.2 for discussion of access to
irrigation among farmers in the villages analyzed empirically.
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bility function with P̄ (·) ∈ [0, 1], P̄′k,ω (·) > 0, P̄′′k,ω (·) < 0 and νk, νω measuring
efficiency of investments into k and ω; and (ii) a variable with superscript de-





= πGφ (φt+1|φt), i.e. the realization in period t + 1 depends only on
period t realization.
Co-operation in the village
Given the nature of idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks affecting the economy,
villagers have two motives for co-operation over: (i) mutual insurance against id-
iosyncratic shocks; and (ii) irrigational investments. To this end, this co-operation
has to be individually rational at any instance as villagers are assumed to be free
to walk away from such agreements. In particular, conditional on any state of the
world, the associated equilibrium allocations are constrained to be such that farm-
ers are voluntarily participating in the agreement on either risk sharing and/or ir-
rigational investments co-operation. This means that at any instance the expected
value of remaining in the agreement conditional on current state has to exceed the
expected value of deviation.
As far as the benefits of such deviations are concerned, after deviating on their
risk sharing or irrigational investment promises agents can:
1. consume as much of their output as they want today and in all future peri-
ods (i.e. not sharing it with others), if they co-operate on risk sharing;
2. invest into irrigation without internalizing associated positive externalities
on others, if they co-operate over this margin (see below).
The first margin of deviations on risk sharing promises is well understood as it
has been analyzed in the literature following Kehoe and Levine (1993), Kocher-
lakota (1996) and Ligon et al. (2002). In line with it, I assume that upon any
deviation in an agreement involving risk sharing, the deviator will be prohibited
from accessing the local credit market in all future periods. This means that from
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the current period onwards such a farmer would be able to rely on self-insurance
only, i.e. he would be able to consume his own production and savings (in the
form of depreciated capital) only.
Furthermore, I assume that the society has access to technology allowing them
to exclude deviators from the part of irrigation provided and managed by other
villagers (but not by government, see below). This excludability technology can
be thought of as the local village council (so called panchayat) forbidding devia-
tors to draw water from common water canals, tanks or dugwells. Moreover, it
can be also thought of as a proxy for public shaming or ostracism imposed upon
deviators.8
Additionally and as already mentioned, I assume that there exists a govern-
mental agency with an exogenously given plan of investments into public irri-
gation units {ωt+1}t ≥ 0 (possibly also state-contingent) in every period t to be
shared among all the N households with perfect foresight over this variable. Im-
portantly, this centrally provided and managed irrigation comes with a significant
indirect cost: it is non-excludable, meaning that the central agency is unable to
condition access to their part of irrigation systems based on other private infor-
mal contracts, such as risk sharing, in the village. The reason for this is either that
doing so simply does not lie in the agency’s domain or it lacks information (or
expertise) necessary for such a form of management.9
The two ways of providing irrigation discussed above imply that the deviat-
ing or non-cooperating household is able to maintain access to their own and the
government-provided part of the irrigation units. This implies that irrigation pro-
vided by villagers is a club good (non-rivalrous and excludable), whereas the part
provided by government is a public good (non-rivalrous and non-excludable).
Mathematically, we have that in such a case the probability of realization of the
8As is well understood in the literature studying endogenously incomplete markets generated
by the limited commitment friction, it is possible to support a continuum of equilibria with differ-
ent properties depending on the exact specification of the outside option. By assuming that any
deviation is punished by exclusion from both the local insurance and the village-owned part of the
irrigation infrastructure, I effectively focus the analysis on equilibria with the highest supportable
degree of risk sharing and most efficient public good provision. This assumption regarding the
deviation on risk sharing is standard in the literature following Kehoe and Levine (1993), Kocher-
lakota (1996) and Ligon et al. (2002). Thus, in the case of irrigation systems being provided by
villagers, assuming excludability and focusing on the best equilibrium attainable is in line with
this literature. While a permanent exclusion from credit markets or irrigation infrastructure may
be seen as far-fetched, these assumptions are a proxy for very strong social norms present in rural
villages.
9See Bardhan (1993) for a discussion of these issues from both conceptual and empirical per-
spectives.
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Figure 1: Timing of events



































of the village’s common irrigation infrastructure.
Importantly, the subsidies for both village- and centrally-owned investments
are financed with sources external to the villages. Since taxation in poor rural
areas (such as the ones analyzed in this paper) is virtually non-existent, I assume
in what follows that the government-owned irrigation units are fully subsidized
(i.e. sω = 1), implying no taxation motives in equilibrium.10
Finally, I will consider all possible benchmarks of no co-operation, joint co-
operation over risk sharing and irrigation, and also co-operation separately over
the former and over the latter. In the case of co-operation over irrigation invest-
ments only, I assume that households attempt to internalize the associated exter-
nalities as much as individually rational at every instance, without engaging in
state-contingent risk sharing. In the alternative case, I assume that households
engage in informal insurance arrangement, share all of the village-owned irriga-
tion system, but they do not internalize irrigation externalities on others when
investing.
Figure 1 summarizes the timing of events in the economy.
1.4 Allocations with various degrees of co-operation
In this section, I discuss properties of equilibria associated with various degrees of
co-operation. I start with non-cooperative and first best benchmarks. Afterwards,
I discuss allocations subject to limited commitment constraints where farmers co-
operate over either risk sharing or irrigation (or both). Going through the all pos-
10More generally, the investments provided by the central agency could come e.g. at a cost of
linear capital investment tax Ti,t (ki,t+1) = τt · ki,t+1 such that the government budget is balanced
in every period, up to the subsidy rate sω: τt ∑Ni=1 ki,t+1 = (1− sω)ωt+1.
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sible combinations will allow me to establish how the risk sharing co-operation
impacts the irrigation co-operation, and vice versa.
1.4.1 Non-cooperative allocation
Given the model’s description, the value of not co-operating to agent i where ev-
eryone consumes only their own production and savings (self-insurance), condi-


























i,t+1 ≤φt · θi,t + (1− δ) knci,t ∀t, xt (4)













here (and below) stands for the Lagrange multiplier on the rel-
evant budget or resource constraint. Furthermore, notice that each household
receives the previous period’s depreciated unsubsidized part of own irrigation
capital.
The associated optimality conditions with respect to c and k read:
c : ζnci,t = ui,ct (5)









































i,t+1 on xt (here
and in what follows); and (ii) Ejs [·], j ∈ {B, G} is an expectation operator under
the “bad” or “good” aggregate risk distribution.
First of all, each household consumes what is available to them from their own
crop output, net of investments made. Secondly, the irrigation investment is done
at the point where the cost in terms of consuming marginally less is equalized
to (i) expected value gain tomorrow weighted by the marginal increase in prob-
ability of good distribution realization, and (ii) the value of an additional unit of
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depreciated irrigation capital invested out of farmers’ pockets (in marginal utility
terms).
Moreover, since (i) the centrally owned part of the village’s irrigation can be
used by everyone (as opposed to each farmer having access to his private irriga-
tion only), and that (ii) conditional on ωt+1 farmers can choose their optimal level
of irrigation investment, we have that:
Corollary 1. In the non-cooperative benchmark, for any (sk, {ωt}t), an additional unit
of centrally-owned irrigation strictly improves expected utility of every villager.
Finally, any additional subsidies sk spent on the irrigation investments pur-
sued by villagers will also be clearly welfare improving in both the non-cooperative
and all the benchmarks to follow.
1.4.2 First best allocation
For this benchmark, consider a benevolent planner maximizing utilitarian social
welfare function (SWF) attaching equal Pareto weights to each household evalu-
ated at state xt =
(





















The ensuing efficient benchmark allocation where the planner is free to move





















kFBi,t ∀t, xt (8)








is characterized by the following first order conditions:
c : ζFBt = ui,ct ⇒
ui,ct
uj,ct
= 1 ∀i, j (9)






































First of all, comparing the consumption sharing rules (9) and (5) shows that
in the first best with equal Pareto weights, consumption smoothing of all farmer
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households will be improved and, in particular, households’ consumption will
fluctuate only in response to endogenous adjustments in irrigation investments
and aggregate fluctuations.11
Furthermore and importantly, the planner now internalizes all the positive ex-
ternalities associated with irrigational investments. In particular, the marginal
benefit in the first best irrigation capital investment rule (10) includes the impact
of marginal increase in irrigational investment not only on the investing house-
hold but also on all the other households in the village.
A second insight follows from the above: since the insurance of villagers against
idiosyncratic shocks is now improved, the investment distortions due to self-
insurance are removed (Arrow, 1971). In particular, decisions in the non-cooperative
benchmark were distorted by excessive risk, leading the self-insuring agents to
smooth their (current and expected) variations in the marginal utility of consump-
tion due to idiosyncratic shocks through inefficient adjustments in k.12 Given all
these observations and the fact that shocks are persistent, the expected continua-
tion value of each agent Ej`Vj,t+1 for both j ∈ {B, G} will also increase.
1.4.3 Co-operation over irrigation and risk sharing with limited commitment
The centralized version of allocation combining both institutions where house-
holds are free to walk away from the agreement at any instance is a solution to



















subject to the aggregate resource constraint equivalent of (8) and the following















≥ Vnci,t (x̃t) ∀i, xt (12)
where:















11This statement holds true if idiosyncratic shocks are independently distributed, as I shall as-
sume in the quantitative Section 1.6.
12Notice that the excessive idiosyncratic risk may push households to increase their invest-
ments for precautionary saving reasons, potentially in the direction of internalizing the true social
marginal benefits of investments. Nonetheless, this will in general not ensure socially efficient
internalization of externalities (both in the non-cooperative and other benchmarks that follow be-
low).
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2. following the methodology developed by Marcet and Marimon (2019), the

















3. the value of the outside option is given by the value of non-cooperating,
with the current state given by x̃t =
(
φt, θi,t, kIRSi,t , ωt
)
. As discussed in Sec-
tion 1.3, the latter means that after deviating on one’s risk sharing or invest-
ment promises, the deviator will be excluded from (i) the local insurance
market against idiosyncratic risk; and (ii) the benefits of investments made
by other households in current and all future periods (while maintaining
access to the centrally managed part of the irrigation system).
Consequently, this agreement can be characterized by the following set of opti-
mality conditions:















∀i 6= j (13)




























































First of all, notice the modified consumption sharing rule: consumption in pe-
riod t is determined by the Pareto weight at the beginning of the period adjusted
for a potentially binding limited commitment constraint after the aggregate and
idiosyncratic shocks are realized. This is done in such a way that in equilibrium no
agent defaults on the contract and so that the co-operation is sustainable in long-
term. Moreover, the extent of efficient risk sharing is pinned down by “how slack”
are the limited commitment constraints of all the agents. In particular, the amount
of resources the planner is able to transfer from agent i to others is an increasing
function of distance between the household i’s (inside) value of co-operation and
the (outside) value of deviating in the enforcement constraint (12).
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Similarly as in the first best, when deciding about irrigation investments, the
planner accounts for all the benefits accruing to other farmers, up to the endoge-
nous Pareto weights. However, as higher irrigation investments today increase
the probability of ending up in the “good” aggregate state tomorrow, the planner
needs to account for it by shading investments in case of binding enforcement
constraints today for household i.13 What is more, she also needs to take into
account the negative effects the increase in irrigation capital investment of house-
hold i has on their value of the outside option through improved self-insurance
(in the form of higher savings in the next period). More precisely, the planner
marginally shades this choice to account for all the possible next period’s states
in which these limited commitment constraints are binding.14 In general, these
investment distortions will be larger for states when the enforcement constraints
are “more binding”, i.e. when the associated Lagrange multipliers have higher
values.
Finally, notice that this allocation constitutes a constrained efficient benchmark
where the planner is subject to the deep friction of limited commitment.
1.4.4 Co-operation over risk sharing with limited commitment
In this benchmark, I assume that villagers co-operate only over mutual insur-
ance against idiosyncratic shocks and (for whatever reason) fail to establish co-
operation over irrigation. This failure means that households do share their irri-
gational infrastructure with each other but fail to internalize externalities on each




















subject to (i) the aggregate resource constraint as in (8); (ii) the set of limited com-
mitment constraints as in (12) with an inside value accordingly adjusted; and (iii)
a constraint that the planner does not internalize the household i’s externalities
on others. The following FOCs characterize this benchmark:15
13The planner does not need to account for the impact of i’s investments on others due to the
assumed exclusion from village-owned part of irrigation.
14This self-insurance effect is similar to the one present in Kehoe and Perri (2002) and Ligon et
al. (2002).
15Notice that this problem is an approximation of the full problem with moral hazard, i.e. with
the presence of incentive compatibility constraints for households’ investments. Solving such a
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Based on this, we have that:
Proposition 1. For any ({ωt}t , sk), extending the risk sharing co-operation by co-
operation over irrigational investments among villagers allows for a Pareto improve-
ment through lower consumption fluctuations due to internalization of investment ex-
ternalities and a possible increase in the extent of efficient risk sharing. Moreover, if
∀t, xt kRSt (xt) = kIRSt (xt), then extending the risk sharing co-operation by co-operation
over irrigation does increase the extent of efficient risk sharing.
Proof. The Pareto improvement follows from the fact that the constraint set of
the RS problem is a strict subset of the constraint set in the IRS, i.e. everything
achievable in the RS is achievable in the IRS, and more. Given this, the planner
can replicate, and improve upon, the RS economy.
The second part follows from the fact that if ∀t kRSt = kIRSt , then the outside
options between the RS and the IRS allocations coincide while the inside option
in the IRS is strictly higher than in the RS.
Intuitively, although internalizing externalities on others (due to extending
the risk sharing co-operation by the irrigational margin) implies higher invest-
ments and as such may increase the value of the outside option (due to better
problem with public investments is cumbersome and lies beyond the scope of this paper (see Mele
(2014) on how to solve such problems). As this approximation implies that the planner does not
internalize the impact of risk sharing transfers on the investment incentives, it constitutes a lower
bound on the true welfare attainable. Notice also that, as the “good” aggregate risk process first
order stochastically dominates the “bad” one, the first order approach (FOA) in the co-operation
over risk sharing with limited commitment and moral hazard would remain valid (see Rogerson,
1985).
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self-insurance), the planner manages to account for it (see (14) with µIRSi,t > 0). In
particular, she chooses investments in such a way that the net effect of reducing
aggregate risk at the possible cost of a reduction in risk sharing is positive, i.e.
that it leads to a Pareto improvement.
Building on the above observations and the fact that the centrally-provided in-
vestments are non-excludable driving the value of the outside option excessively
high (as compared to the village-provision), it immediately follows that:
Proposition 2. Assume that (i) the efficiency of village investments k is equal to that
of government investments ω, i.e. νk = νω; and (ii) the villagers’ investment deci-




















t) with a compensating increase of the village-investment sub-
sidy to s2k > s
1









= ω1t ∀t, allows for a Pareto improvement.













(ii) the compensating increase in village-investment subsidy implies that the pre-
reform value of autarky will exceed the post-reform one (i.e. Vnc,1 > Vnc,2). The
latter is warranted by (i) excludability of village-owned investments, and (ii) the
assumption that k does not respond to the reform, controlling for any potential
changes in self-insurance.
The assumption about equality of investment efficiencies is needed because if
νk was much higher than νω, the reform could in principle make the outside op-
tion excessively high, leading to worse risk sharing and so a potential destruction
of welfare. Nonetheless, this assumption is sufficient (and not necessary) as this
effect disappears when the size of village N is large enough (as then the weight on
















declines. Moreover, as was the case with the Proposition
1, the second assumption is important to control for endogenous changes in self-
insurance, which may affect the value of non-cooperating. Although difficult to
show theoretically, notice that this assumption may be innocuous as increases in
subsidies sk are likely to reduce private investments k. Nonetheless, in the quan-
titative section below I demonstrate that relaxing these two assumptions does not
alter the qualitative nature of the results.
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The Pareto improvement is possible due to the fact that lowering the size of
centrally provided irrigation releases resources that can be channeled into invest-
ments by villagers which have the advantage of being excludable and thus not
increasing the value of the outside option as much as the centrally owned ones. In
general, this may be reflected either in improved consumption insurance against
idiosyncratic shocks or a reduction in the latter compensated by an increase in the
level of consumption. In Section 1.5.4, I provide empirical evidence from three
Indian villages supporting these predictions, i.e. that (i) more village-provided
irrigation improves risk sharing, and (ii) higher government-ownership is associ-
ated with crowding out of risk sharing.
Finally, notice that a related and interesting question is whether it is possi-
ble to achieve a Pareto improvement with an uncompensated reduction in ω. This
may in principle be possible since the expected marginal utility of consumption
in the outside option (of being self-insured only but with access to a household’s
own and centrally-owned part of irrigation) is going to necessarily be higher than
within co-operation. Given this, a marginal reduction in ω may in fact reduce the
outside value by much more than the inside value, leading to a potential Pareto
improvement. I investigate this issue in the quantitative section below.
1.4.5 Co-operation over irrigation with limited commitment
For this benchmark, I assume that villagers co-operate over irrigational invest-
ments, but not over risk sharing. In this case, the centralized version of the agree-



















subject to (i) the set of budget constraints as in (4); and (ii) the set of limited com-
mitment constraints as in (12) with an inside value adjusted accordingly.
In this case, the allocation can be characterized by the following optimality
conditions:
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∀i 6= j (17)




























































Notice that in this case, although she cannot do so directly, the planner with
a utilitarian SWF still wants to insure households against idiosyncratic shocks.
Thus, she will do so through inefficient assignment of investments. In particular, a
household that is subject to a low idiosyncratic shock will be indirectly insured by
reducing their irrigation investments, which will be partly balanced by increased
investments on the side of households enjoying high productivity. This will lead
to: (i) an increase in the consumption of low productivity households; and (ii)
maintenance of their continuation value at a relatively high level due to higher in-
vestments made by others who are currently better-off. This inefficient insurance
mechanism suggests that in the presence of limited commitment constraints, risk
sharing facilitates voluntary co-operation over irrigation: it provides resources
to “critical” households with low productivity that would otherwise find them-
selves on the verge of defaulting, allowing them to increase their consumption by
undercutting their investments to socially suboptimal levels. Formally:
Proposition 3. For any ({ωt}t , sk), extending the co-operation over irrigational in-
vestments by risk sharing allows for a Pareto improvement through lower overall con-
sumption fluctuations and an increase in the extent of efficient risk sharing. This is
achieved through (i) removing investment distortions due to self-insurance; and (ii) if
∀t, xt kIt (xt) = kIRSt (xt), through relaxing limited commitment constraints.
Proof. Pareto improvement follows due to the fact that the constraint set of the
co-operation over irrigation is a strict subset of the constraint set in IRS, i.e. ev-
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erything achievable in co-operation over irrigation is also achievable in IRS, and
more. Increase in the extent of risk sharing follows trivially by construction.
Then, comparing FOCs (18) and (14) shows that risk sharing removes distor-
tions to investment decisions due to self-insurance. Secondly, if ∀t, xt kIt (xt) =
kIRSt (xt), the value of the outside option V
nc
i,t is the same for both the irrigation and
joint co-operation, whereas the value of the inside option associated with joint co-
operation V IRSi,t strictly exceeds that associated with irrigation co-operation only
V Ii,t. This means that ∀t, xt the limited commitment constraints are more slack in
the joint co-operation. The latter in conjunction with the fact that risk sharing
co-operation introduces state-contingent assets imply better risk sharing.
1.5 Empirical evidence
The purpose of this section is to provide empirical evidence supporting the causal
mechanism at the heart of this paper. Moreover, this evidence will be used later
in Section 1.6 to calibrate the quantitative model used for optimal policy analysis.
1.5.1 Data description
For what follows, I use two waves of the ICRISAT’s Village Level Studies (VLS)
panel data set on households living in rural South India. Following the literature,
I focus analysis on 3 villages: Aurepalle, Shirapur and Kanzara. The first wave
contains monthly records starting from July 1975 until the end of 1984,16 and the
second wave is a yearly panel covering the years 2001-2004.17 Each village sample
was divided into 4 groups of 10 households each representing families in four
classes: laborers, small-, medium- and large-farmers.
The VLS records data on production, labor supply, assets, price of goods, rain-
fall, monetary and non-monetary transaction, household size, age and education.
Townsend (1994) gives a detailed description of the data. Thus, here I discuss only
the issues specific to this paper.
First of all, I aggregate the monthly data in the first wave to yearly so that
the two waves constitute comparable data sets and use years 1976-1984.18 I drop
16The first wave of the ICRISAT’s dataset is one of the most commonly used datasets in the
macro-development literature, see e.g. Townsend (1994), Ligon et al. (2002), Mazzocco and Saini
(2012), Laczo (2015) or Abraham and Laczo (2018).
17Morten (2018) also uses the 2001-2004 wave of the dataset to study joint determination of risk
sharing and migration.
18Strictly speaking, the data in the first wave of ICRISAT is collected approximately every
month. This is approximate since the frequency of the interviews varies and the dates of the
25
laborer households and, in case of the first wave, households with fewer than 80
data points. Moreover, I exclude outliers by trimming the data at the top and
bottom percentiles. This implies that I am left with 86 and 180 households in the
first and second waves respectively.
The household income data in the first wave is constructed as a sum of farm
and non-farm income, profits from agriculture, livestock, capital and interest in-
come (net of remittances). In the second wave, this variable is recorded directly by
ICRISAT and is a sum of similar accounts: income from farm and non-farm work,
profits from agriculture, migration, caste occupations, livestock, capital and inter-
est income (net of remittances).
For the analysis of consumption smoothing, apart from data on household
income, I need further data on consumption expenditures and household demo-
graphics. The non-durable consumption in both waves is equal to the sum of
expenditures on milled grain, oil, animal products, fruits and vegetables, and
on other non-durable goods such as electricity, water charges, cooking fuels for
household use, and expenses for domestic work. In order to control for the house-
hold’s age and size composition, the consumption and income variables are trans-
formed into per-capita using the age-gender weight as in Townsend (1994).19 Fi-
nally, both the income and consumption variables are deflated to the 1975 price
level using the consumer price index for agricultural laborers published by the
Labour Bureau of India. Table 1 reports summary statistics of the main variables.
Providing empirical support for the mechanism of irrigation crowding-in or
crowding-out risk sharing requires data on weather, the implied aggregate (post-
irrigation) risk, the size of irrigation available in each village and its ownership
/ management structure. Since the second wave of the ICRISAT panel does not
contain rainfall data, I use the rainfall records in each province available through
the Indian government’s OGD platform.20 As far as aggregate risk is concerned,
as already mentioned, I will control for it in regressions with village-time fixed
effects, and otherwise (in a non-regression based analysis) I will proxy it with
variance of mean village income. The data on actually irrigated and irrigable land
interviews differ across households. In order to overcome this problem, I follow Mazzocco and
Saini (2012) and for each interview that covers two months I compute the percentage of days that
belongs to each month. Then, I assign the corresponding data point to each month using this
percentage.
19In particular, it is computed by adding the following numbers: for adult males, 1.0; for adult
females, 0.9; for males aged 13-18, 0.94; for females aged 13-18, 0.83; for children aged 7-12, 0.67;
for children aged 4-6, 0.52; for Toddlers 1-3, 0.32; and for infants 0.05.
20This data is available under https://www.data.gov.in
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1976-1984 2001-2004
Variable Average Std. Dev. Average Std. Dev.
Household size 7.99 3.43 4.82 2.03
log Cons. (real, per cap.) 6.94 0.951 7.06 0.472
log Income (real, per cap.) 7.17 0.838 7.54 0.706
Age-gender weight 6.57 2.85 4.27 1.61
Number of HHs 86 - 180 -
Observations 734 - 690 -
% of small farm HHs 34% - 47% -
% of medium farm HHs 32% - 37% -
% of large farm HHs 34% - 16% -
Table 1: Data summary statistics
comes from the ICRISAT panel. Unfortunately it does not record the associated
management structures. To address this issue, I use the 1st, 3rd and 4th Minor
Irrigation Censuses conducted in 1986-1987, 2000-2001 and 2006-2007.21 This cen-
sus contains district-level data on the number, ownership-management structure
and the irrigated- and irrigable-area of irrigation units such as dugwells, tanks,
deep and shallow tubewells, check dams or diversion channels. Given this data
limitation, the analysis below effectively assumes that the three villages analyzed
are representative in each district to which they belong.
1.5.2 Aggregate risk and irrigation in ICRISAT villages
Weather risk
I start by documenting that the weather risk in all three villages has increased over
time. In particular, Table 2 shows that between the two waves: (i) the quantity of
annual rainfall has decreased; and (ii) it has become more erratic (with the excep-
tion of Aurepalle where the standardized variance has decreased somewhat). For
robustness reasons, I also include a longer time frame covering 9 years (as in the
first wave) between 1996 and 2004 which confirms these results.
As a cross-check, I make use of the survey component of the second wave of
the ICRISAT data where in 2001 households were asked about their perceptions of
changes in rainfall characteristics between the end of the first and the beginning
of the second wave. In line with results in Table 2, virtually all the households in
three villages answered that: (i) the quantity of rainfall and the number of rainy








Aurepalle 1020.80 0.250 829.45 0.166 910.60 0.153
Kanzara 911.47 0.104 831.87 0.160 896.88 0.163
Shirapur 773.26 0.235 619.22 0.347 714.63 0.237
Table 2: Rainfall in ICRISAT villages
Note: Rainfall in Aurepalle is measured as rainfall in district Telangana, Kanzara - Madhya
Maharashtra and Shirapur - Matathwada. Mean and standard deviation of rainfall are
computed for the annual rainfall in each district for specified periods.
days have decreased; (ii) the distribution of rainfall has become highly erratic; and
(iii) monsoons tend to arrive later than usual.22
Irrigation development and exposure to weather risk
The overall access of irrigation systems in all three villages analyzed has on av-
erage increased between the 1970/80s and 2000s. This can be seen in Figure 2,
presenting the data from the two waves on households’ (i) actually irrigated land;
and (ii) irrigable land (defined as area that would be irrigated in normal times).23
While the use of irrigation has increased over the two waves, these changes have
been characterized by significant variations in both waves. Obviously, this dy-
namic may reflect changes in both the demand (e.g. due to changes in weather
conditions) or supply (e.g. due to breakdowns of some of the infrastructure, col-
lapsing wells etc.). While identification of the sources of these variations is not at
the center of this paper, these will be used below to provide evidence on interac-
tion between irrigation and risk sharing.
Columns 1-3 of Table 3 summarize Figure 2 and show that between the two
waves the share of irrigated land has increased in all three villages, with a much
higher relative growth in Kanzara and Shirapur. At the same time, columns 4 and
5 of Table 3 show that the variance of mean village income has decreased by 66%-
22Subjective reasons given by households for these changes were: changes in nature/monsoon
patterns, deforestation and pollution.
23Importantly, while the data on irrigated land is recorded in both waves for every year, the
data on irrigable land is available only for the years 2001-2004 and 1985 (the end of the first wave).
In order to address the missing data problem in the case of irrigable land, I impute the data in
the first wave by fitting in a linear long-run trend of irrigable land growth rate between 1985 and

































































































































































































































































A. 13.9% 19.8% 42% 0.067 0.013 -80.5%
K. 10.8% 37.9% 250% 0.069 0.023 -66.6%
S. 8.7% 46.6% 435% 0.054 0.018 -66.6%
Table 3: Irrigable land and “post-irrigation” aggregate risk in two waves
Note: A./K./S. stand for Aurepalle/Kanzara/Shirapur. Variable irr is defined
as an average of mean irrigable and irrigated land in each wave, i.e. irri =
1
2
( ¯irrigablei + ¯irrigatedi) , i ∈ {W1, W2}; vary denotes variance of log mean village in-
come in corresponding waves; girr and gvar stand for the growth rates of irrigable land
and variance of log mean village income.
80%, depending on the village.2425 Given the high magnitude of these numbers, a
natural follow-up question is how much of this change is due to improvements in
irrigation.26 Arguably, the second most important factor (after irrigation) reduc-
ing aggregate risk faced by villagers are potential changes in crop trade prices.
Furthermore, Evenson and Gollin (2003) call the 1960-2000 period a “Green
Revolution”, characterized by large increases in both the levels and stability of
crop yields worldwide. Apart from irrigation, they list advancements in the fol-
lowing factors that have contributed to these developments: use of fertilizers or
pesticides, mechanization and modern crop varieties. While most of these factors
affect farmers’ idiosyncratic risk or the level of their crop yields,27 they may still
have an effect on the computed measure of aggregate risk.
Thus, I will use the quantitative model in Section 1.6 below to measure how
24Notice that the number of households in the second wave of the panel significantly exceeds
its counterpart in the first wave. In order to avoid biasing the computations of this variance by
differences in sample sizes, I divide the second wave of the sample in each village randomly into
a number of subgroups that are a multiple of the first wave sample sizes. Then, I compute mean
variance income of each of these subgroups in each village and compute the total village variance
as a weighted (by subgroup measures) average variance. I repeat this procedure 1000 times and
compute the final variance as a mean over these simulations.
25See also Kukal and Irmak (2018) for evidence on the mechanism studied in case of the Great
Plains in the US. In line with results above, they show that irrigated fields, apart from having sig-
nificantly higher yields, were characterized by a significantly lower yield variability as compared
to similar fields without irrigation.
26Notice that reverse causality (i.e. that e.g. lower aggregate risk causes higher irrigation invest-
ments) is arguably not confounding the interpretation of results in this case.
27By destroying insects affecting particular crops, pesticides mostly reduce the level of idiosyn-
cratic risk affecting farmers having different crops (Carlson, 1989; Villano and Fleming, 2006). On
the other hand, fertilizers increase fertility of land, and so their main role is to increase the yield.
Similarly, mechanization mostly increases work efficiency and so the yield. Lastly, increased use
of modern high yielding varieties (the adoption of which has mostly been possible in places with
reliable rainfall or irrigation (Evenson and Gollin, 2003)) is associated with both increases in yield
and reductions in variability.
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much of the documented reduction in variance is due to the increased usage of
irrigation.
Access to irrigation within villages
One of the main assumptions of the model is that, upon agreeing to co-operate on
irrigation, all the households share the benefits of irrigation equally. While farm-
ers may obviously install irrigation units that are completely private in nature
(e.g. private wells on own land), it is usually much more economically sensible to
invest in common large water tanks, canals, shared water pumps etc. This is seen
particularly often in dry and semi-arid regions of south India (the regions of the
three ICRISAT villages studied in this paper), where the motives for co-operation
are particularly strong and so the local communities organize informal bodies
aimed at co-ordinating the village-wide irrigation strategies (see e.g. Wade, 1988
and Bardhan, 2000).
In reality, however, it need not be the case that households share access to ir-
rigation equally, even if it is largely a public good. This can occur for a variety
of reasons, the most basic being due to differences in demand for irrigation stem-
ming from differential crop choices and associated crop farming requirements.
Alternatively, if using irrigation is associated with additional water charges, it
may be the case that only the wealthier households with larger landholdings can
afford irrigation. To this end, the first row in Figure 3 ranks households in each
village according to their total owned land between 1976-1984 and shows that ac-
cess to irrigation has to a large extent been shared by everyone in all three villages.
However, Indian rural areas are characterized by strong organization along
caste lines. For instance, individuals from a given caste are usually not allowed
to get married to a person from another caste. Moreover, the consequences of
caste systems also extend to the economic and political functioning of the rele-
vant areas. For instance, Munshi and Rosenzweig (2016) show that informal risk
insurance networks organized along caste lines28 have significant implications for
rural households’ migration decisions and associated (mis)allocation of labor.29
28The argument that the relevant risk-sharing unit in Aurepalle, Kanzara and Shirapur is the
caste (and not village) is made by Mazzocco and Saini (2012). However, a comment by Shrinivas
and Fafchamps (2018) somewhat weakens the case for it.
29Furthermore, Munshi and Rosenzweig (2013) argue that caste networks enable local commu-
nities to elect the most competent representatives, overcoming political commitment problems.
In terms of career choices, Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) show that males from some castes (as
compared with females) are much more likely to attend traditional, local language schools leading
to traditional occupations (which have been becoming less profitable in recent decades).
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More relatedly however, Anderson (2011) studies markets for water irrigation
in northern Indian villages and finds evidence for discrimination of lower-castes
in access to irrigation in villages dominated by upper-castes. Although the focus
of this paper is on villages in the south of India, this discrimination may well also
be present in the case of Aurepalle, Kanzara and Shirapur. To this end, the second
and third rows in Figure 3 break down the same shares as above along two dif-
ferent measures of caste ranks in each village.30 Consistent across these two mea-
sures of caste rank and with the work of Anderson (2011), I find some evidence
consistent with discrimination in access to irrigation for lower caste households.
As this observation may have important implications for any policy recommen-
dations below, I return to it in the conclusion.
1.5.3 Imperfect insurance
Next I turn to study the patterns of insurance against idiosyncratic shocks in the
ICRISAT villages. First, I perform a standard test of consumption smoothing doc-
umenting that risk sharing in the villages is incomplete. Secondly, I delve deeper
into the nature of idiosyncratic risks affecting villagers by studying their persis-
tence and volatility.
Consumption smoothing test
Along the lines of literature following Townsend (1994), I test the null hypothesis
of perfect consumption smoothing by running the following regression:
log (consi,t) = α + βlog (inci,t) + β̃i + γv,t + εi,t (19)
where cons is per capita expenditure of households on non-durable consump-
tion (excluding savings), inc is their income net of remittances, β̃i is a household
fixed effect, γvt is a village-year fixed effect that captures the total resources avail-
able to the village at time t (i.e. it controls for aggregate fluctuations in the village)
and errors εivt are clustered at the village-year level.31
30Note that these graphs do not capture differences in land size across castes. Moreover,
datapoints-households with no irrigated land are marked as 1% irrigated share datapoints; and
the 0% points imply that there is no household in the data with a given landholding size.
31Unfortunately, due to the smaller sample size, I am not able to run (19) with household fixed
effects in the second wave. To address this issue, I instead include demographic controls of house-
hold and landholding size. Nonetheless, the estimates from a pooled sample are obviously with
household fixed effects.
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Note: Total size of land owned is a sum of owned land between 1976-1984.
Datapoints-households with no irrigated land are marked as 1% irrigated share
datapoints; and the 0% points imply that there is no household in the data with a given
landholding size. Caste ranks come from the ICRISAT dataset. The caste rank by V. S.
Doherty is based on the social, religious, and economic standing of a caste in the village.
The caste rank by J. G. Ryan is based on an inspection of descriptive data on occupation
and socioeconomic condition of individual castes.
Figure 3: Access to irrigation in the ICRISAT villages (wave 1) according to house-
holds’ landholdings and caste
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Dep var: cons. expenditures 1976-1984 2001-2004 Pooled
Income in all villages 0.258*** 0.280*** 0.292***(0.052) (0.40) (0.035)
Income in Aurepalle 0.223** 0.250** 0.326***(0.090) (0.065) (0.063)
Income in Kanzara 0.340*** 0.246** 0.194***(0.083) (0.051) (0.072)
Income in Shirapur 0.257*** 0.303** 0.318***(0.065) 0.0698 (0.053)
Village-time FE Yes Yes Yes
Household FE Yes No Yes
R2 (3 villages) 0.7532 0.3651 0.7313
Number of obs. (3 villages) 734 690 1395
Table 4: Consumption smoothing in ICRISAT villages in two waves
Note: Table presents coefficient β from running regression log (consi,t) = α +
βlog (inci,t) + β̃i + γv,t + εi,t for the first wave and pooled sample; and log (consi,t) =
α + βlog (inci,t) + β̃Xi,t + γv,t + εi,t for the second wave. Standard errors provided in
brackets. Errors are clustered at the village-year level. The difference in sample size be-
tween individual waves and the pooled dataset is due to trimming (at the top and bottom
percentiles) the data after matching of the two (untrimmed) waves is done.
Table 4 presents the results of running regression (19) for all 3 villages, both
separating and pooling the two waves of ICRISAT panel dataset.32 We see that
while in both waves the test rejects perfect insurance, the shocks to income are
relatively well insured with the best insurance against idiosyncratic shocks in Au-
repalle (in the first wave) and in Kanzara (in the second wave). In line with the
informal insurance mechanism studied in this paper, Mazzocco and Saini (2012)
document that the real per-capita transfers given and received by households in
the first wave amount on average to 28.3% and 21.1% of non-durable expenditures
in Aurepalle; 8.9% and 15.9% in Kanzara; and 16% and 21% in Shirapur.
1.5.4 Interaction between risk sharing and irrigation provision
One part of the theory developed above suggests that, due to differential impact
on the outside option, government interventions aimed at providing irrigation
infrastructure in village economies lead to excessive crowding out of local risk
32Notice that the obtained elasticities may differ from results obtained in other papers using
ICRISAT data due to a different specification of the econometric test ((19) is similar to the one
used by Morten, 2018; see Townsend, 1994, Mazzoco and Saini, 2012 or Abraham and Laczo, 2018
for other specifications) or focusing the analysis on households with positive land holdings.
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Village (district) metric Gov. share ’86/’87 Gov. share ’00/’01 Gov. share ’06/’07
Aurepalle (Mahbubnagar) irrigable 31.28% 8.9% 6.93%irrigated 39.39% 6.86% 3.90%
Kanzara (Akola) irrigable 39.93% 20.6% 0.07%irrigated 34.89% 20.82% 0.07%
Shirapur (Solapur) irrigable 3.48% 0.40% 2.88%irrigated 2.98% 0.80% 2.87%
Table 5: Government share in ownership of irrigation units
Note: Table presents the shares of government ownership in irrigation structures in the
districts of Mahbubnagar, Akola and Solapur in the first (1986-1987), third (2000-2001)
and fourth (2006-2007) Minor Irrigation Censuses. The irrigable metric is defined as Cul-
turable Command Area (“The area which can be irrigated from a scheme and is fit for
cultivation.”); and the irrigated metric is defined as Irrigation Potential Utilised (“The
gross area actually irrigated during reference year out of the gross proposed area to be
irrigated by the scheme during the year.”) - see http://micensus.gov.in for more details.
sharing as compared with provision by villagers (Proposition 2). In what follows,
using two only indirectly dependent measures of irrigation infrastructure size in
the ICRISAT villages, I provide evidence for this mechanism. In particular, I show
that (i) irrigation improves risk sharing, conditional on the share of irrigation in-
frastructure being governed by central authorities; and that (ii) an increase in the
share of irrigation infrastructure owned by government is associated with a re-
duction in risk sharing.33
For the proxy of irrigation infrastructure installed in the villages, I use the
above discussed ICRISAT data presented in Figure 2. Moreover, and as mentioned
previously, I use the Minor Irrigation Census to establish the share of infrastruc-
ture units owned and administered by central authorities. To this end, I construct
the following variable measuring it:
gov = ∑
i




where (i) the sums are over indices i, j indicating the type of the infrastructure
unit (such as dugwell, tank, deep or shallow tubewell, check dam or diversion
channel); (ii) share o f gov. owned units is defined as No. o f gov.−owned unitsNo. o f gov.−owned+priv.−owned units
for a given unit type i; and (iii) irrigation area is either the irrigable or actually ir-
rigated area covered by the given irrigation unit type i.
The data is presented in Table 5, where we observe that the districts of Au-
33See the later part of this subsection for discussion of empirical literature documenting mech-
anisms similar to this and the other element of the theory suggesting that risk sharing improves
co-operation over irrigation.
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repalle and Kanzara have experienced significant privatization of irrigation in-
frastructure from 31-40% of government ownership in 1980s down to 0-7% in late
2000s. On the other hand, in Shirapur these rates have always been low, at levels
between 1-3%. In order to exploit this variation and investigate its interaction with
risk sharing, I combine this data with pooled two waves of the ICRISAT panel34
and run the following regressions:
log (consi,t) = α + β1log (inci,t) + β2log (inci,t) · irrv,t (21)
+ β3log (inci,t) · irrv,t · govv,w + β4log (inci,t) · govv,w
+ β5irrv,t · govv,w + β6irrv,t + β7govv,w + β̃i + γv,t + εi,t
where govv,w is the measure of government ownership share (20) in village v
during wave w (1 or 2), β̃i is the household fixed effect, γv,t is the village-time
fixed affect and irrv,t stands for the share of irrigated or irrigable land in village v
at time t.
Table 6 with regression results supports the theory outlined above by docu-
menting that (i) an increase in the share of land with access to irrigation is asso-
ciated with a significant improvement in risk sharing; and that (ii) conditional on
the share of land with access to irrigation, an increase in the government owner-
ship of the irrigation units is associated with a significant reduction in risk shar-
ing. These conclusions are consistent for both measures of irrigation (irrigated and
irrigable land) with the exception of comparing irrigated land across the 1st and
3rd censuses, where the coefficient on the income-irrigation-government share in-
teraction maintains the right sign but is statistically insignificant.
While the evidence presented here should obviously not be interpreted as
causal, it is indicative of a significant empirical interaction between the two insti-
tutions along the lines of the theory outlined above. Nonetheless, the correlational
results suggest that for all three villages pooled, a one standard deviation increase
in total irrigation (equal to approx. 75% of its mean) while holding the absolute
government-ownership constant (reflecting an increase in the village-owned ir-
rigation) is associated with crowding-in of risk sharing equivalent to an average
reduction in the elasticity of consumption of 13.6%.35 Similarly, holding total irri-
34When pooling the two waves, I match the households that have not split over the 16 years gap
between the two waves. Households that have split over time are treated as independent from the
first wave.
35Notice that the ICRISAT data does not break down the irrigation data according to ownership
structure. Thus, in order to measure the benefit to risk sharing from increasing village-owned
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Dep var: cons. expend. (irrigated 1+3) (irrigable 1+3) (irrigated 1+4) (irrigable 1+4)
income 0.393*** 0.412*** 0.407*** 0.413***(0.089) (0.065) (0.087) (0.067)
income·irrigation -0.406* -0.507*** -0.548** -0.690***(0.229) (0.106) (0.213) (0.161)
income·irrig.·gov share 0.465 4.300* 5.321** 9.633***(1.367) (3.471) (2.584) (3.378)
income·gov share -0.089 -0.752* -0.536 -1.349***(0.326) (0.394) (0.370) (0.469)
Village-time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.7335 0.7353 0.7359 0.7372
Number of observations 1395 1395 1395 1395
Table 6: Empirical interaction of risk sharing with irrigation and its ownership
structure
Note: Table presents the coefficients β1, β2, β3 and β4 of running regression (21) for both
waves of the panel pooled, with irrv,t standing for the share of irrigated or irrigable
land in village v at time t; regressions (1+3) are on the government share data
from the 1st (1986-1987) and 3rd (2000-2001) censuses; and (1+4) on the 1st and
4th (2006-2007) censuses. Errors are clustered at the village-year level.
gation fixed at its mean level, a one standard deviation increase in the government
share (equal to approx. 100% of its mean) is associated with crowding-out of risk
sharing equivalent to an average increase in the elasticity of consumption of ap-
prox. 37%.36
Existing evidence in the literature cited above provides further support for
the modeling assumption of local irrigation ownership and management allow-
ing for stronger punishments helping to elicit better co-operation, as opposed to
irrigation, I linearly extrapolate what would be the government-ownership rate upon a corre-
sponding increase in village-owned irrigation. Furthermore, this decrease in elasticity amounts
to 17.4%, 14.9%, 12.8% and 9.2% for the 1st and 3rd census with irrigated land, the 1st and 3rd
census with irrigable land, the 1st and 4th census with irrigated land and the 1st and 4th census
with irrigable land, respectively. For instance, in the case of “irrigated 1+3” regression, I compute
this change as ∆ε = 0.393−0.406·irr2+0.465·gov2·irr2−0.0891·gov20.393−0.406·irr+0.465·gov·irr−0.0891·gov − 1, where irr = 17.65%, irr2 = 33.1%,
gov = 17.43% and gov2 = 9.23% (representing the means of respective variables in the first and
second wave of the dataset, see Figure 2 and Table 5).
36More precisely, this increase in elasticity amounts to 84.5%, 17.9% and 45.4% for the 1st and
3rd census with irrigable land, the 1st and 4th census with irrigated land and the 1st and 4th
census with irrigable land, respectively. Note that these results are very large partly due to huge
variation in government ownership data resulting in 1 standard deviation of govt ranging between
86% and 110% of its mean. Unsurprisingly, given the statistically insignificant coefficient on the
double-interaction term “irrigated 1+3” regression, there is no change in elasticity for the 1st and
3rd census with irrigated land.
37
centralized provision and management. In particular, Wade (1988) conducts a
study of 31 irrigated villages in Andhra Pradesh (the state of Aurepalle) between
the 1970s and 80s. Among other findings, he points out that in many villages
access to irrigation water has been regulated partly by the local community and
partly by the state Irrigation Department (Wade, 1988, p.7, 72). More importantly
however, Wade (1988, p. 14, 73) finds that the latter has largely been unable to
efficiently regulate this access vis a vis the local community (which succeeded
in eliciting much better co-operation through social ostracism or imposing local
norms).
Similar conclusions are found in a different set of South Indian villages by
Bardhan (2000, p. 849, 852). He studies 48 irrigated villages and notes that in the
1990s on average around half of irrigation units were funded and administered by
the central government’s Public Works Department, and the other half by the local
community. Furthermore, he documents higher degrees of social co-operation in
cases where communities have more autonomy in self-regulating the distribution
of water as opposed to ones where this is mostly handled by the Public Works
Department.37
Finally, recall that the theory also suggests that risk sharing facilitates and in-
creases efficiency of co-operation over irrigational investments. While provid-
ing evidence for this using the ICRISAT data is much harder, several papers in
the literature find that reductions in associated risk stimulate agricultural invest-
ments. For instance, Cole, Gine and Vickery (2014), Mobarak and Rosenzweig
(2012) and Karlan, Osei, Osei-Akoto and Udry (2014) conduct experiments in In-
dia and Ghana showing that access to formal insurance products induces farmers
to shift production towards higher-return but higher risk cash crops. Similarly,
Cai, Chen, Fang and Zhou (2015) document that the promotion of formal financial
products providing insurance against the risk of infection-related deaths of sows
increases production. Lastly, Emerick, de Janvry, Sadoulet and Dar (2016) show
that the adoption of modern flood tolerant rice varieties in rural India increases in-
vestments and co-operation through more labor-intensive planting, employment
of larger farming areas and increased usage of fertilizers and credit.




Given empirical evidence consistent with the theory presented, I proceed to esti-
mate the structural parameters of the model. The main purpose of this exercise
is: (i) to externally validate the model; (ii) to provide independent support for
the interaction between risk sharing and investments in public irrigation systems,
predicted by the theory; (iii) to measure the extent to which irrigation develop-
ment can account for the reduction in aggregate risk documented in Table 3; and
(iv) to conduct a number of counterfactual experiments. The latter aim to measure
the size of reinforcing effects between risk sharing and public irrigation systems
and economic losses due to centralized ownership of irrigation.
In what follows, I employ the approximation method commonly used in the
literature, reducing the computational complexity of solving for optimal decisions
of N-households to solving for decisions of one household with the other repre-
senting the rest of the village. See Appendix A for details on the numerical algo-
rithm and recursive formulation of FOCs used for solving the model.
1.6.1 Calibration
Estimating the structural parameters of the model involves choosing parameters
such that moments generated by the model in equilibrium capture the variations
captured in the first wave of the ICRISAT panel data. This task is non-trivial as
the income process, risk sharing and investment decisions are all endogenous and
depend on actions of every other household in the village. Identification is based
mostly on (i) the crowding-in effects due to interaction between risk sharing and
irrigation provision documented in Section 1.5; and (ii) evidence in Morten (2018)
concerning the impact of negative rainfall shocks on household income in the
ICRISAT villages (see Figure 8 in Appendix C).
Since the calibration is performed on the first wave of the dataset, I set the pop-
ulation size equal to the one of the empirical samples, i.e. to N = 29 in Aurepalle,
N = 30 in Kanzara and N = 27 in Shirapur.38 Moreover, this approach implies
that the assumed period length equals one year.
In what follows, I describe the simulated method of moments approach which
aims to capture the empirically documented variations. Notice that since the equi-
librium of the dynamic model is complex, in some cases one parameter may affect
38This follows the practice common in the literature on rural risk-sharing applying similar ap-
proximations, see e.g. by Ligon et al. (2002), Laczo (2015) and Bold and Broer (2018).
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many targeted moments.
Preferences and investment technology
Utility function and discounting. I assume that agents value consumption according
to the log-utility function, i.e. u (c) = log (c). The time preference parameter β
will be used to target elasticity of consumption w.r.t. income documented in Table
4.
Depreciation. I pin down the depreciation parameter δ using the Indian Min-
istry of Statistics data on national accounts on input and output of crop sector in
the country for the years 2011-2017. Based on these, I assume that the depreciation
rate in all three villages is 4.5%.
Irrigation and government. First of all, in order to save on the number of state
variables, I assume that government-provided irrigation is constant over time,
i.e. ωt = ω ∀t. I choose ω such that the average share of irrigation infrastruc-






in the simulated economy
matches the evidence of ĜS ∈ {35.33%, 37.41%, 3.23%} reported in Table 5.
As mentioned above, since smallholder farmers in rural areas of developing
countries usually face no taxation, I assume that the government-owned irriga-
tion is subsidized at the rate of 100% (implying that τt (xt) = 0 ∀t, xt). Further-
more, I pin down the subsidy parameter for village-owned irrigation sk using data
from the Minor Irrigation Census. Based on this, I assume that the village-owned
infrastructure investments in Aurepalle, Kanzara and Shirapur are co-financed at
the rates of 58.12%, 10.40% and 5.44%. See Appendix B for details on estimating
this subsidy rate.
Stochastic processes
Both the idiosyncratic and the aggregate risk processes are estimated using in-
direct inference and are modeled as symmetric two-state Markov processes with
shock levels
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Aggregate risk. First, for the impact of investments on the probability of the
39For T large enough and νk, νω standing for effective return rates to an extra unit of investing
in village- or centrally-owned irrigation.
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with νk, νω being scaling/investment efficiency parameters. The latter two param-
eters affect both the size of crowding-in/out effects and, by affecting the measure
of mass attached to the good and bad distributions, the equilibrium distribution
of aggregate shocks. Thus, I first choose νk to match the observation that a 75%
increase in irrigation owned by villagers (holding the government part constant),
generates a reduction in elasticity of consumption of 13.6% (in line with the mech-
anism discussed in Proposition 2 and the empirical evidence in Section 1.5.4). In
order to engineer these changes in irrigation capital, I re-solve the model for a new
equilibrium with new consumption insurance transfers (respecting the new lim-
ited commitment constraints) using the same parameters but a modified probabil-














where (1 + g) is used to generate a variation of increasing village-owned irriga-
tion while keeping the government-owned part constant (the variation described
in Section 1.5.4).40
Then, I normalize the average level of good aggregate shock to 1, i.e. I as-
sume that φGH + φ
G
L = 2. Furthermore, I assume that irrigation reduces only the














sistence parameter ρφ and the private investment efficiency parameter νk using
empirical evidence in Morten (2018, see Figure 8 in Appendix C). She combines
the first wave of the ICRISAT panel with the University of Delaware precipitation
database and shows that a bottom 10%/20%/50% negative rainfall shock occurs
in 14%/28%/49% of periods and reduces household’s log income by 0.923 / 0.231
40In particular, I generate this variation of increasing the total size of irrigation by 75% (1 stan-
dard deviation in the data) while holding absolute government ownership constant (reflecting an























k j,t + ω
)
(22)
with kt being the vector of simulated (baseline) optimal capital investment decisions and T being
large enough. Interpreted literally, the changes through 1 + g can be thought of as changes in
private investment subsidies. Interpreted more broadly, they can be thought of as a proxy for






s̄d (ei,t) 0.413 0.325 0.555
Table 7: Persistence and volatility of idiosyncratic risk in ICRISAT villages (1976-
1984)
Note: s̄d (ei,t) stands for mean standard deviation of idiosyncratic risk ei,t taken over all
the village households. Errors are clustered at the village-year level.
/ 0.104.41 Based on this, I first choose the value of parameters ρφ and νk so that
in simulations the long-run probability of the φGL , φ
B
L shocks’ occurrence is 28%






so that the coefficients
from running regression log (inci,t) = α+ β1 · 1φBL + β2 · 1φGL + εi,t on the simulated
data replicate the empirical evidence of the bad low shock reducing log income
by 0.577 (mean over the 10% and 20% bottom shocks in Figure 8) and the good
low shock reducing income by 0.104 (i.e. that β1 = −0.577 and β1 = −0.104).
Idiosyncratic risk. I estimate parameters of the idiosyncratic risk process fol-
lowing the methodology proposed by Storesletten et al. (2004). In particular, I use
the following decomposition of household i’s real per-capita earnings in the first
wave of the data:
log (inci,t) = α0 + β̃i + γv,t + ε̃i,t (23)
where β̃i is a household fixed effect and γvt stands for village-time fixed effects
capturing the aggregate risk. Consequently, ε̃i,t is an indirect measure of house-
holds’ idiosyncratic risk. In order to allow for some persistence of shocks, I model
the idiosyncratic risk component as an AR(1) process:
ε̃i,t = Πθ ε̃i,t−1 + ei,t (24)
I compute volatility of idiosyncratic risk s̄d (ei,t) as a mean of idiosyncratic
risk’s standard deviation taken over all the village households. Table 7 shows the
results of this estimation.
Secondly, I assume that (i) the idiosyncratic shock levels add up to 1 (i.e.
41Morten (2018) defines the negative aggregate shock as a rainfall event falling below the 20th
percentile of the 1900-2008 rainfall distribution. The probability of shock occurrence differs from
the estimated long-run density since the regression is done on a subperiod of the first wave of the
panel (1975-1984).
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Parameter Aurepalle Kanzara Shirapur Source/target
Preferences & investment technology
Time preference β 0.84 0.685 0.795 Cons. smoothing in Table 4
Depreciation rate δ 4.5% Indian Min. of Statistics
Gov.-owned irrig. ω 2.8 0.75 0.093 Minor Irr. Census/Gov. share in Table 5
Subsidy rate sk on k 58.12% 10.40% 5.44% Minor Irrigation Census, Table 12
Subsidy rate sω on ω 100% Modelling choice
Shock processes
Idiosyn. shock θL 0.265 0.34 0.225 Std. dev. in Table 7
Idiosyn. shock persist. ρθ 0.77 0.55 0.765 Persistence in Table 7
Scaling parameter νω 2.65 7.05 7.33 Crowding-in of risk sharing, Table 6
Scaling parameter νk 5.32 16.72 17.00 Morten (2018): good neg. shock prob.
Low B−Aggr. shock φBL 0.58 Morten (2018): bad neg. shock impact
Low G−Aggr. shock: φGL 0.95 Morten (2018): good neg. shock impact
High Aggr. shock φBH = φ
G





Aggr. shock persistence ρφ 0.76 Morten (2018): bad neg. shock prob.
Numerical parameters
Min/max k−grid points 0.01 / 0.6 modelling choice
# k (= k1 · k2)−grid points 100 modelling choice
Min/max Pareto grid points 0.25 / 4.0 modelling choice
# Pareto weight grid points 9 modelling choice
Table 8: Parameter values in the quantitative model
θH + θL = 1), and (ii) that they are independently distributed among the village’s
population.42
Given the above, I impose the moment restrictions for regressions from the
simulated model to replicate their empirical counterparts in Table 7. In particular,
I choose parameters ρθ and θL such that (i) the standard deviation of ei,t, and (ii)
the persistence of idiosyncratic shocks Πθ; in ε̃i,t = Πθ ε̃i,t−1 + ei,t (where ε̃i,t is the
residual from log (yi,t) = α0 + φt + ε̃i,t) matches the empirical evidence provided.
Table 8 summarizes calibration parameters chosen for all the three villages.
1.6.2 Model evaluation
In this section, I discuss results of solving the model economy of joint co-operation
over risk sharing and irrigation with limited commitment. I first discuss the fit of
the model to the data. Then, to better understand the mechanism, I discuss op-
timal household consumption and investment policy functions. Finally, I present
simulation paths of the benchmark model compared with the first best case.
42Given that the solution to the N-household case is approximated, the latter statement implies
that the income process of the rest of the village is given by yRoV,t = φt · 12 .
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Calibration results
Table 11 evaluates the precision of the calibration. To generate the respective mo-
ments, I simulate the model for 10,000 periods, with the first 100 being discarded.
Most of the target moments are reasonably well matched by the quantitative
model, with the highest estimate precision in the case of Shirapur. The largest
deviation from the empirical moment is in the crowding-in of risk sharing in Au-
repalle.
Interestingly, notice that the calibrated parameters are s.t. νω < νk, imply-
ing that government-owned investments are less efficient than the investments
made by villagers themselves (in pure investment return terms, i.e. even without
accounting for the impact on local co-operative patterns). This finding may re-
flect the superior knowledge of local society on how and where such investments
should be conducted. Moreover, notice that these efficiency parameters are much
larger in Kanzara and Shirapur. This is due to the fact that as the government-
owned irrigation ω and/or investment subsidy rate sk are much lower in these
villages, matching the (common across the three villages) moment of long-run
shock occurrence probability from Morten (2018) requires settings these numbers
to much higher values.
Note that although the estimated values of β may seem to be relatively low,
they should not be seen as invalid because they are implied by the data. The
main moment driving the value of this parameter is the relatively high correlation
between consumption and income in the data.43
Finally and importantly, the last row of Table 9 shows that the model is also
able to generate crowding-out of risk sharing.44 However, its magnitude is signif-
43Moreover, these estimates are in the ballpark of other papers’ estimates of time preferences for
the same villages, e.g. 0.7-0.95 in Ligon et al. (2002) and 0.65-0.8 in Morten (2018).
44Recall that the empirical evidence suggests that doubling the government share (while hold-
ing the total size of irrigation constant, as measured by 1 + g) is associated with a 37% increase in
the elasticity of consumption. I generate this variation using the calibrated parameters and resolv-
ing the model for a new equilibrium with ω increased to appropriate value ω2, holding the size of
total irrigation constant. I solve for parameters g and ω2 from the following system of equations:
ĜS =
νωω2
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(26)
where the simulated path of private irrigation capital kt is taken from the benchmark calibrated
model, and I set (1 + ĝ) = 1 and ĜS ∈ 2 · {35.33%, 37.41%, 3.23%} for Aurepalle, Kanzara and
44
Moment Aurepalle Kanzara ShirapurData Model Data Model Data Model
Cons. elasticity 0.223 0.230 0.340 0.343 0.257 0.254
Gov. share in irrigation 35.33% 34.63% 37.41% 39.14% 3.23% 3.65%
Variance of θ process 0.413 0.427 0.325 0.329 0.555 0.526
Persistence of θ process 0.546 0.545 0.100 0.116 0.525 0.525
Crowding-in of risk sharing 13.6% 42% 13.6% 29.7% 13.6% 18.4%
Income-rainfall reg. coeff. φBL -0.577 -0.593 -0.577 -0.590 -0.577 -0.577
Income-rainfall reg. coeff. φGL -0.104 -0.107 -0.104 -0.094 -0.104 -0.102
Long-run prob. of φBL 28% 27.7% 28% 31.5% 28% 30%
Long-run prob. of φGL 21% 22.2% 21% 17.7% 21% 17.2%
Not targeted
Crowding-out of risk sharing 37% 147% 37% 71% 37% 69.7%
Table 9: Moments in the data versus generated by the quantitative model
Note: Crowding-in (-out) of risk sharing is measured as a reduction (increase) in the elas-
ticity of consumption w.r.t. idiosyncratic shocks (in percentage terms).
icantly higher than the empirical evidence presented in Section 1.5.4 (especially
in the case of Aurepalle). Nonetheless, given that this moment was not targeted,
this finding effectively constitutes a test of the model’s external validity. Similarly,
the model generates low (pre-subsidy) investment rates with mean investment
amounting to only 8.6%, 3.24% and 8.4% of mean consumption in Aurepalle, Kan-
zara and Shirapur (see Table 10), in line with findings in the empirical literature
studying poor rural areas of developing countries.45
Policy functions
The main outcome of solving the quantitative model are the associated optimal
policy functions. These will be used to simulate the model below and to derive
the main welfare statistics. Figure 4 shows optimal first best (dashed lines) and
limited commitment (solid) policies for an individual household i and household
RoV representing the rest of the village (red and blue lines, respectively). The




and (i) θ = θL for
household i (and θ = 0.5 · (θL + θH) for the representative household); and (ii)
θ = θH for household i. In both cases, households are assumed to hold the same
capital stock of k = 0.5 · (kmin + kmax).
The first row presents optimal policies for updating multipliers, where a lower
Shirapur.
45See e.g. Bandiera et al. (2017) and Banerjee et al. (2015).
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Pareto weight implies a higher weight on household i. Notice that for the high
idiosyncratic productivity state, the planner is able to enforce higher insurance
transfers from the RoV-household to household i, and at the same time, she can-
not transfer as much to the RoV as in the low productivity state scenario. These
dynamics reflect the higher bargaining position of the household i, when it is more
productive.
In any case, both agents are willing to forgo some of the current consump-
tion (by accepting lower relative weights). This reflects the insurance value and
efficiency gains associated with the contract: agent 1 is ready to maintain co-
operation within the contract even with high weight on the other agent, in ex-
pectation that in some future period they will be worse-off and will benefit from
insurance transfers from others.
In terms of consumption policies, observe first the monotonicity of first best
policies along the changes in the relative Pareto weight. Second, the optimal con-
sumption policies follow the first best rules up to the points where the enforce-
ment constraints become binding. For instance, in case of θL, the planner cannot
increase the consumption of the rest of the village above approx. 1.0 (as the cur-
rent Pareto weight increases above approx. 1.8), since at this point the limited
commitment constraint of agent i becomes binding.
Although similar logic applies to the optimal investment rules, these differ
from the first best rules due to the occasionally binding enforcement constraints.
First, recall that when assigning optimal investment decisions, the planner needs
to shade these decisions due the fact that an additional unit of investment will
both (i) improve the self-insurance of the investing household in the next period,
and (ii) improve their next period expected aggregate state realization, driving the
value of deviating up (see the FOC (14)).
Second, notice that for high (low) relative Pareto weights the investment level
under limited commitment is above (below) the first best one. This dynamic is
due to the impact of binding limited commitment constraints on the rate at which
the investment externalities are internalized (best seen in the FOC (14) used for
computations, described in Appendix A). In particular, the fact that for household
i’s relatively high Pareto weights (below 1) the limited commitment constraints
of the household representing the rest of the village tends to be binding (which
is obviously not the case in the first best), implies that the rate of externalities’
internalization exceeds the efficient one. Nonetheless, the average (over Pareto
weights) investment level of a household with low (high) θ tends to be below
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(above) the first best rule assignment.
Figure 9 in Appendix D shows a similar graph of optimal decisions for high
and low aggregate productivities φ from the Bad distribution, holding idiosyn-
cratic productivity θ constant. While all other conclusions remain unchanged, it
shows that households invest more in periods of low aggregate productivity. This
dynamic is due to the fact that (i) both the Good and Bad aggregate risk Markov
processes are persistent and symmetric, and that (ii) the high value of productiv-
ity is equal across the two distributions. These imply that the marginal benefit of
investing is much higher in low rainfall/φ states, as these are the states when it
makes a large difference whether the productivity is drawn from the Bad or Good
distribution.
Finally, value functions reflect all the observations mentioned above with the
difference being that their curvature over Pareto weights in the economy with
limited commitment is much lower as compared to the first best. This is due
to the fact that in the latter the planner has to respect the limited commitment
constraints and as such cannot redistribute as freely as in the first best.
Simulation results
Figure 5 presents results of simulating household i’s decisions in the first best
(with constant and symmetric Pareto weight) and limited commitment bench-
marks approximated to the N-household case in Aurepalle (see Appendix A for
description of the algorithm).46 Firstly, notice how the Pareto weights are ad-
justed along the simulations: due to high assumed persistence of θ, as household
i spends more and more time with high idiosyncratic productivity, the relative
Pareto weight decreases (recall, again, that a higher relative Pareto weight im-
plies lower weight on household i). Importantly, the asymmetry in relative Pareto
weights comes about as this policy function comes from the 2-household model
with one household representing the rest of the village. Since the approximation
method implies that the latter household does not face any idiosyncratic risk, it
effectively has a much higher relative bargaining power.
Furthermore, we observe lower consumption fluctuations in the first best bench-
mark as compared to the model with limited commitment.47 In particular, since
46In order to ensure comparability, I feed in the same stochastic process into the two bench-
marks.
47In particular, for the case of Aurepalle, the elasticity of consumption w.r.t. idiosyncratic shocks
amounts to 0.230 and to 0.03 in the limited commitment and first best cases (respectively).
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Figure 4: Optimal policy functions: household i vs household representing the
rest of the village
Note: Red plots represent optimal policy functions of household i and blue ones - of the
household representing the rest of the village. Solid plots stand for optimal policies in the
first best model, and dashed ones - for the ones in the model with limited commitment.
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the enforcement issues are not present in the latter, in first best each household re-
ceives the constant shre of 1N in every period (with the associated relative Pareto
weight always equal to 1). On the other hand, in the limited commitment case the
share of total consumption assigned to household i follows closely the realization
of its idiosyncratic productivity θ. For instance, consumption of household i ex-
ceeds the first best assignment in periods of high idiosyncratic productivity, when
their relative Pareto weight increases.
In terms of optimal (pre-subsidy) investment decisions, we observe two inter-
esting patterns. First, for similar reasons as in the discussion of policy functions
above, conditional on idiosyncratic productivity θ, households invest more in pe-






(as compared to φ = φBH = φ
G
H).
Second, since in the limited commitment model the degree of uninsured idiosyn-
cratic risk is strictly higher than in the first best benchmark, so the precautionary
saving motive is stronger in the former implying higher average investment in
the model with limited commitment.
1.6.3 Counterfactual analysis
In this section, I conduct a number of counterfactual experiments. In particular,
I first measure the extent to which irrigation development can account for the re-
duction in consumption fluctuations due to aggregate risk documented in Table 3.
Then, I compute welfare gains associated with moving from partial co-operation
(over risk sharing or irrigation only) to the joint one. Finally, I analyze (i) the
effects of reducing the size of centrally-owned irrigational investments; and (ii)
potential welfare gains attainable by replacing centrally-owned irrigation with a
compensating increase in the co-financing rate for the village-owned investments.
In order to compare different policies in what follows, I will use a standard
measure of lifetime consumption equivalent changes in welfare. It shows by how
much households’ consumption should change in every period such that their
expected utility in the pre-reform scenario is equal to their expected utility associ-









where V0 and V1 stand for the approximated48 value functions pre- and post-
48I approximate these value functions as an average of discounted sums of utilities along shorter
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Note: Income stands for household’s output y = φ · θ. Consumption share is defined as
capproxi,t (xi,t)
ctot,t(xi,t)
. See Appendix A for details on computing these simulation paths.
Figure 5: Model simulations: first best (dashed) and limited commitment (solid)
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reform. Thus, W greater (lower) than 1 indicates that post-reform households’
consumption needs to be decreased (increased) in every period by |W − 1| · 100%
in order to keep the household indifferent w.r.t. the pre-reform status quo, indi-
cating a welfare improvement (deterioration).
Irrigation development and accounting for changes in aggregate risk
Figure 6 shows the relationship between changes in irrigation use and in the vari-
ance of the aggregate shock φ faced by farmers in the ICRISAT villages (see the
note below Figure 6 for details on how it is measured). Importantly, since I per-
form this exercise on the baseline calibration, I hold the weather risk constant at
the 1976-1984 level. We observe that as the size of irrigation investment increases,
the aggregate risk drops at a declining rate. These rates of change are different
for each village and stem from differences in investment rates (amounting to 8.6%
of mean consumption in Aurepalle, 3.24% in Kanzara and 8.4% in Shirapur, see
Table 10).
More importantly though, in the case of Aurepalle, we observe that the in-
crease in total irrigation of 42% documented in Table 3 generates a reduction in
aggregate risk of approx. 25%, accounting for approximately 31.13%(= 2580 · 100%)
of the reduction in aggregate risk documented above. In the case of Kanzara,
results suggest that the 250% growth in irrigation implies a 63% drop in aggre-
gate risk, accounting for approx. 95%(= 6366 · 100%) of the documented drop in
aggregate risk. Finally, the empirical drop in aggregate risk in Shirapur of 66%
is somewhat below the reduction of approx. 86.8% implied by the quantitative
model.
These findings mean that irrigation constitutes an effective insurance against
aggregate risk. In Aurepalle, where the irrigation growth has been modest relative
to Kanzara and Shirapur, a large chunk of the residual decline in aggregate risk
seems to be due to other factors mentioned in Section 1.5, such as lower crop trade
price variation, increased use of fertilizers, pesticides, high yielding crop varieties
or improved mechanization. In Kanzara, the much larger increase in irrigation
accounts for most of the empirical evidence. Last but not least, the fact that the
documented drop in Shirapur’s aggregate risk is well below the drop generated
by the quantitative model may suggest e.g. that the weather or the crop price risk
faced by local farmers has significantly increased between the two waves of the
sub-paths of simulations. In particular, I simulate the model for 10,000 periods and compute this
average using discounted sums for 100 short paths of 100 periods length each.
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ICRISAT panel.
Interaction between risk sharing and irrigational investments
Table 10 presents key welfare statistics from models of co-operation over both
risk sharing and irrigation (“I+RS”), irrigation only (“I”) and risk sharing only49
(“RS”), with the same calibrated parameters across the models. In line with the
theory presented in Section 1.4, it lends quantitative support to mutual reinforce-
ment between the two institutions of co-operation over risk sharing and irriga-
tional investments.
On one hand, we can see that households co-operating over irrigation are
ready to give up between 2.9% (in Kanzara) and 6.2% (in Shirapur) of their con-
sumption in every period in order to maintain co-operation over risk sharing.
This welfare improvement comes mostly due to the improved insurance against
idiosyncratic shocks. This is manifested by a 63%-73% reduction in the elasticity
of consumption (w.r.t. idiosyncratic income shocks) upon introducing risk shar-
ing, depending on the village. This finding confirms that in rural settings informal
risk sharing significantly dominates self-insurance.
Moreover, as introducing risk sharing reduces precautionary saving motives,
the mean irrigational investment drops by 28%-58%, depending on the village.
This implies a slight drop in mean consumption of 0.6%-3%, compensated by a
43%-70% reduction in its overall variance. For the same reasons, the mean ag-
gregate productivity drops by 1%-3.7%, with an associated 5%-30% increase in its
variance. In general, the importance of risk sharing for villagers increases with
the variance of persistence of idiosyncratic shocks (compare Kanzara with the
least volatile and persistent θ-process to the other two villages).
On the other hand, households co-operating over risk sharing are willing to re-
duce their consumption by 0.05% in Aurepalle and Kanzara, and 1.6% in Shirapur
49Notice that the manner of modeling risk sharing co-operation may lead to the lower-bound
estimates. It is made for analytical and computational convenience, as by assuming that risk shar-
ing agents do not share irrigation with each other, I would effectively idiosyncratize the aggregate
risk of each household. In such a case, the analysis could lead to ambiguous results as it would be-
come difficult to disentangle how much risk sharing against idiosyncratic shocks is due to θ-shocks
and how much due to φ-shocks. An alternative and computationally tractable approach would
involve solving for the risk sharing only allocation by assuming that the aggregate risk weight-
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)
. This approach could consequently lead
to an upper-bound on the true underlying effects.
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Note: Figure shows the empirical findings in Table 3 (points) and a re-
lationship between growth rate of irrigation and decline rate of aggre-
























2)−(0.5·(φGL +φGH))2]+(1−P( 11−sk k̄,ω))[0.5·((φBL)2+(φBH)2)−(0.5·(φBL+φBH))2] −
1, where (i) g is the growth rate of irrigation capital; (ii) ω′ is computed using (25) s.t.
at every point the government share equals ĜS ∈ {6.65%, 10.39%, 1.74%} in Aurepalle,
Kanzara and Shirapur (means over the 3rd and 4th census data in Table 5) with ω′ = ω
at the 0% growth rate of irrigation; (iii) the unconditional probability that the Markov
chain is in state L/H equals 0.5 due to the assumption of chains being symmetric; and
(iv) k̄ denotes mean of the simulated investment decisions in the baseline model.
Figure 6: Impact of irrigation development on aggregate risk in ICRISAT villages:
model vs data
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Statistic Aurepalle Kanzara ShirapurI+RS I RS I+RS I RS I+RS I RS
Cons.-equiv. welfare 1 0.958 0.995 1 0.971 0.995 1 0.942 0.984
Elasticity of cons. 0.230 0.858 0.287 0.343 0.934 0.368 0.254 0.861 0.401
Mean consumption 0.449 0.461 0.449 0.438 0.441 0.437 0.445 0.459 0.449
Var. of consumption 0.013 0.042 0.015 0.016 0.028 0.017 0.017 0.057 0.027
Mean aggr. prod. φ 0.900 0.924 0.900 0.883 0.891 0.882 0.889 0.924 0.896
Var. of aggr. prod. φ 0.041 0.033 0.041 0.044 0.042 0.044 0.043 0.033 0.041
Mean irrig. invest. k 0.039 0.084 0.043 0.015 0.021 0.014 0.037 0.088 0.053
Var. of irrig. invest. k 0.0014 0.0063 0.0020 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.001 0.007 0.003
Table 10: Comparison of key statistics across models of various degrees of co-
operation.
in every period in order to maintain co-operation over irrigation.50 In particular,
we observe that irrigation co-operation significantly improves informal insurance
against idiosyncratic shocks as evidenced by a reduction in the elasticity of con-
sumption of 19.9% in Aurepalle, 6.8% in Kanzara and 36.7% in Shirapur.
In general, irrigation co-operation becomes more important as government in-
volvement gets smaller (3.23% in Shirapur vs 35.33%-37.41% in Aurepalle and
Kanzara). However, notice that the exact effect on consumption, aggregate pro-
ductivity and investment metrics differs between the villages due to the interplay
of different government’s irrigation ownership shares with the general equilib-
rium effects working through the limited commitment constraints.
Reducing size of centrally-owned irrigation
Figure 7 presents the evolution of the key welfare statistics51 in the three villages
upon changing the ω parameter from 100% to 0% of its calibrated value. The first
and intuitive observation is that the effects of reducing the size of government-
owned irrigation become smaller as its initial share declines (with the largest share
in Aurepalle, followed by Kanzara and Shirapur).
Secondly, as the centrally-owned irrigation is progressively removed, the vari-
ance of aggregate shocks φ increases by up to 25% in Aurepalle. Relatedly, the
mean value of φ declines by up to 6%, followed one-to-one by mean consump-
tion. These welfare-reducing effects are compensated by improvements in risk
sharing. In particular, we observe very large reduction in consumption elasticity
w.r.t. idiosyncratic income shocks, up to a 66.6% in Aurepalle, 59.3% in Kanzara
50See Footnote 49.
51These statistics are the same as used in Table 10.
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Figure 7: Change in welfare statistics upon reducing ω
and 10.5% in Shirapur. The overall variance of consumption decreases by up to
11.4% in Aurepalle (at a 50% reduction in ω), 16.7% in Kanzara and 5.4% in Shi-
rapur.
Nonetheless, the overall welfare effects are clearly negative, with households
in Aurepalle valuing ω at the equivalent of up to 6.7% of consumption in every
period, in Kanzara - 3.4% and in Shirapur - 0.7%. These dynamics suggest that
although a simple removal of government-owned investments may improve local
co-operation in village economies (as measured by risk sharing), such reforms
may not be able to generate budget savings without destroying welfare of these
societies as the associated losses due to removal of resources are first order.
Shifting resources from centrally- to village-owned irrigation
While improving welfare by simply reducing the size of government-owned irri-
gation seems impossible, Proposition 2 above says that we can achieve a Pareto
improvement by redirecting funds spent on the centrally-owned irrigation to sub-
sidies for privately done investments. Table 11 presents results of conducting such
reforms in the three villages, supporting the theory developed above.
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Statistic Aurepalle Kanzara ShirapurStatus-quo Optimal Status-quo Optimal Status-quo Optimal
Policy ω, sk 2.8; 58.12% 0; 85% 0.75; 10.40% 0; 65% 0.093; 5.44% 0; 15%
Cons.-equiv. welfare 1 1.013 1 1.030 1 1.005
Elasticity of cons. 0.230 0.074 0.326 0.258 0.254 0.230
Mean cons. 0.449 0.452 0.441 0.451 0.438 0.438
Var. of cons. 0.013 0.009 0.016 0.014 0.017 0.016
Mean aggr. prod. φ 0.900 0.905 0.879 0.900 0.884 0.884
Var. of aggr. prod. φ 0.041 0.039 0.044 0.039 0.437 0.440
Mean irrig. invest. k 0.039 0.028 0.015 0.014 0.036 0.032
Var. of irrig. invest. k 0.0014 0.0005 0.0001 0.00009 0.0013 0.0009
Table 11: Comparison of key statistics upon compensated replacement of
government-owned irrigation ω.
In general, the largest welfare gains are attainable in Kanzara, where the status-
quo (i) subsidy rate is relatively low, (ii) government share is high, and (iii) the
transmission of idiosyncratic shocks to consumption is large. More precisely, Kan-
zara’s villagers are willing to pay up to 2.9% of every period’s consumption in or-
der to implement the reform of fully eliminating the government irrigation ω and
using the resources released to increase the subsidy rate sk from 10.40% to 65%.
The respective welfare gains in Aurepalle and Shirapur are smaller given higher
initial subsidies sk or lower government involvement there, and amount to 1.3%
and 0.5% of consumption in every period.
The welfare improvement takes place as switching to the more efficient lo-
cal village management of irrigation infrastructure leaves farmers with more re-
sources, and at the same time, improves patterns of local co-operation. To this
end, the reform reduces the elasticity of consumption by 67%, 20.9% and 9.4%
in Aurepalle, Kanzara and Shirapur (respectively). Notice also that although the
reform reduces precautionary saving motives, and so reduces average levels of
investment, it directs funds to villagers who have an advantage over government
in terms of investment efficiency. Thus, the reform also increases the mean and
reduces the variance of aggregate productivity φ.
1.7 Conclusion
The economic literature has well-documented the prevalent use of informal in-
surance contracts in rural areas of developing countries. Since the functioning of
these contracts often relies on the idiosyncratic nature of shocks affecting the in-
come of population, their ability to provide insurance against aggregate shocks
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is very limited. However, given the very high prevalence of agriculture in these
areas, villagers can significantly mitigate the effects of aggregate shocks due to er-
ratic rainfall through co-ordinated irrigation investments. This paper studies how
these two margins of co-operation interact with each other.
Theoretically, I perform this analysis through the lenses of a limited commit-
ment model characterized by joint determination of risk sharing against idiosyn-
cratic shocks and co-operation over irrigation investments reducing impact of ag-
gregate shocks. The analysis suggests that the two institutions are complemen-
tary to each other, if the society can regulate access to the irrigation and as such
punish deviators by excluding them from it. In such a case, improved value of ir-
rigation’s public good within the co-operation increases the extent of efficient risk
sharing. On the other hand, by reducing the degree of the society’s idiosyncratic
risk, the risk sharing institution improves the allocation of investments. However,
if exclusion from irrigation is not feasible, as I argue is the case when irrigational
structures are owned and managed by central authorities, improvements in its
provision may lead to excessive crowding-out of local risk sharing due to exces-
sive improvements in the value of defaulting on insurance credit promises.
I provide empirical support for the theory developed using the ICRISAT’s Vil-
lage Level Studies panel data set on three South Indian villages. In particular, I
find that increases in total size of irrigation through adding new village-owned in-
frastructures are associated with significant crowding-in of risk sharing (as mea-
sured by reductions in consumption elasticity w.r.t. idiosyncratic shocks), and
that increases in the government share of villages’ irrigation are associated with
significant crowding-out.
Building on these findings, I calibrate a quantitative version of the model to
the setting of three villages analyzed in order to conduct a number of experiments.
First, performing the exercise of accounting for empirically documented changes
in aggregate risk faced by the villagers suggests that investments in irrigation con-
stitute a very effective way of insuring villagers against the risk of weather fluctu-
ations. Second, comparing models with various degrees of co-operation confirms
significant reinforcing effects between the two institutions of risk sharing and irri-
gation co-operation. Third, although improving villagers’ well-being by a simple
reduction in the size of government-owned infrastructure is not possible, shift-
ing resources from the latter to subsidies on investments made by villagers can
achieve significant welfare improvements, while holding the size of overall ex-
penditures constant. In particular, such a reform strengthens the within-village
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co-operation by improving both the informal insurance and the efficiency of irri-
gation investments.
Given the experimental results shown, policy recommendations may seem ob-
vious. In a way, the evidence from the Minor Irrigation Census (Table 5) shows
that such practices of increasing privatization of irrigation systems have already
been followed to some extent, at least in the case of villages analyzed here. How-
ever, policy makers need to bear in mind that traditional functioning of Indian
rural societies built around castes may imply that such reforms may come at the
unwanted cost of redistributing welfare gains towards the more privileged castes.
Thus, it may be necessary to establish appropriate institutions aimed at facilitat-
ing fair access to irrigation. However, it is important to stress that any type of
traditional institutions enforcing such fair access may harm the superior local
management of irrigation systems. To this end, it could be worthwhile to con-
sider different types of interventions supporting inter-caste co-operation within
villages, especially given that Anderson (2011) finds that the potential gains of
removing discrimination in access to irrigation are enormous. Findings of this
paper shed some light on possible sources of these gains.
In terms of avenues for further research, notice that in the above I have as-
sumed away any type of private information frictions, shown by Ligon (1998) to
be potentially relevant in the Indian villages analyzed here.52 Staying within the
context of village economies, the prime example of an investment margin where
private information might be especially important is fertilizer use. For analysis of
the latter in conjunction with risk sharing, see Pietrobon (2018). In this case, pro-
viding more village insurance induces farmers to reduce their private effort and
expenses on fertilizers. Thus, it might be worthwhile to investigate this private
information friction jointly with village risk sharing and co-operation over irriga-
tion investments. Similarly, given the exposed importance of interaction between
the two institutions on allocation of resources in village economies, it may be par-
ticularly interesting to investigate the implications of this relationship for growth
of rural regions, such as the villages analyzed here.
Finally, the mechanism studied here can be also applied to settings other than
rural ones. One example of such an application may be to the case of economic
unions such as the EU or the USA co-operating over risk sharing and common
goods, such as pollution abatement. This application is already on my research
52Similarly, a more recent paper by Ligon and Schechter (2018) shows in the context of
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1.8 Appendix A: Recursive formulation and solution algorithm
In order to save on complexity of solving for the N-agent co-operation equilib-
rium, I follow the commonly used approximation of solving for co-operation be-
tween one household and a household representing the rest of the village (used
e.g. in Ligon et al., 2002; Laczo, 2015; Morten, 2018; Bold and Broer, 2018) ex-
tended for public irrigational investments. In particular, I consider a problem
of individual i that (i) chooses capital investment ki,t affecting the aggregate risk
of all N households; and (ii) co-operates with agent −i representing the rest of
the N − 1 households living in the village. The use of this representative agent,
assumed to have the same preferences as all village members and to receive a
productivity shock equal to the average across N− 1 villagers, implicitly assumes
that the rest of the village can (i) share the idiosyncratic risk; and (ii) internal-
ize investment externalities as in the first-best allocation. Consequently, the vec-
tor of outside options’ values is pinned down by consumption of individual and
village-average net endowments in every period (given by φt (ki,t, ωt) · θi,t− ki,t+1






Before describing the numerical algorithm, I show first how to rewrite the
model’s first order conditions in a recursive way allowing for a numerical so-
lution. Since the steps are similar to the ones in Kehoe and Perri (2002), I skip the
lengthy derivations. The only equation that has to be rewritten, is the intertem-
poral Euler equation. In particular, it can be shown that for the case of irrigation
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Secondly, the approximation method implies that (i) a transfer of ci,t resources
for consumption of household i leaves c−i,t = (yi,t + y−i,t − ci,t − k−i,t − ki,t) for
consumption by the household representing the rest of the village; and that (ii)
































Given the recursive formulation, the model is solved using a policy function
iteration method. Let xt = (zt, ki,t, k−i,t, φt, {θi,t}) be the state variable with the
understanding that zt, ki,t and k−i,t are inherited from the previous period. Given
this, I define a discrete grid G on the state space. Define also value functions for
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each agent i:

































G. Given these, I update the guess in the following way. Suppose we are on the
n-th iteration of updating the vector of unknown functions, and suppose we are
at point q in the grid. First assume neither enforcement constraint binds. Thus,
immediately vi(q) = 0 and z′0(q) = z. (At the same time, this assumption cor-
responds to solving for the first best allocation.) Given the guesses, we iterate
over the Euler equations of both agents over all the grid points with consumption
shared according to z.53 This gives an update of the consumption policy function
for both agents. We compute consumption policy of the rest of the village as a
residual from the resource constraint. Given these updated policy functions, I up-
date the value functions and repeat the algorithm until the optimal consumption
policy function converges.54
Now, we check whether any of the limited commitment constraints binds. If
not, we proceed to the next grid point. Otherwise, I will proceed by assuming that
only one of the enforcement constraints binds, i.e. either that of the household or
of the rest of the village.
If e.g. the limited commitment constraint of agent i binds, we are solving for{
ci(g), ki(g), z′(g), v01(g)
}
∀g ∈ G. First, we use the old guesses of c and k′ in
order to compute total wealth and total consumption. Then, we use the binding
enforcement constraint (still with old guesses) to solve for new relative Pareto
weight z′ (and so also v) at the given grid point. Given the new relative Pareto
weight, we can solve for ci and c−i using the consumption sharing rule.
Then, we use the Euler equations of both agents to solve for investment deci-
53In particular, when solving for optimal decisions of agent i, I use his Euler equation with old
guess of agent −i’s decisions in order to solve for optimal investment (and, by resource constraint
and given the z, consumption) of agent i. Then, I proceed accordingly using the Euler equation of
agent −i.
54Notice also, that in order to solve for the value of autarky it is enough to solve the model
using above described algorithm and (i) imposing separate budget constraints, and (ii) assuming
that agents ignore their externalities on others.
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sions at the given grid point. However, since now vi (g) > 0 (binding enforcement
constraint), we need to take care of the derivatives of autarky value functions in
period t + 1 w.r.t. current capital. To arrive at the latter, differentiate the value
function of each agent in autarky in period t w.r.t. k, use the envelope condition












θi,t+1 + (1− δ)
)
With these derivatives and old guesses in hand, we use agents’ Euler equations
to solve for new optimal investment decisions (similar to above). We check the
sup-norm of the change in the consumption policy rule, and keep updating until
the latter is very small.
I finalize the approximation by constructing the panel of village consumption
and investment data. In order to do so, I simulate the model N times for long
enough where in each period tI proceed according to the following steps:
1. I assign the optimal new multiplier z′,approxi,t = z
′
t (xi,t) ∀i ∈ {1, ..., N}, where
state is given by xi,t =
(








∀i ∈ {1, ..., N}
2. I then compute approximate consumption rules capproxi,t (xi,t) ∀i ∈ {1, ..., N}
according to:55























where (i) I use the duality between the Promised Utility and Marcet and Ma-
rimon’s multiplier approach implying that z′ = z · 1+µ̃−i1+µ̃i (with µ̃ being the
Lagrange multiplier on the promise keeping constraint in the dual problem);
and (ii) the total consumption is derived from the resource constraint and is


















55See equation (20) in Ligon et al. (2002) and Bold and Broer (2018, p. 8-9) for details on deriving
(28).
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3. I assign investment rules kapproxi,t+1 (xi,t) ∀i ∈ {1, ..., N} using the investment
rules from the exact solution for a given state xi,t and multiplier z′i,t (xi,t).
Given these, I impute the approximate investments by the rest of the village
as kapprox−i,t+1 (x−i,t) =
1






∀i ∈ {1, ..., N}.
4. Having computed all the objects of interest, I proceed to the next period t+ 1
with the state given by xi,t+1 =
(








∀i ∈ {1, ..., N}, where:
(a) kapprox−i,t+1 =
1
N−1 ∑j 6=i k
approx
j,t+1 ,
(b) zapproxi,t+1 = z
′,approx
i,t ,














from the bad one.
1.9 Appendix B: Estimation of irrigation subsidies
The following data comes from the 3rd Minor Irrigation Census conducted in the
years 2000-2001. The data on sources of financing is unfortunately not available
in earlier censuses and thus I assume that the subsidy rates estimated using the
2000-2001 census hold in the first wave of the ICRISAT panel.
The subsidies are computed using the following formula:
subv = ∑
i




where (i) subv denotes subsidy for private investments in village v, (ii) i is the
index for types of irrigation units (as in the construction of the data in Table 5),
(iii) share totali stands for the share of village-owned units in the total number
of irrigation units in village v; (iv) share subsidizedi is the share of the subsidy
financed units in the total number of subsidy, private and loan financed units;
and (v) the “irrigation area” metric is the same as the one for “irrigable-” and
“irrigated land” (as in construction of the data in Table 5).
There are two important caveats to the construction of this variable. First,
some of the irrigation units recorded in the Minor Irrigation Census are financed
by “some loan and some subsidy”. In such a case, I assume that half of such
units have been financed by loan (private sources) and the other half by sub-
sidy. Second, the census does not contain information on sources of finance for
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Village (district) metric Subsidy rate
Aurepalle (Mahbubnagar) irrigable 54.21%irrigated 62.04%
Kanzara (Akola) irrigable 9.04%irrigated 11.70%
Shirapur (Solapur) irrigable 5.56%irrigated 5.32%
Table 12: Subsidy rates on village-owned irrigation in ICRISAT villages
Note: Table presents the subsidy rates of irrigation structures in districts of Mahbubna-
gar, Akola and Solapur in the third (2000-2001) Minor Irrigation Censuses. The irrigable
metric is defined as Culturable Command Area (“The area which can be irrigated from a
scheme and is fit for cultivation.”); and the irrigated metric is defined as Irrigation Poten-
tial Utilised (“The gross area actually irrigated during reference year out of the gross pro-
posed area to be irrigated by the scheme during the year.”) - see http://micensus.gov.in
for more details.
village-owned units separately (i.e. it only contains information on sources of fi-
nance for the aggregate number of units). Thus, I impute the latter as share totali,v ·
share subsidizedi,v.
For calibration, I assume the mean values of irrigated- and irrigable land sub-
sidy rate estimates (see Table 8).
1.10 Appendix C: Impact of aggregate shocks on income in ICRISAT
villages
Figures 6 presents the evidence from Morten (2018) on the impact of weather
shocks on households’ log income. Data used comes from the first (1975-1984)
wave of the ICRISAT panel and the University of Delaware precipitation database.
Negative aggregate weather shock is defined as a rainfall event falling below the
20th percentile of the 1900-2008 long-run rainfall distribution.
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Figure 8: Impact of aggregate weather shocks on income (from Morten, 2018)
1.11 Appendix D: Additional policy functions
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Figure 9: Optimal policy functions: household i vs household representing the
rest of the village
Note: Red plots represent optimal policy functions of household i and blue ones - of the
household representing the rest of the village. Solid plots stand for optimal policies in the
first best model, and dashed ones - for the ones in the model with limited commitment.
70
2 Student Loans with Risky Graduation and College
Wage Premium
2.1 Introduction
Over the past decades, student loan programs have become an ever more impor-
tant means of financing higher education in the US, with the level of outstanding
student debt in 2019 reaching USD 1.6 trillion (making it the second largest debt
category in the US after house mortgages).5657 To large extent, the latter number
reflects very high overall costs of pursuing higher education in the US. For this
reason, policy makers see the student loan programs as tools allowing for increas-
ing equality of opportunity for students from disadvantaged backgrounds.58 At
the same time however, enrolling into a college may be very risky: Long (2018)
reports that the overall completion rate of full-time students in four- and two-year
institutions in the year 2016 amounted to only 49.1% and 38.6%, respectively. In
light of such high drop out rates, a natural question is what are the distributional
and efficiency consequences of student loans, do they work as intended and, if
not, how could they be optimally designed? Investigating these issues is at the
center of this paper.
I begin by investigating theoretical properties of a dynamic human capital in-
vestment model with ex-ante homogenous students exerting private effort in or-
der to increase their probability of graduating from college. The latter event can-
not be insured and as such generates market incompleteness. In other words,
students are subject to uninsurable college graduation shocks, which result in
two types of workers: those with college- and those with high school educa-
tion. Moreover, these two types of workers are assumed to be imperfectly substi-
tutable when employed by firms (in line with the evidence in Katz and Murphy,
1992, Ciccone and Peri, 2005 and Malmberg, 2018), giving rise to endogenous col-
lege wage premium. I first study constrained efficiency of educational choices in
the competitive allocation, with the constraint on efficiency coming from miss-
56According to the Federal Reserve data:
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/g19/HIST/cc_hist_memo_levels.html
57The idea of income-contingent student loans has arguably been first proposed and discussed
by Milton Friedman (1955).
58At the same time however, around 63% of the outstanding debt is held by students with
parental income in the third and fourth highest quartiles. This is according to calculations of
the Urban Institute using the Survey of Consumer Finances: https://www.urban.org/urban-
wire/which-households-hold-most-student-debt
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ing insurance markets for graduation shocks.59 Given the latter and the presence
of general equilibrium effects working through the college wage premium, the
laissez-faire decisions turn out to be constrained inefficient and characterized by
under-education. In particular, had every student exerted more effort, the col-
lege wage premium would become smaller and as such provide better (from the
ex-ante point of view) insurance for everyone. Thus, the model endogenously
generates motives for some form of government intervention.
As mentioned above, one form of such government intervention in the US
is the provision of income-contingent student loans. In line with observed poli-
cies, I show that an appropriately designed student loan program which is self-
financed and provides insurance against the risk of college drop-out, can achieve
the allocative efficiency of a second best benchmark where the insurance markets
are complete. Importantly, this implementation has to account for the associated
efficiency-equity trade-off generated by moral hazard due to the educational de-
cisions being made at a privately optimal level. In particular, on the one hand
insurance against college failure improves consumption smoothing across their
lifetimes, but on the other it destroys incentives for students to invest more effort
in their education.
Related literature. The analysis in this paper relies on an extended (by the dy-
namic and risky human capital accumulation decision) version of the “canonical
model” in Goldin and Katz (2008). This extension gives rise to the general equi-
librium effects associated with college wage premium similar to the ones demon-
strated by Stiglitz (1982). The theoretical novelty of this paper is its studying the
interaction of these effects with incomplete markets.
The latter combination implies that educational decisions in competitive equi-
librium are constrained inefficient and are characterized by under-investment.
This finding is related to Davila et al. (2012) who study a neoclassical growth
model rendering capital investment decisions constrained inefficient due to the
general equilibrium effects (or pecuniary externalities, as they called them) as-
sociated with the interest rate (which is taken as given by agents). Moreover, I
abstract from physical capital in order to clearly expose another important source
of externalities due to the students’ wage taking behavior. Furthermore, the in-
teraction between education and capital accumulation for constrained efficiency
of competitive equilibria has been investigated by Gottardi, Kajii and Nakajima
59See Diamond (1967) for seminal work on the constrained efficiency approach.
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(2015) and Park (2018).60 Both of these papers study a version of the Davila et
al. (2012) environment with risky human capital accumulation. Differently to the
approach here, in their frameworks workers are perfectly substitutable between
the college/high-skilled and non-college/low-skilled sectors. By analyzing the
sectoral composition of workers, I characterize a novel channel of inefficiencies.
The result of under-education is in line with broad empirical literature (for
an early contribution see e.g. Friedman and Kuznets, 1954) documenting that re-
turns to human capital are excessively high as compared to the returns on physical
capital, arguably for the precise reason that capital market imperfections limit in-
vestments in education. While comparison of human and physical capital invest-
ments is not at the center of the analysis, I show that some of the risk associated
with human capital is endogenous to aggregate educational decisions and as such
can be mitigated by ’collective’ actions benefitting everyone, without introducing
any direct forms of insurance.
Building on these theoretical findings, I show that the second best allocation
can be implemented with an income-contingent student loan system.61 To this
end, Gary-Bobo and Trannoy (2015) and Findeisen and Sachs (2016) both study
dynamic environments of one-shot risky college education where students pos-
sess private information about their ability and effort exerted. They show that a
Pareto optimal allocation can be implemented using an integrated tax and stu-
dent loan system with income contingent repayment rates. Similarly, Stantcheva
(2017) studies optimal policies with human capital accumulation over the whole
life-cycle of workers and also finds that the second-best allocations can be im-
plemented with the combination of income-tax enhanced by income-contingent
loans. The approach in this paper differs due to the presence of demand for skills
leading to endogenous skill premium.
The second best implementation with student loans is naturally related to the
literature studying borrowing constraints in the context of education. To this end,
Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2012) review this literature and conclude that in
recent years credit constraints have become an important determinant of educa-
tional outcomes among the youth. On the other hand, Keane and Wolpin (2001)
and Johnson (2013) estimate structural models of higher education and find that
60See also Mayr (2018) for analysis of optimal policy in an environment with entrepreneurial
talent where competitive equilibrium is similarly constrained inefficient.
61See Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2016) for a recent review of the literature with some optimal
policy recommendations. Their work ignores the issues related to the endogeneity of the college
wage premium analyzed in this paper.
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relaxing borrowing constraints has only a modest impact on educational attain-
ment. The latter findings can be very well generated by the uninsured risk asso-
ciated with pursuing college education. In this paper, I analyze the insurance role
of income-contingent student loans.
Furthermore, there is a broader literature studying tax and subsidy policies in
relation to education and its impact on earnings inequalities, see e.g. Abbott, Gal-
lipoli, Meghir and Violante (2018), Benabou (2002), Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005),
Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2017), Krueger and Ludwig (2013, 2016)
and Vardishvili and Wang (2019). Most of these papers allow for general equilib-
rium effects of government policies on relative factor prices. In this paper, I take
a closer look at the general equilibrium impact on college wage premium and the
associated insurance role of student loans.
Structure. This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I outline the
two period model with ex-ante homogenous agents. In Section 2.3, I define and
characterize the competitive equilibrium. In Section 2.4, I show how to decentral-
ize the constrained efficient benchmark using a student loan system characterized
by income contingent repayments. Section 2.5 concludes. Appendix B develops
the quantitative model with the associated calibration strategy being outlined in
Appendix C.
2.2 Model economy
The economy has a continuum of ex-ante identical risk averse student-workers
with a unit measure. Each agent is maximizing her expected utility. They live
for two periods, value consumption and dislike educational effort according to
functions u (c) and v (e) with both satisfying u′ (c) , −u′′ (c) , v′ (e) , v′′ (e) > 0
and being continuous.
In the first period, agents have just finished high school and face a single deci-
sion on whether to pursue higher education and how much effort to exert on this.
In order to do so, they need to (i) cover the tuition fee F, for which they need to
borrow against their future income; and (ii) exert educational effort e improving
their probability of graduating. More precisely, the human capital accumulation
process depends on effort in the following way:
E [θiwi] =
θHwH with probability p (e)θLwL with probability 1− p (e) (30)
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where θH, θL are the skill levels associated with each level of education, p (e) is
the graduation probability function satisfying p′(e), −p′′(e) > 0; and wH, wL are
the wage rates offered by competitive firms (see next section).
Education shock is realized at the beginning of the second period. This pins
down workers’ income, which they use to consume and repay their student debt
together with interest accruing at the exogenously given rate of r. Normalizing
time preference to 1, agents wish to maximize the following quantity:
−v (e) + p (e) u (cH) + (1− p (e)) u (cL)
Subject to the budget constraint of:
ci + (1 + r) F · 1e>0 ≤ θiwi ∀i ∈ {H, L} (31)
where 1e>0 is the indicator function taking value equal to 1 if the student de-
cides to go to college, i.e. when the effort supplied is positive. Moreover, the setup
implicitly assumes that the borrowing constraints are such that agents can always
finance their tuition fee F.
Finally, notice the assumed incomplete structure of capital markets. In par-
ticular, students do not have access to any instruments that would allow them
to hedge the college graduation risk. One example of such an instrument could
be a long-term contract between a student and a firm making their income con-
ditional on their graduation outcome. With this in mind, the assumed market
incompleteness can be micro-founded by limited commitment on students’ side.
In particular, in a world with such long-term contracts, any student after success-
ful graduation would have incentives to default on their contract and go to work
in another firm offering a market wage rate. This mechanism may well lead to
collapse of such markets in equilibrium.
Production sector
The production sector is perfectly competitive. Moreover, I consider equilibria
where all firms are identical, and so I study the problem of a representative firm.
Importantly, in order to produce, firms need to employ both types of the high-
(N̂H) and low-skilled (N̂L) workers. Strictly speaking, the elasticity of substitution
between the college and non-college workers is assumed to be less than infinity.
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In particular, firms produce using the technology Y = N̂H
ρN̂L
1−ρ.62
The objective of firm managers is to maximize their profits given by Π =
N̂H
ρN̂L
1−ρ − N̂HwH − N̂LwL, where the wage rates are given by the marginal
products of the relevant worker type.
2.3 Competitive equilibrium
In this Section, I first define the competitive equilibrium, discuss the associated
dynamics and then discuss its welfare properties. In particular, I show that the
competitive equilibrium is constrained inefficient.
2.3.1 Dynamics of the competitive equilibrium
I now formally define the relevant competitive equilibrium concept:
Definition 1. Given the economy in Section 2, the associated competitive equi-
librium with rational expectations is defined as decisions (cH, cL, e) and prices
(wH, wL) such that:
1. Agents maximize their expected life-time utility:
maxe,cH ,cL − v (e) + p (e) u (cH) + (1− p (e)) u (cL) (32)
subject to budget constraints:
ci + (1 + r) F · 1e>0 ≤ θiwi ∀i ∈ {H, L} (33)
2. Firms maximize their profits while remunerating workers at the rate of their
marginal product: maxN̂H ,N̂L N̂H
ρN̂L
1−ρ − wH N̂H − wLN̂L.
3. The labor market clears: N̂H = p (e) θH and N̂L = θL (1− p (e)).
Since the problem is nicely concave, typically the ensuing equilibrium will be
unique. In order to analyze issues related to student borrowing, let us assume
that:
62The Cobb-Douglas assumption is without loss of generality and is made to simplify analy-
sis and exposition. Strictly speaking, it implies that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
between worker types equals 1, not far from empirical estimates in Katz and Murphy (1992), Cic-
cone and Peri (2005) and Malmberg (2018) ranging between 1.3 and 1.5.
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Assumption 1. The cost of attending college F is such that in equilibrium effort
supplied is positive, i.e. e > 0.
Now, the equilibrium dynamics are characterized by the following first order
condition:
e : v′ (e) = p′ (e) (u (cH)− u (cL)) (34)
This equation equalizes the marginal cost of educational investment with the
expected benefit. As such, it also reveals the associated moral hazard problem:
too much of any potential insurance offered to students against graduation shocks
destroys their incentives for exerting educational effort.
As far as the firm sector is concerned, the wage rates wH, wL are given by:
wH = MPLN̂H = ρ [p (e) θH]
ρ−1 [θL (1− p (e))] 1−ρ (35)
wL = MPLN̂L = (1− ρ) [p (e) θH]
ρ [θL (1− p (e))] −ρ (36)
Notice that since the graduation probability is a smooth function, in equilib-
rium every student decides to go to college and chooses the same level of educa-
tional effort e > 0.
2.3.2 Constrained inefficiency of the competitive equilibrium
In this section, I show that the competitive equilibrium is generally inefficient.
To focus the discussion, I define the relevant concept of constrained efficiency
following Davila et al. (2012).
Definition 2. The competitive equilibrium (cH, cL, e, wL, wH) is said to be con-
strained efficient if there exists no decision ê and the implied equilibrium wages
(ŵL, ŵH) such that:
−v (ê) + p (ê) u (− (1 + r) F + θHŵH) + (1− p(ê)) u (− (1 + r) F + θLŵL)
> −v (e) + p (e) u (− (1 + r) F + θHwH) + (1− p (e)) u (− (1 + r) F + θLwL)
In other words, the equilibrium is said to be constrained efficient if there is no
level of educational effort ê such that, given the associated competitive wages, the
expected life-time utility of agents is higher than under competitive equilibrium.
In particular, the constraint on efficiency is due to a lack of well functioning capital
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markets (or, equivalently, due to the planner having access to no redistributive
instruments).
In order to show the constrained inefficiency of the competitive equilibrium,
consider the impact of a small variation de of the level of educational effort exerted
by everyone. Differentiating the objective function (32), I obtain:
dU = −v′ (e)de + p′ (e) (u (cH)− u (cL))de + p (e) u′ (cH)dcH (37)
+ (1− p (e)) u′ (cL)dcL
where dcH = θHdwH and dcL = θLdwL. The effects of an increase in educa-
tional effort e on the wage rates wH, wL are:
dwH
de
= ρ (ρ− 1) [p (e) θH]ρ−2 [(1− p (e)) θL]−ρ p′ (e) θH < 0 (38)
dwL
de
= ρ (1− ρ) [p (e) θH]ρ−1 [(1− p (I)) θL]−ρ−1 θH p′ (e) > 0 (39)
These dynamics reflect the production technology’s imperfect substitution be-
tween the college and non-college workers. As higher supply of the high-skilled
workers implies lower supply of the low-skilled, the prices for both groups have
to adjust in the direction reflecting changes in supply and demand.
Using the individual FOC (34) in (37), I arrive at:
dU = p (e) u′ (cH) θHdwH + (1− p (e)) u′ (cL) θLdwL (40)
If (40) turns out to be different from zero, the competitive equilibrium is con-
strained inefficient. The steps below confirm that it is indeed strictly greater than
zero:
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p (e) u′ (cH) θH
dwH
de



























where in the second step I have used wage setting conditions in both sectors.
Clearly, as the marginal utility of the high types is necessarily always lower
than that one of the low types, the inequality (41) holds always true. This means
that:
Theorem 1. The competitive allocation is constrained inefficient and is characterized by
under-education.
In other words, due to the pecuniary externalities, social welfare can be en-
hanced by a uniform increase in educational investment. Intuitively, by reducing
the gap between θHwH and θLwL, a uniform increase in educational effort pro-
vides better insurance against the risk of failing to graduate.
Interestingly, as the initial wealth goes to infinity and the wage share in the sec-




= 1 implying that in such case the competitive allocation
converges to constrained efficiency.
Finally, it is important to stress again that the constrained inefficiency arises
due to the lack of long-term financial contracts between students and firms, e.g.
due to human capital not constituting a good form of collateral. Indeed, apply-
ing insights of Prescott and Townsend (1984) to this environment suggests that if
students were able to sign such binding and observable contracts, the constrained
efficiency of the competitive equilibrium would be restored.63
63Moreover, the above analysis has ignored the possibility of self-insurance through adjust-
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2.4 Second best allocation and student loan programs
In this section, I first study properties of the second best allocation where plan-
ner (i) can redistribute resources across agents; (ii) internalizes the endogenous
response of the college wage premium, and (iii) has to respect students’ incentive
compatibility constraints. After this, I show that the second best benchmark can
be implemented as a competitive equilibrium with an optimally designed pro-
gram of student loans with graduation-contingent repayment rates.
2.4.1 Second best benchmark
The planning problem just described reads:
Problem 1. Second best allocation is a solution to:
maxcH ,cL,e − v (e) + p (e) u (cH) + (1− p (e)) u (cL) (42)
s.t.
p (e) cH + (1− p (e)) cL ≤ p (e) θHwH + (1− p (e)) θLwL − (1 + r) F
e = argmaxẽ {−v (ẽ) +p (ẽ) u (cH) + (1− p (ẽ)) u (cL)}
It is well understood that the second constraint corresponds to a continuum of
inequality constraints (Rogerson, 1985). However, if Problem 1 is concave, I can
replace it by a necessary and sufficient first order condition:
v′ (e) ≥ p′ (e) (u (cH)− u (cL)) (43)
which will hold with equality whenever e > 0 (warranted by Assumption 1).
It is easy to see the sufficiency of (43) since:
−v′′ (e) + p′′ (e) (u (cH)− u (cL)) ≤ 0 ∀e (44)
This is due to (i) the effort disutility v (e) and graduation probability p (e) func-
tions being strictly convex and concave (respectively), and (ii) the requirement
ments in labour hours provided. In principle, this mechanism could improve consumption
smoothing at the cost of worse labor supply smoothing. Nonetheless, the empirical evidence in
Appendix B shows that the college wage premium is large enough suggesting that the drop-out
risk remains empirically large. Therefore, considering endogenous labor supply should not alter
the qualitative nature of any of the conclusions.
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that the equilibrium effort choice has to be individually rational, i.e. in equilib-
rium cH ≥ cL has to hold. Given that the first order approach is valid, the follow-
ing holds:
Proposition 4. The second best benchmark is characterized by the following consumption





1− p (e) ·
1− p (e)− ψp′ (e)






∂e + (1− p (e)) θL
∂wL
∂e




v′′ (e)− p′′ (e) (u (cH)− u (cL))
]
(46)
where ψ and µ denote the Lagrange multipliers on the incentive compatibility and resource
constraints, respectively.
Proof. See Appendix A.
As far as the consumption sharing rule is concerned, notice that since p′ (e) > 0
and the incentive compatibility constraint (43) will be binding in equilibrium (by
Assumption 1, implying ψ > 0), the presence of moral hazard pushes the alloca-





order to elicit the efficient level of effort. Clearly, students are strictly better-off in
the second best than in the competitive allocation, either due to a higher level of
consumption 64 or better consumption smoothing (or both).
Finally, notice that if effort had been perfectly contractible (or if moral hazard
was absent, corresponding to the case of ψ = 0), consumption would be perfectly
smoothed across graduation states, as in the first best benchmark with a utilitarian
social welfare function and equal Pareto weights.
2.4.2 Student loans
So far I have only considered a direct assignment of consumption and incentive-
compatible effort levels by the planner. Now, I explore implementation of this
64It is straightforward to show that output maximization requires that the supply of high skilled
workers equals their share in production function, i.e. p (e) = ρ. This effect is internalized by the
planner (and not by students), and as such the planner can achieve the efficient level of output.
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allocation with income-contingent student loans. Intuitively, providing insurance
might be possible through charging the successful college-graduates higher inter-
est rates compared to drop-outs, in a way that balances the loan repayments in
the aggregate. This is precisely the logic on which Lochner and Monge-Naranjo
(2016) base their suggestion that the optimal student loan design has to be such
that:
1. loans are fully repaid in expectation;
2. they provide insurance against failure to graduate or find the right job (e.g.
through income-contingent repayments);
3. they provide incentives for students to work hard (given the distortion com-
ing from the insurance).
In the context of this paper, full repayment amounts to the following condition:
1 + r = p (e) (1 + rH) + (1− p (e)) (1 + rL) (47)
I firstly characterize the dynamics associated with competitive equilibrium
upon introducing a student loan system with graduation-contingent repayment
rates:
Proposition 5. A competitive equilibrium with a student loan program characterized by
graduation-contingent repayment rates of rH if θi = θH and rL if θi = θL is characterized






























where µL and µH denote the Lagrange multipliers on budget constraints of the low
and high type agents, respectively.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The difference between this allocation and the competitive equilibrium with
non-contingent repayment rates studied above lies in the levels of consumptions,
which here are given by cSLH = θiw
SL
i − (1 + ri) F and, in the latter, by cH = θiwi −
(1 + r) F.
Given the above, I can state the main student loan implementation result:
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Proposition 6. A student loan program with the following graduation-contingent re-
payment rates implements the second best benchmark and satisfies the full repayment
condition (47):
rH (e) =




θLwL (e)− cSBL (e)
F
− 1










1− p (e) ·
1− p (e)− ψp′ (e)












· p (e) + ψp
′ (e)
1− p (e)− ψp′ (e)
)
Furthermore, the repayment rates satisfy rH (e) > rL (e).
Proof. See Appendix A.
The implementation result comes from using income-contingent repayment
rates in order to match second best consumption allocations for a given level of
effort (which, due to the incentive compatibility constraint, is pinned down in the
same way in laissez-faire and second best allocations). Furthermore, and as ex-
pected, the positive difference between high and low repayment rates constitutes
the market-based insurance against college drop-outs. Finally, observe that the
gap between the high and low repayment rates shrinks as the level of tuition fees
F increases.
Upon assuming functional forms for utility functions, I get the following corol-
lary:
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1− p (e) ·
1− p (e)− ψp′ (e)














· p (e) + ψp
′ (e)
1− p (e)− ψp′ (e)
)]
− 1
Finally, notice that since the second best benchmark constitutes the upper
bound on attainable welfare for allocations subject to moral hazard and no di-
rect redistribution, the competitive allocation is strictly Pareto dominated by the
(second best) optimal student loan benchmark.
2.5 Conclusion
Results derived in this paper show that in an incomplete market economy, educa-
tional decisions are inherently inefficient due to the (endogenous) risk manifested
by the college wage premium. In particular, in an environment with ex-ante ho-
mogenous agents, I show that this uninsured risk leads to under-investment in
human capital. Consequently, this finding calls for some corrective measures.
One form of such intervention is the introduction of a student loan program with
income contingency, which is shown to constitute a potentially powerful tool for
policy makers interested in providing insurance against dropping out from col-
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lege. Moreover, I show that these financial instruments are characterized by an
inherently inbuilt efficiency-equity trade-off: the higher the degree of insurance
provided, the lower the educational effort of students becomes.
At this point, I would like to draw the reader’s attention to the link between
the constrained inefficiency and the second best implementation results. On one
hand, the latter improves the allocation because of the (assumed) government’s
power to “complete” the markets by offering different repayment rates condi-
tional on education and labor market experiences. In practice, enforcement of
these contracts is facilitated by the ability of governments to e.g. garnish wages,
impose additional taxes or withhold tax returns.
On the other, the finding that the endogeneity of college wage premium is
a source of indirect insurance against the college graduation risk suggests that
the need for direct insurance via student loans (or other programs) is lower than
in a world with an exogenous premium. This is true since by reducing the risk
of attending college, student loans incentivize more education, driving the risk
associated with the college wage premium down.
In Appendices B and C, I proceed by constructing and describing the cali-
bration strategy of a rich life-cycle OLG education economy with student loans
including relevant heterogeneities w.r.t. learning abilities and initial wealth en-
dowments. In the future, I plan to use this model to investigate effects of income-
contingency on college enrollment and resulting welfare and income inequalities:
to first evaluate the current income-based repayment system in the US; and to
quantify the welfare gains of pursuing optimal student loan policies. Second, the
model can be used to investigate how much the optimal policy would differ if the
endogenous response of the college wage premium was ignored by policy mak-
ers.
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2.6 Appendix A: Proofs
Proposition 4. The second best benchmark is characterized by the following con-





1− p (e) ·
1− p (e)− ψp′ (e)





∂e + (1− p (e)) θL
∂wL
∂e




v′′ (e)− p′′ (e) (u (cH)− u (cL))
]
where ψ and µ denote the Lagrange multipliers on the incentive compatibility and
resource constraints, respectively.
Proof. The second best maximization problem reads:
maxcH ,cL,e − v (e) + p (e) u (cH) + (1− p (e)) u (cL)
s.t.
(µ) p (e) cH + (1− p (e)) cL ≤ p (e) θHwH + (1− p (e)) θLwL − (1 + r) F
(ψ) v′ (e) ≥ p′ (e) (u (cH)− u (cL))
The FOCs w.r.t. cH, cL and e read:
cH : p (e) u′ (cH) + µ + ψp′ (e) u′ (cH) = 0
cL : (1− p (e)) u′ (cL) + µ− ψp′ (e) u′ (cL) = 0
e : − v′ (e) + p′ (e) [u (cH)− u (cL)]
+ µ
[
p′ (e) ((θHwH − cH)− (θLwL − cL)) + p (e) θH
∂wH
∂e






v′′ (e)− p′′ (e) (u (cH)− u (cL))
]
= 0
Using the incentive compatibility in the FOC for e and dividing both cH and
cL conditions by each other yields the result.
Proposition 5. A competitive equilibrium with a student loan program char-
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v′ (e) = p′ (e) [u (cH)− u (cL)]
where µL and µH denotes the Lagrange multipliers on budget constraints of
the low and high type agents, respectively.
Proof. Each agent solves the following problem:
maxcH ,cL,e − v (e) + p (e) u (cH) + (1− p (e)) u (cL)
s.t.
(µH) cH ≤θHwH − (1 + rH) F
(µL) cL ≤θLwL − (1 + rL) F
The FOCs w.r.t. consumptions are:
cH : p (e) u′ (cH) + µH = 0
cL : (1− p (e)) u′ (cL) + µL = 0
The resulting FOC w.r.t. e is:
v′ (e)− p′ (e) [u (cH)− u (cL)] = 0
Proposition 6. Student loan program with the following graduation-contingent








θLwL (e)− cSBL (e)
F
− 1










1− p (e) ·
1− p (e)− ψp′ (e)







θHwH + θLwL − (1 + r) F− cSBL
)
· 1− p (e)
p (e)
· p (e) + ψp
′ (e)
1− p (e)− ψp′ (e)
)
Furthermore, the repayment rates satisfy rH (e) > rL (e).
Proof. The optimal repayment rates can be found by equating cSBi
!
= cSLi = θiwi (e)−
(1 + ri (e)) F, i ∈ {H, L} where the implicit expressions for cSBH (e) and cSBL (e)








) = p (e)
1− p (e) ·
1− p (e)− ψp′ (e)
p (e) + ψp′ (e)
and where consumption bundles are taken from the resource constraint
p (e) cSBH + (1− p (e)) cSBL = p (e) θHwH + (1− p (e)) θLwL − (1 + r) F
Then, since effort is chosen according to the same FOC in both second best
and student loan allocations (and is a function of consumption bundles only),
I automatically have eSL = eSB and also wSBi
!
= wSLi , i ∈ {H, L}, proving the
decentralization.
Now, given the latter, full repayment follows since:
p (e) rH + (1− p (e)) rL = p (e) θHwH (e)− cH (e)
F





Finally, to see that rH (e) > rL (e), notice that:
rL (e) < rH (e)
⇐⇒
θLwSBL (e)− cSBL (e)
F
− 1 <




θLwSBL (e)− θHwSBH (e) <cSBL (e)− cSBH (e)
⇐⇒




p (e) θHwSBH (e) + (1− p (e)) θLwSBL (e)






H (e)− (1 + r) F
which holds always due to the assumed objective function with preference for
insurance.
2.7 Appendix B: Quantitative model
For the quantitative analysis, I consider an overlapping generations model con-
sisting of students-workers that are heterogenous with respect to age, wealth,
learning ability, education and labor productivity. Firms produce final goods by
hiring labor and capital on competitive spot markets. The government operates
education subsidies, pension system and the tax system financing it. Moreover,
students have access to graduation-contingent student loans. Decisions of indi-
viduals differ depending on the phase in which they find themselves. In the first
period of life, after having drawn their learning ability and initial wealth endow-
ment, each individual decides whether to attend college. College education takes
two periods and graduation from it is risky, with more effort and monetary invest-
ment translating into (i) a higher graduation probability, and (ii) a higher human
capital stock. Apart from this, individuals make consumption and labor supply
decisions in each period of their working life. Finally, workers retire and live on




In each period t, the economy is populated by J overlapping generations indexed
by j = 1, 2, ..., J, where J denotes the maximum age. Individuals survive from age
j to j + 1 with Poisson probability ψj+1. For simplicity, I assume that the survival
rate before retirement is equal to one; agents face death hazard once they retire,
i.e., φj = 0 for j < jr and φj ∈ (0, 1] for j ≥ jr, where jr denotes the retirement age.
I normalize the size of every cohort entering the economy in each period to 1J . To
facilitate aggregation later on, I define mj as the size of population of age cohort j





Firms hire labor and capital on competitive spot markets to produce a final good.
Firms employ workers for two types of tasks: low- and high-skilled ones (s f ∈
{H, L}). I index the “human capital category” of workers by s ∈ {cg, cd, n},
where the college-graduates (s = cg) work as high skilled workers, and those
who dropped out of college (s = cd) or have not attended it (s = n) - as low
skilled ones. Within each skill type, labor is perfectly substitutable across ages;
but across skill types, labor is imperfectly substitutable.65 Let Lt,H and Lt,L denote
aggregate labor in terms of efficiency units of the skilled and unskilled workers,








with the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor being given
by 11−ζ .
I assume existence of a representative firm producing according to standard
Cobb-Douglas production function Yt = Kαt L
1−α
t . The representative firm takes
the wage rates of skilled and unskilled labor, wt,H and wt,L, and the interest rate rt
as given.
65See Katz and Murphy (1992), Ciccone and Perri (2005) and Malmberg (2018).
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Endowments, labor productivity and preferences
Newborn students are heterogeneous in their learning ability a (constant over life-
time) and initial endowment ω drawn from truncated normal distributions Fa and
Fω with supports on the unit interval (0, 1). Furthermore, students also differ w.r.t.
their parents’ education status sp ∈ {cg, cd, n}. I assume positive correlations ρs
and ρω between (i) sp and a; and (ii) sp and ω. In addition, every individual is
endowed with one unit of labor in each period of their life.
There are three elements to labor productivity hs,j (e, I) for each generation j
and skill type s ∈ {cg, cd, n}. First, post-education productivity is given by θ (e, I),
where θ (· ) is increasing and concave in effort e and investment I and is constant
for each period of life j (see the “College Education” section below). Furthermore,
the life-cycle productivity profile is reflected by deterministic changes in the age-
and skill-specific variable εs,j. Finally, labor productivity is also subject to stochas-
tic shocks ηs,j that evolve according to a Markov process πηs . Mathematically:
hs,j (e, I) =
εs,j · exp
(
θs (e, I) + ηs,j
)
, i f j < jr
0 o.w.
Individuals have preferences over streams of consumption cj, leisure lj and
education effort e. For those not in college lj = 1− nj, where nj denotes labor
supply. The leisure of college students amounts to lj = 1− nj − ξ (a), where ξ (a)
is the time cost of college (decreasing and concave in ability a). More precisely,
student’s preferences are given by:












where (i) the effort disutility function satisfies v′ (e) ,−v′′ (e) > 0, and (ii)
1college denotes the indicator function taking value of 1 for individuals deciding
to attend the college. Notice that the education effort takes a toll in forms of both
reducing the agent’s time endowment and mental disutility.66
College education
At age one, after having drawn her learning ability a and education-contingent
initial wealth ω, an individual decides whether to attend college. Enrolling into
66See Mazur (2016) for analysis of differences between separable and non-separable disutility
costs of effort in the context of unemployment insurance and labor search.
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college is associated with a tuition fee F and the outcome of education is realized
in period 2. Individuals which choose not to attend college are characterized by a
human capital stock of a · θ. On the other hand, students graduate with probabil-
ity p (e, I; a), which (i) is increasing and concave in both educational effort e and
supplementary (above F) monetary investment I; and (ii) exhibits complemen-
tarity between effort, monetary investments and ability. As mentioned above,
apart form improving the probability of graduation, higher effort e and monetary
investment I increase the return to having a college degree in terms of improv-
ing the post-education productivity θs (e, I) at each working period j ∈ [2, ..., jr].
Strictly speaking, I assume the following human capital accumulation technology:
θs (e, I) =

θcg (e, I) = a ·
(
θ + eχθ I1−χθ
)
with p (e, I) , i f 1college = 1
θcd (e, I) = a ·
(
θ + λθ · eχθ I1−χθ
)
with 1− p (e, I) , i f 1college = 1
θn (e, I) = a · θ i f 1college = 0
(51)
Notice, in particular, that the difference in (51) between college graduates and
drop outs is expressed with the fraction 1−λθ of additional human capital for suc-
cessful college graduates. While dropouts are assumed to work in the same un-
skilled sector with non-college workers, the additional human capital for college
drop outs will account for the empirically documented gap in earnings between
no college and some college workers (see Appendix C for details on calibration).
For the graduation probability function, I make the parametric assumption of:
p (e, I; a) =
a · eχp I1−χp
1 + eχp I1−χp
(52)
The optimal resource cost of attending college F + I is endogenously deter-
mined by students. As indicated above, college education is also associated with
(i) a time cost ξ (a) ∈ (0, 1), that depends on learning ability; and (ii) disutility
v (e). Furthermore, college dropouts bear only share λF+I of the total cost F + I.
Finally, students have also access to government subsidies awarded based on
merit and initial endowment. I denote by za,ω the fraction of monetary investment
F + I borne by government for individual (a, ω). Upon deciding about going to
college, financially constrained individuals can work part-time and/or take out
student loans subject to a borrowing constraint (see the next Subsection).
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Financial market structure and borrowing constraints
Financial markets are incomplete in that there is no insurance against idiosyn-
cratic labor productivity shocks and mortality risks. Individuals can self-insure
against those risks by saving in risk-free deposits d with associated return rt.
Borrowing b is allowed only using the student loans for financing college ed-
ucation. The student loan program’s repayment rates are contingent on students’
graduation outcomes, i.e. students from period j ≥ 2 repay their loans at the rate
of qs, s ∈ {cg, cd}. Notice that if the program is designed such that qcd < qcg, then
the student loan program brings the market structure closer to complete by pro-
viding insurance against the drop-out risk and effectively cross-subsidizing the
unsuccessful students.
Furthermore, I assume that (i) workers have to make non-negative repayments
of the debt in all future periods; and (ii) the student debt is repaid by the time of
retirement. Taken together, these assumptions imply the following borrowing
constraints:
A1 = (1− za,ω) (F + I)
Aj,s =max
{
0, (1 + qs) bj,s
}
, j ∈ [2, ..., jr − 1] and s ∈ {cg, cd} (53)
Ajr,s =0
where notice that I assume that student loan can be taken up to the full amount
of college expenses.
In order to ensure that the student loans program is self-financed in aggregate,
I impose the following condition guaranteeing equivalence between the new bor-
rowing by students and the repayments by elder ones:
∫ ∫
X(1,c)
b′1 (a, ω)︸ ︷︷ ︸
new loans












·mj (s, εs)dadd (54)
where X (j, s) denotes the subset of the state space corresponding to age j
students/workers with decision/college outcome s (see the formal Competitive
Equilibrium definition below), mcol1 denotes the relative mass of newborns attend-
ing the college and b1 (a, ω) denotes their respective borrowing decision.
Finally, notice that although dependence of the borrowing constraint in period
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1 on agents’ actions may in principle complicate the numerical solution, I derive
the following result guaranteeing that all of the education expenses will be cov-
ered through student loans (facilitating the computations):
Conjecture 1. If the student loan repayment rate upon dropping out is lower than upon
successful graduation, i.e. qcd < qcg, every college enrollee strictly prefers to finance all of
college expenses with student loans and use their own wealth for consumption or saving,
i.e. b1 (a, ω|s = c) = −A1.
Government
The government runs a pay-as-you-go pension system: the government collects
contributions from current workers and distributes the revenues directly to cur-
rent pensioners. Moreover, the government also collects tax for the purpose of
financing education subsidies. More precisely, in every period t, current workers
of both skill types contribute a fraction τ of their labor income to the tax pro-
ceeds, and (i) current students receive their subsidies (see above); and (ii) current
retirees receive a pension benefit that is proportional to their average life-time in-
come: pent (s, θs) = κwt,s f L̄t (s, θs), where L̄t (s, θs) is the average labor supply,
in efficiency unit terms, of working age cohort with characteristics (s, θs). The
budget constraint of the tax system then reads:







pent (s, θs)mj (s, θs)dθ + Zt (55)
where (i) Zt = z
∫
θ (p (e, I) + (1− p (e, I)) λF+I) (F + I (a, ω))m
col
1 (θ)dθ de-
notes the total spending on education subsidies with the subsidy rate of z; and (ii)
mj (s, εs) is the relative size of age cohort j that falls into the skill category s and
has a human capital level of θ.
Finally, the government collects accidental bequests and redistributes them to
the generation that has just entered the economy. To come up with a plausible
calibration of the initial wealth distribution, I assume that the government fills
the gap between accidental bequests and actual transfers in each period.
Recursive life-cycle formulation
In this subsection, I set out precisely the recursive problem of individuals’ over
their life-cycle. For what follows, denote the current state by (j, a, s, d, b, ε, η),
97
where j ∈ {1, ..., J} denotes age, a ∈ (0, 1) inborn ability, s ∈ {c, n} is the school-
ing decision in period 1 and s ∈ {cg, cd, n} is schooling outcome from period
2 onwards, d ≥ 0 is the current balance of student’s deposit, −Aj,s ≤ b ≤ 0
is the current balance on the student loan, ε is the current state in worker’s life-
time productivity profile and η is the current realization of stochastic productivity
component. Notice also that state s defines the type of worker’s job skill-category
s f ∈ {H, L}.
Age j = 1: Before the college decision is made, each student draws its learning
ability a and initial wealth ω. Given these, individuals decide whether to attend
college, which is captured with the following indicator function:
1s (a, ω) =
1 i f W (a, c, ω, b, ε) > W (a, n, ω, b, ε)0 o.w. (56)
where
W (a, s, ω, b, ε) ≡∑
η′
πηn (η)V (1, a, s, ω, b, ε, η) (57)
is the expected period-1 value of life-time utility of an agent with college de-
cision s, learning ability a and an initial wealth endowment of ω. Notice that the
initial idiosyncratic productivity η is drawn from distribution for unskilled work-
ers. Then, I assume that upon a successful college graduation, skilled workers
redraw the idiosyncratic shock η from the distribution for skilled workers and so
thereafter the stochastic productivity component evolves over time according to
πηs (η
′|η).
Given its initial wealth ω, college decision s, human capital stock θ and its ini-
tial draw of stochastic productivity η, every individual then chooses consumption
and labor supply so as to maximize its expected present value of life-time utility.
Formulated recursively, each individual solves the following Bellman equation:





















p (e, I) ·V
(
2, a, cg, d′, b′, ε, η
)
+ (1− p (e, I)) ·V
(




c + d′ + b′ + 1s (1− z) (F + I) ≤ (1 + rt)ω + (1− τ)wt,s f hs,1l + Tr
b′ ≥ −A1
d′ ≥ 0
Age j ∈ {2, ..., jr − 1}: While decisions at age one may differ for college and
non-college individuals, decisions during the working life are pretty standard:
given the current state (j, a, s, d, b, ε, η), each agent chooses consumption and la-
bor supply so as to maximize its present value of utility. The associated Bellman
equation reads:
V (j, a, s, d, b, ε, η) = maxc,n,d′,b′
{








j + 1, a, s, d′, b′, ε, η
)}
subject to:
c + d′ + b′+ ≤ (1 + rt) d + 1s · (1 + qs) b
+ 1s=cd · (1− λI+F) (1− z) (F + I) + (1− τ)wt,s f hs,jl + Tr
b′ ≥ −Aj,s
d′ ≥ 0
where recall that the non-college individuals have no student debt, i.e. b′ = 0
if s = n; and the term 1s=cd · (1− λθ) (F + I) is due to the assumption that college
droupouts bear only fraction λF+I of total education costs.
Decisions at age j ∈ {jr, ..., J}: After retirement, workers’ labor productivity
drops to zero, and they live on savings and pension benefits. The associated Bell-
man equation is given by:
V (j, a, s, d, b, ε, η) = maxc,n,d′
{










c + d′+ ≤ (1 + rt) d + (1 + qs) b + pent (s, θ) + Tr
d′ ≥ 0
where, as student debt is assumed to be repaid by the time of retirement, I
have b′ = 0 for j ≥ jr and b = 0 necessarily for j ≥ jr + 1.
Competitive equilibrium
To define the competitive equilibrium of the economy, let us introduce some ad-
ditional notation. In particular, let E = [0, 1], J = {1, ..., J}, S1 = {c, n}, Sj =
{cg, cd, n}, D = R, F = R and H = R denote the state space for ability a, age j,
education choice and outcome s, wealth d, human capital level θ and the stochastic
productivity component η. Given these, let Σ denote the Borel σ-algebra defined
on the product space X = E × J × S1 × Sj × D × F ×H. As for any X ∈ X a
measure φ (X) can now be properly defined, I proceed to the definition of equi-
librium:
Definition 3. A stationary recursive competitive equilibrium is a collection of: (i)
decision rules of individuals {1s (a, ω) , e (a, ω) , I (a, ω) , c/n/d′/b′ (j, a, s, d, b, ε, η)};
(ii) aggregate capital and labor {Kt, Lt,H, Lt,L}; (iii) value functions V (j, a, s, d, b, ε, η);
(iv) government policies
{
τp, τl (y) , pen (s, θ) , κs, z, Tr
}
; (v) prices {rt, wt,H, wt,L};
and (vi) a vector of measures φ, such that:
1. The decision rules of individuals solve their respective life-cycle problems,
and V (j, a, s, d, b, ε, η) is the associated value function.
2. Aggregate capital and labor inputs {Kt, Lt,H, Lt,L} solve the representative
firm’s profits maximization problem, which is fully characterized by the fol-
lowing first order conditions:
rt = αkα−1t − δ











































hs,j (θ, η) l (j, a, s, d, b, ε, η) φ (j, a, s, d, b, ε, η)dddθdη
where X (j, s) is the subset of the state space X corresponding to age j and
skill type s.
4. The capital market clears:
Kt+1 + Bt+1 = Dt+1








d′ (j, a, s, d, b, ε, η) φ (j, a, s, d, b, ε, η)dddθdη
5. The good market clears:
Yt = Ct + Ft + It + Invt
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c (j, a, s, d, b, ε, η) φ (j, a, s, d, b, ε, η)dddθdη
Ft + It =
∫ ∫ ∫
X(1,c)
(p (e, I) + (1− p (e, I)) λF+I) I (1, a, c, ωc, 0, ε, η)




(p (e, I) + (1− p (e, I)) λF+I) φ (1, a, c, ωc, 0, ε, η)dddθdη
and Invt = δKt is gross investment.
6. The government budget constraints hold:







pent (s, θs)mj (s, θs)dθ + Zt
(1 + rt) Db,t + Bt+1 = (1 + rt) Bt + (1 + rt) Dinit,t + Trt






1s (a, d) (p (e, I) + (1− p (e, I)) λI+F) I (1, a, c, d, 0, ε, η)






1s (a, d) (p (e, I) + (1− p (e, I)) λI+F) φ (1, a, c, d, 0, ε, η)ddda













· φ (j, a, s, d, b, ε, η)dddθdη





dφ (1, a, s, d, 0, ε, η) f (d)dd
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where f (d) is the distribution from which initial wealth is drawn.
7. The student loan program is self-financed in the aggregate, i.e. (??) holds.
8. Individual behaviors are consistent with aggregate behavior: measure φ is a
fixed point of φ (X) = Π (X, φ), for any X ∈ X, where Π (X, ·) is the tran-
sition function generated by the decision rules of individuals, the process of
exogenous states, and the survival probabilities.
9. All aggregate variables are constant over time.
2.8 Appendix C: calibration
This section discusses parameter choices. I calibrate the model to the US econ-
omy. The majority of parameters are either estimated directly from the data or
calibrated internally by matching certain aggregate moments in the US data. The
rest of the parameters are taken from the literature.
Demographics
New generations enter the economy at the age of 18. A period in the model cor-
responds to four years and so it takes one period to complete college. Everyone





computed from actuarial life tables for the full time male workers in the US. The
reference year is 2011.
Preferences
I consider a CRRA instantaneous utility function of the following form:
u
(










where ν is a taste parameter for consumption and 1γ is a risk aversion param-
eter. These two parameters jointly determine (i) the average labor supply, (ii) the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption, and (iii) the Frisch labor
supply elasticity. I set γ to 0.25 and choose ν such that workers supply on average
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one-third of their time time endowment.67 The subjective discount factor β is used
to target a capital-output ratio of around 2.4, which falls in the range commonly
used in the literature.
Production technology
The aggregate production function is of Cobb-Douglas form. The capital share
α is set to 0.33. I set the elasticity of substitution between skilled labor and un-
skilled labor 11−ζ to 1.5 – in accordance with the estimate of Katz and Murphy
(1992), Ciccone and Peri (2005) and Malmberg (2018). In addition, I set the annual
depreciation rate δ to 7.55%, as in Krueger and Ludwig (2016).
Labor productivity
Recall that the labor productivity of workers with education outcome s ∈ {cg, cd, n}
and of age j is given by:
hs,j (e, I) =
εs,j · exp
(
θs (e, I) + ηs,j
)
, i f j < jr
0 o.w.
For calibration of the endogenous part of the process - θs (e, I) - see Subsection
"Education process" below. In order to estimate the deterministic life-cycle com-
ponent εs,j and the stochastic component ηs,j, I run the following cross-sectional










is a function of age and education capturing the life-cycle produc-
tivity profile with Xj being a vector of observables including education dummies
and a cubic polynomial in age, and w̃j is a residual term.
I estimate εs,j by indirect inference method, i.e. by matching the coefficients
on the age polynomial from regression (59) in analogous regression on the data
generated by the model. Furthermore, I normalize εs,j’s of both types going and
not going to college s.t. ε1,n = 1.















AR(1) Markov Chain HH FE
ρ σ2η ps ηs σ2η
College graduate 0.963 0.011 0.982 {−0.041, 0.041} 0.048
College dropout – – – – –
No college 0.926 0.019 0.963 {−0.050, 0.050} 0.065
Table 13: Estimates for the labor productivity process
Then, I model the stochastic component ηs,j as a two-state, education-specific






I estimate this Markov process using the residual term w̃j. In particular, within
each education group I model it as an AR(1):
logw̃i,t = αi + zi,t
zi,t = ρzi,t−1 + ηi,t
where αi is an individual fixed effect that I assume to be normally distributed
with cross-sectional variance σ2α . Table 1 summarizes the results of estimation.
Education process
Calibrating returns to and costs of education require specifying parameters of the
tuition fee F (standing for the basic fee that can be supplemented with I); the
human capital accumulation process θs (e, I); the graduation probability function
p (e, I; a) = a·e
χp I1−χp
1+eχp I1−χp
; and the education effort disutility function v (e) = eχe . I
focus on private four-year colleges as the data on these is more likely to reflect the
true resource cost.
Recall that the human capital accumulation process is given by:
θs (e, I) =

θcg (e, I) = a ·
(
θ + eχθ I1−χθ
)
with p (e, I) , i f 1college = 1
θcd (e, I) = a ·
(
θ + λθ · eχθ I1−χθ
)
with 1− p (e, I) , i f 1college = 1
θn (e, I) = a · θ i f 1college = 0
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First, I normalize θ=1. Second, I calibrate the level of basic tuition fee F using
the evidence in Trends in College Pricing (2018, Figure 2, p.11). In the data for the
year 2016, the bottom 25th percentile of students enrolling into private four-year
colleges spends on average USD 25,000 on tuition and fees. Moreover, in 2016 the
nominal US GDP per capita amounted to ca. USD 57,000. Thus, I calibrate F so
that in equilibrium FY =
25,00
4·57,000 ≈ 10.96%.
The college wage premium, graduate shares, the level of (supplementary) ed-
ucation investment I and the level of students’ indebtedness are pinned down
jointly by parameters governing the θs (e, I), p (e, I) and v (e) functions. Thus, I
use λF+I , χθ, χe and χp jointly to match:
1. evidence in Valletta (2016) from CPS documenting that in 2000s the average
real wage of workers with college education has been approx. 72% higher
than that of high school graduates;
2. median supplementary spending on college education Ī such that the me-
dian total spending on college education F + Ī in 2016 amounts to USD
36,000, i.e. F+I4·Y ≈ 15.78% (Trends in College Pricing, 2018, Figure 2, p.11);
3. 27% of population having college education, 35% being college dropouts
and 37% having high school education only (Valletta, 2016);
4. average student debt amount owed by dropouts of approx. USD 14,000, or
14,000
4·57,000 ≈ 6.14% of output (Brown, 2017).
Furthermore, Valletta (2016) documents also that in 2000s the premium of workers
with some college (taken as college dropouts for the purpose of this paper) over
high school graduates has amounted to approx. 20%. I use parameter λθ for
matching this number.
Finally, I pin down the amount of government-financed education subsidies
using the evidence in Trends in College Pricing (2018, Figure 8 and 9, p. 17-
18). According to the latter, the average net (after grant aid and tax benefits)
and gross prices of “tuition and fees” at private (non-profit) four-year institu-
tions USD 14,000 and 34,500. Thus, I assume that the subsidy rate amounts to
z = 20,50034,500 ≈ 59.4%. This implies that for the benchmark calibration I assume
the fraction of educational costs borne by the government to be the same for all
individuals, regardless of their learning ability and financial situation. I consider
need- and merit-based grants and scholarships later on as extensions. Table 2
summarizes the results of estimation.
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θ λθ χθ χp χe F
1 - - - - -
Table 14: Estimates for the human capital accumulation technology
Wealth distribution
Heterogeneity in initial wealth in this paper is intended to capture the family
income effects on college attendance and college quality choice. Ionescu (2009)
pins down the initial asset distributions using the Survey of Consumer Finances
(1983) and the High School and Beyond (1980) datasets on individuals aged 18-20
(SCF) and below 18 (HSB) deciding about going to college. Importantly, the latter
dataset contains data on expected family contribution for college, where Ionescu
(2009) finds that “the expected family contribution in the HB data is not different
across groups of students that eventually enroll or not in college.” Ultimately, she
arrives at the mean of USD 23,100 and a standard deviation of USD 32,415 in 1984
constant dollars. I choose parameters µFω and σ
2
Fω such that the model generated
endogenous distribution of initial wealth corresponds to these findings, relative
to the economy’s output Y.
Learning ability distribution and college time costs
In calibrating ability distribution and college time costs, I follow mostly Krueger
and Ludwig (2016). In particular, the time requirement for attending class and
studying in college is given by the linear function:
ξ (a) = 1− a
so that children with lowest ability face prohibitively large time costs of going
to college, (e = 0) = 1.
Moreover, newly born agents draw their ability from a distribution πsp (a)
that depends on the education level of their parents and follows a normal dis-
tribution with parameters µa,sp and σa which are discretized to 10 values, e ∈
{e1 = 0, ..., e10 = 1}, I choose parental education specific means µsp to match col-
lege completion rates of students by parental education levels, and choose the
variance σa,sp such that the probability mass of the original normal distributions
located in the unit interval [0, 1] is 90% on average over the three groups of sp.
To obtain college completion rates of students by parental education I turn to
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the National Education Longitudinal Study (NELS:88). I compute the percent of
individuals from this nationally representative sample who were first surveyed as
eighth-graders in the spring of 1988, that by 2000 had obtained at least a Bachelors
degree, conditional on the highest education level of their parents. I identify sp =
cg in the model with the highest education of a parent being at least a Bachelors
degree (obtained by 1992), and with sp = cd with parents who have high school
and some college education. I find that for students with parents in the sp = cg
category 63.3% have completed a Bachelors degree, in sp = cd - 30% and in sp = n
- 22%. Although in the model these shares are endogenously determined, they
are mainly driven by the values for the education specific means µsp .
Government policy
Consistent with the current social security configuration, pension benefits are set
to be 45% of the average income of each skill group, i.e., κs = 45%. Payroll tax
rate τ is then set to balance the spending on pensions and education subsidies.
Student loans
The baseline calibration is meant at evaluating the current income-based repay-
ment (IBR) component of student loans in the US. It entails usually68 a monthly
payment of 10%-15% of borrowers monthly gross income (if it makes the bor-
rower better-off than repaying at the market rate) and a full discharge of the loan
after 20-25 years. Importantly, IBRs are not a default solution in the US. Moreover,
transforming one’s student loan into an income-based one is associated with sig-
nificant administrative efforts and as such is seen as one of the major reasons why
the usage of IBRs is relatively small (see Barr, Chapman, Dearden and Dynarski
(2019) for discussion of these issues). In what follows, I will abstract from this and
so will proceed as if the system of IBRs was a default component of the student
loan design in the US.
In order to implement this numerically, I impose the repayments of college
dropouts to be b′j,s (a, d)− (1 + rt) bj,s (a, d) = 12.5% · wt,s f hs,jl for the maximum
of 20 years (unless repaid earlier). Notice that this solution may imply that col-
lege dropouts do not fully repay their loans, forcing the government to cover the
missing part by taxing working population.
68Source: http://www.ibrinfo.org/existingidr.vp.html
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As outlined in the modelling section above, in the counterfactual exercises I
will allow for elastic repayments through endogenous choice of b′ at the two re-
payment rates of qcd < qcg. Notice that this solution should dominate the fixed
repayment rate policy, if I properly account for the amount of non-repaid loans
that need to be covered through labor taxation.
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3 A Note on Pessimism in Education and its Economic
Consequences
3.1 Introduction
Beliefs about returns to education constitute perhaps the most important determi-
nant of educational investment decisions. The very nature of these investments
being rare and taking a lot of effort, time and money to deliver a positive net pay-
off, suggests that these investments may be lumpy (see more on this below). As
such, we cannot expect people to get their decisions right by trial-and-error or by
making marginal adjustments.
Unsurprisingly then, the empirical literature in economics of education has
seen a recent surge in studies documenting biases in students’ and/or parental
beliefs about returns to and costs of college education, see e.g. Hoxby and Turner
(2015), Wiswall and Zafar (2015b), Belfield, Boneva, Rauh and Shaw (2016), Boneva
and Rauh (2017), Boneva and Rauh (2018), Bleemer and Zafar (2018) or Dizon-
Ross (2019). These biases may arise for a variety of reasons ranging from a lack of
role models in the neighbourhood, unawareness about available options, scholar-
ships, subsidies, or preferential loans, to simply being generated by media reports
of students burdened by their loans.
A common conclusion flowing from this literature is firstly that these beliefs
are important for decisions about the level and direction of educational invest-
ments pursued. Secondly, these beliefs are oftentimes severely downwardly bi-
ased, i.e. pessimistic. Finally, this pessimism is much more often found among
poorer or less-educated households. Building on these conclusions, the literature
advocates for and demonstrates the effectiveness of interventions removing these
informational frictions with the ultimate goal of improving the equality of oppor-
tunity and allocation of talent (see e.g. Hoxby and Turner, 2013; Pallais, 2015;
Wiswall and Zafar, 2015a,b; Alan and Ertac, 2017 or Dynarski, Libassi, Michel-
more and Owen, 2018).
In this note, combining the aforementioned insights, I show that in the pres-
ence of uncertainty about the true returns to lumpy educational investments, pes-
simistic beliefs may persist in the long-run due to being self-confirmed in equi-
librium (in the sense of Fudenberg and Levine, 1993). In other words, I show
that while optimistic agents will be able to find out through their labor market
outcomes that their beliefs about returns were upwardly biased, this will not be
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true of pessimistic market participants since in equilibrium they will receive labor
income confirming their pessimistic priors.
The general idea behind education being a lumpy investment is that it can-
not be varied by small amounts. On the one hand, actual years of schooling are
bunched around years associated with the completion of primary, secondary or
higher education. Similarly, the pay-offs from pursuing different professions are
often concentrated at different levels. On the other hand, when making a school
choice, families need to take into account not only the differences in quality, but
also the earnings foregone and the differences in the level of tuition fees and liv-
ing costs due to different geographical locations.69Unsurprisingly then, the ensu-
ing belief system about the returns and costs of educational investments will very
likely take the form of a step function (not necessarily the “correct” one, as the
above mentioned literature finds), mimicking the real world constraints.
Building on this simple theoretical model, I argue that the lumpy nature of
educational investments and the persistence of biased beliefs have important em-
pirical implications. Firstly, the lumpy nature of educational investments implies
that countries with more rigid institutional setups will be characterized by (i)
a higher degree of human capital concentration; (ii) a higher degree of human
capital investments misallocation; and (iii) larger discrepancies between the ob-
served human capital and the underlying initial ability distributions. Secondly,
the self-confirming nature of pessimism implies that the true underlying skill dis-
tributions cannot be identified without having identified the underlying beliefs
of students or their parents. I discuss these issues in the concluding Section 3.3.
In Appendix A, I discuss further theoretical implications for long-run economic
growth and political voting patterns. Then, in Appendix B, I describe possible cir-
cumstances conducive to the persistence of such beliefs in dynamic environments
with overlapping generations, social learning, peer effects or costly information
acquisition.
69Strictly speaking, the lumpy investment profile may arise due to non-convex education ad-
justment costs. Card (2001) reviews the literature on returns to schooling and offers some recon-
ciliatory explanations for seemingly contrary conclusions arrived at in this literature. Similarly to
the approach followed here, one of these explanations (p. 1156) is based on the discrete differ-
ences in education costs and institutional features constraining the optimal choice of educational
attainment. Moreover, Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2008) provide estimates of low returns to col-
lege attendance vs. high returns to college completion - consistent with the step function returns
assumed here.
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3.2 Model economy ...
3.2.1 ... with rational expectations
Consider a decision problem of a risk averse agent-student. She lives for two
periods, discounts the future at the rate of β and values consumption according
to the utility function u (c) with u′ (c) , −u′′ (c) > 0 and the Inada condition at 0.
Therefore, she wishes to maximize the quantity:
u (c1)− v (e) + βEu (c2)
where E is the rational expectations operator, e ∈ [0, 1] stands for educational
(mental) effort and v (e) represents the associated disutility satisfying v′ (e) , v′′ (e) >
0 and v (0) = 0.
The student starts her life in period 1 with initial endowment ω, which can
be thought of as a family transfer or potential earnings during her youth. She
is just about to make a decision about the level of her investment in education
(think of choosing the whole path of education, from high school education to
the finishing of a Ph.D.). Specifically, given the wealth available, she decides on
[1] her consumption in the current period (c1), [2] saving or borrowing b at the
risk-free interest rate r (exogenously given); and [3] educational investment in the
form of physical effort e and associated lump sum70 education cost F ≥ 0 (e.g.
tuition fee). Thus, the student faces the following budget constraint in period 1:
c1 + b + 1e>0 · F ≤ ω (60)
Furthermore, assume that the saving/borrowing decision b satisfies b ≥ B, where
B < 0 is a natural borrowing limit.71 Motivated by issues discussed in the intro-




θ i f e ∈ [0, q1)
θ (q1) i f e ∈ [q1, q2)
... ...
θ (qN) i f e ∈ [qN, 1]
(61)
where θ > 0 stands for some minimum level of human capital attainable without
pursuing any further education.
70This is without loss of generality, modeling educational costs as an increasing function of total
effort would not change any of the main results below.
71Notice that due to the assumed Inada condition, the borrowing constraint will never bind.
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Then, in the second period, after the student graduates, she collects her savings
with the incurred interest (1 + r) b and the wage income of w · θ (e), where w is the
(exogenous72) market wage rate. Thus, the budget constraint in period 2 reads:
c2 ≤ (1 + r) b + w · θ (e) (62)
Equilibrium
In equilibrium, the student’s optimal decisions will be made according to:
b∗ : u′ (c∗1) = (1 + r) βEu
′ (c∗2) (63)














The savings decision b is made according to a standard intertemporal Euler con-
dition involving comparing the marginal loss in consumption today and the ex-
pected marginal gain in consumption tomorrow (in marginal utility terms). On
the other hand, the optimal education decision e involves exercising educational
effort at a level e∗ ∈ {0, q1, ..., qN} maximizing the students’ (expected) life-time
utility.
3.2.2 ... with subjective beliefs
Consider now a student with a following subjective belief system:
Assumption 2. Subjective beliefs are assumed to be as follows:
• A pessimistic student’s belief ES (θ (e)) is that θ (e) is a step function as in
(61) with NP < N steps s.t. ES (θ (qi)) = θ (qi) , i = 1, ..., NP .
• An optimistic student’s belief ES (θ (e)) is that θ (e) is a step function as
in(61) with NO > N steps s.t. ES (θ (qi)) = θ (qi) for some N′ ≤ N steps
and ES (θ (qi)) > θ (qi) for the remaining NO − N′ steps.
Figure 10 presents an example of lumpy objective, subjective pessimistic and sub-
jective optimistic beliefs on returns to education. The objective process involves
four steps, while the pessimistic one involves three. This can be thought of as
returns associated with pursuing high school, undergraduate or graduate educa-
tion, where the pessimist does not believe in any returns from completing a 2 year
72Theoretically, wages are completely pinned down by a linear constant returns to scale tech-
nology. I thus ignore the impact of changes in supply on the wages associated with schooling.
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Figure 10: Example of objective, pessimistic and optimistic beliefs on returns to
education
community college education (for reasons discussed in the introduction). On the
other hand, the optimist believes in 8 different levels of educational investments
with some of these not being as productive as believed in.
Finally and importantly, such a lumpy educational investment profile could
arise endogenously as an optimal decision made by students facing uncertainty
about the true return function and costly information acquisition along the lines
of rational inattention literature. In such a case, lumpy educational investment
would be optimal even if the optimal profile without rational inattention were
continuous. For more on this, see the work of Matejka and Sims (2011), Matejka
(2015) and Ellison and Macaulay (2017).
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Equilibrium
Now, I want to argue that the competitive equilibrium associated with subjec-
tive beliefs ES (θ (e)) (as in the Assumption 2) is self-confirming in the sense of
Fudenberg and Levine (1993). To make this clear, I first spell out the notion of
self-confirming equilibrium (SCE) in the setting outlined.
Definition 4. The SCE is defined as decisions (c∗1 , c
∗
2 , b
∗, e∗) and the student’s sub-
jective belief ES (θ (e)) on returns to education such that given the numbers {r, w}:
1. (Maximization) Agent maximizes her expected life-time utility:
maxc∗1 ,c∗2 ,b∗,e∗u (c1)− v (e) + βE
Su (c2) (65)
subject to the natural borrowing constraint73 b ≥ B and budget constraints:
(a) in t = 1: c1 + b + 1e>0 · F ≤ ω;
(b) in t = 2: c2 ≤ (1 + r) b + w · θ (e)
2. (Self-confirmation) Agents’ beliefs on returns to education are confirmed in
equilibrium, i.e. ES (θ (e∗)) = θ (e∗).
3. (Experimentation) Agents can realize that their beliefs are wrong by devi-
ating from the equilibrium strategies, i.e. choosing e′ = e∗ ± ε produces a
return of θ (e′) 6= ES (θ (e′)).
The equilibrium choices of borrowing/saving and educational effort are charac-
terized by conditions similar to (4)-(5) with subjective expectation operators:
b∗ : u′ (c∗1) = (1 + r) βE
Su′ (c∗2) (66)














In terms of the example in Figure 10, the optimal decision of a pessimistic student
will be to choose e at one of the levels of 0, 0.25, 0.5 or 0.75. Notice that the above
discussion implies that:
Proposition 7. The allocation associated with pessimistic subjective beliefs as in Assump-
tion 2 constitutes a self-confirmed equilibrium.
73Strictly speaking, the associated natural borrowing limit is also a function of the subjective
and objective beliefs. As it is still the case that it will not be binding in equilibrium, this fact does
not matter for further analysis.
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In particular, because the subjective and objective beliefs coincide at the points of
discontinuity, the beliefs will be confirmed in equilibrium (i.e. ES (θ (e)) = θ (e)).
Furthermore, had the student experimented by pursuing an off-equilibrium
educational investment decision, she could find out that her subjective beliefs
were wrong. Returning to the example in Figure 10, assuming parameter val-
ues such that that the optimal decision with pessimistic beliefs is to invest at the
level of e∗ = 0.25, an investment of e′ = 0.25 − ε would produce a return of
θ (e′) 6= ES (θ (e′)) refuting the subjective belief. If education was to be taken
again (e.g. at a higher level) or the student was to have offspring facing a similar
schooling decision problem in the future, this could incentivize her to learn more
about the true returns to education (see the Appendix B for discussion of some
possible learning algorithms).
Notice that a pessimistic subjective belief system could in principle result in
students choosing education at levels both above or below the ones with rational
expectations. Nonetheless, I refer to such beliefs as pessimistic due to the very
fact that such a decision would be due to underestimating returns to education at
lower levels and as such would lead to a strictly lower lifetime utility.
In case of an optimistic student, however, the equilibrium labor income real-
ization upon choosing an overly optimistic level of educational investment (e.g.
the level of e = 0.625 in Figure 10), will reveal the student’s optimistic bias. How-
ever, this will not be the case for pessimists as in equilibrium they will receive
labor income confirming their prior.
3.3 Conclusion: empirical implications
Institutional design and allocation of human capital
Design of education systems varies tremendously from country to country. This is
especially the case in Europe, where in some regions, such as e.g. eastern Europe,
France, the Mediterreanean and Scandinavian countries, primary and secondary
education is mostly universal, without much specialization at early stages. On
the other hand, institutional design in countries such as e.g. Austria, Germany,
Lithuania, Switzerland or the Netherlands is characterized by highly developed
apprenticeship systems streaming their pupils into particular occupations at a
very early stage. Similarly, while in some countries the quality of higher educa-
tion is fairly comparable across most of the public universities (e.g. in Germany),
in others there is a small set of elite universities that strictly dominate the rest of
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the higher education system (e.g. in France or the UK).
Needless to say, these differences in “discreteness” - i.e. how easy it is to reach
a higher level of qualification, or to reverse one’s previously chosen education
path - may have serious implications for the allocation of human capital. To this
end, let us re-interpet Figure 10 as presenting education systems in three coun-
tries: a country with a least “discrete” education system (“optimistic” profile in
Figure 10), a country with a most “discrete” system (“pessimistic” profile in Figure
10), and a country in-between (“correct” profile in Figure 10). With this interpre-
tation in mind and assuming that the distribution of initial ability is continuous
and the same across countries,74 the model outlined above suggests that the more
“discrete” the institutional design of a country’s education system, the more it will
be characterized by: (i) a higher degree of human capital concentration; and (ii)
larger discrepancies between the observed human capital and the underlying ini-
tial ability distributions. Notice that this result holds regardless of the correctness
of students’ beliefs (as long as they are non-degenerate).
Secondly, let us re-interpret Figure 10 as presenting: the education system in
a country with a less “discrete” education system (“optimistic” profile in Figure
10); a country with a more “discrete” one (“pessimistic” profile in Figure 10); and
a common subjective belief about returns to education (“correct” profile in Figure
10). In such a case, the model suggests that the degree of human capital invest-
ments misallocation should be significantly higher in countries with more rigid
(or “discrete”) education systems. Moreover, self-improvement of these misallo-
cations may be particularly difficult to achieve due to the self-confirming nature
of pessimistic biases.
Identification of underlying skill distributions
As a second implication, the self-confirming nature of beliefs combined with an
endogenous human capital accumulation process has a direct implication for aca-
demic research. Following the insights of Saez (2001), it is a common practice
nowadays in public finance to infer true underlying skills from observed income
distributions. The results above imply that without pinning down the beliefs of
relevant parts of population affecting their human capital accumulation decisions,
the true underlying skill distribution cannot be identified (but rather its lower
bound).
74This assumption is arguably sensible in the case of European countries where populations
have been interacting and mixing with each other for many centuries.
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Therefore, for instance, it seems like a worthwhile endeavour to verify the
optimal policy prescriptions derived in the literature when the downwardly bi-
ased beliefs are properly accounted for. While this is obviously not to say that we
should tax or subsidize people differently based on their past mistakes, it might
be worthwhile to investigate the changes to optimal policy prescriptions and the
size of social welfare losses due to a combination of the two forces.
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3.4 Appendix A: Theoretical implications
Growth
Constraints on human capital accumulation imposed by pessimistic beliefs may
have important implications for long-run economic growth. This is especially so
in light of a dynamic complementarity between human capital accumulation and
firms’ technology adoption (or R&D) demonstrated by Lloyd-Ellis and Roberts
(2002) and Stokey (2017). On one hand, without continued technological progress
workers would not find it profitable to acquire new skills. On the other, in the face
of a shortage of appropriate skills required for operating new technologies, firms
would reduce their technological investments. As a direct implication, pessimism
would slow down the rate of the economy’s long-run growth rate.
Political economy
Piketty (1995), Alesina and Angeletos (2005) and Benabou and Tirole (2006) de-
velop political economy models where workers face the identification problem of
distinguishing the impact of effort and luck on the income received. This leads
some dynasties to believe that their outcomes are mostly due to the luck compo-
nent, and some that it is more due to their effort. As a consequence, these dy-
nasties have endogenous preferences for more or less redistributive policies (e.g.
on public education provision) which feed back into their effort decisions leading
to a set of self-confirmed equilibria with different efficiency and inequality levels.
Given that students’ and parents’ expectations are an important factor determin-
ing educational investments (Wiswall and Zafar, 2016; Bleemer and Zafar, 2018;
Hastings, Neilson and Zimmerman, 2018; Belfield et al. 2019), and that the latter
have significant impact on the level and variance of labor income (see e.g. Meghir
and Pistaferri, 2004), the combination of misinformation about returns to educa-
tion with the just discussed political economy consequences may lead not only
to implementation of sub-optimal education policies, but also to a sub-optimal
design of the general welfare system at large.
3.5 Appendix B: Robustness
In what follows, I firstly discuss robustness of the self-confirmed equilibrium re-
sult to deviations from the Assumption 2; and secondly I discuss broadly some
dynamic environments in which the self-confirmed beliefs may well survive in
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spite of students having ways to learn the truth. Obviously, the purpose of this
exercise is certainly not to argue that such beliefs will necessarily persist in the
long-run, but rather to complement the applied literature by pointing out the crit-
ical groups75 and contingencies where such informational interventions may be
particularly needed.
Robustness to assumptions on subjective beliefs
An alternative way of defining pessimism is to consider a subjective profile of re-
turns that is strictly below the objective. With pessimism defined in such a way,
the student will always be positively surprised by her returns to education, break-
ing the result of self-confirmation. To this end, notice that in the above the student
was assumed to have a degenerate unitary belief system assigning probability 1
to one particular education return function. However, it might be more realistic
to assume that students’ prior on returns to educational investments consists of
a distribution of return functions with corresponding subjective probabilities.76
In such a case, the self-confirmed equilibrium becomes obviously more robust as
with non-degenerate beliefs the educational outcome would have to coincide with
only one of the return functions from the distribution of prior subjective expecta-
tions.
Robustness to introducing learning algorithms
Consider first a version of the baseline model extended by overlapping gener-
ations living for two periods each. In such an environment, one can think of
multiple cross-generational information transmission mechanisms from parents
(or from neighbourhood role models) to young offspring. One example could
be social learning through observed market outcomes in a richer environment
with endogenized wage rates77 and agents differing w.r.t. their inborn ability and
parental wealth. Interestingly, if we assume the inborn ability to affect the returns
to educational investments and its distribution Ω to be unobservable (to students
75Chetty and Hendren (2017a, b) identify such critical groups and regions in the US by showing
that the quality of a neighborhood and county where children grow up has causal impact on their
college attendance and future earnings, among others.
76A source of such a diffused prior could be e.g. uncertainty about one’s innate ability or imper-
fect information about market outcomes of similar individuals.
77One way of generating wage rates that are endogenous to supply of skill in the economy could
be by assuming existence of competitive firms that have to employ e.g. two types of workers (high-
and low-skilled) that are imperfectly substitutable.
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themselves), then conditional on the realized distribution of θ’s and vector of mar-
ket wage income ` ·w, every agent with a wrong subjective belief can come up
with a wrong prior Ω̃ that is consistent with her subjective belief. In particular,
after observing market outcomes that are inconsistent with her subjective belief, a
pessimistic student may revise her prior belief on the inborn ability distribution in
a way that supports the self-confirming equilibrium. The same can be said about
social learning from the realized human capital levels θ: if a student is surprised
by high accomplishments of her friends, she may similarly revise her prior beliefs
about the friend’s inborn skill in a way that supports her own pessimism.
Peer effects, defined as the impact of others educational effort on a student’s
own human capital level (i.e. a model with ∂θi(e)∂ej 6= 0, i 6= j and e being a vec-
tor of population’s efforts), constitute another candidate mechanism for breaking
the self-confirmed pessimism. In principle, going to college with a high quality
student body may enable some individuals to achieve a career they initially did
not even think of. However, this need not necessarily be true if the underlying re-
turns to education are a step function and the peer externalities are weak enough,
failing to push the pessimistic student to the next notch of human capital level.
Clearly, in such a case pessimism could persist again.
Finally, students may also have an opportunity to acquire information about
returns to education but processing it can be costly, as in models of limited at-
tention with discrete choices (such as educational investments) by Matejka and
McKey (2015). If education is the only choice variable whose outcomes are uncer-
tain, a model with agents differing w.r.t. wealth should lead the poorer students
to acquire more information as their marginal utility of consumption will be much
higher in expectation. In such a case, the pessimism should disappear over time
(at least on the side of poor households).
However, it is arguably more realistic to consider environments with a trade-
off in allocation of attention between consumption and education margins. This
could be thought of as uncertainty about product prices in shops, uncertainty
about the choice of a travel agency offering the best value for money holidays, or
simply a difference between consumption preferences in the short- and long-run.
In such a case, the households would have to allocate their attention optimally
between these two margins. Since the variation in consumption price would be
much more important for the poorer households, they would allocate less atten-
tion to information acquisition on the true returns to education, as compared with
richer households. In such a case, pessimism would not only persist but could also
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become deeper relative to the wealthier (and potentially more optimistic) part of
the population.
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4 Can Welfare Abuse be Welfare Improving?
4.1 Introduction
In the late 1970s the labor markets in the US and Europe began to diverge and
these differences are profoundly visible until today. Unsurprisingly, this contrast-
ing evolution has attracted interest of many economists. Among many topics re-
lated to it, arguably the most attention has been devoted to unemployment insur-
ance (UI) systems (vide e.g. the research program ran by Ljungqvist and Sargent).
In this paper, I model one particular aspect of UI which differs strikingly between
the two continents: the benefit entitlements for workers quitting jobs voluntar-
ily. While in the US no quitter is eligible for receiving unemployment benefits78,
the entitlement policy in Europe is generally more generous and usually allows
for payment of benefits in such cases subject to some sanctions. The exact re-
quirements and sanctions have been described by Venn (2012). In general, there
is a fixed work experience (or rather a social security contribution) requirement
which is the same for both fired workers and quitters - usually it varies between
6 to 18 months of employment within the last 12-36 months preceding unemploy-
ment. On top of it, in order to discourage quitting, there are sanctions79 in form of
payment suspensions: in Lithuania and Slovakia there are no such sanctions, in
Denmark there is a 3-week sanction, in Austria - 4; in Belgium - 7; in Sweden - 9;
in Germany - 12. Nevertheless, there are also European countries not paying out
the benefits for voluntarily unemployed, like Estonia, Italy or the Netherlands.
To the best of my knowledge, there is no research analyzing the welfare effects of
these policy choices. This paper is trying to fill this gap.
To this extent, I construct and calibrate to the US labor market a job search
model where fired workers are eligible for time-limited UI and ask what is the
optimal entitlement policy for voluntarily unemployed, i.e. whether such quits
should be punished by no UI entitlement or, if not, for how long should such
workers be employed before being awarded UI entitlement. In order to pick the
best policy I perform a social welfare analysis. This is a natural approach as it re-
quires a consistent accounting for both benefits (such as more time and resources
available for job search) and adverse incentive effects of the UI (such as work-
78Some states in the US allow quitters to apply for benefits if backed with a “good cause”.
Nevertheless, as Venn (2012) reports, most (including e.g. the seven largest states where almost
50% of the U.S. population lives) do disqualify all the voluntary quits.
79These sanctions are often not executed if the employer does not contest worker’s UI claim.
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ers being more picky, generating possibly higher unemployment rate and conse-
quently higher tax rate to finance the welfare system).
In particular, when an ex-ante homogenous worker becomes unemployed she
consumes her savings or unemployment benefits (defined as the replacement ra-
tio tied to her most recent wage). Furthermore, in order to find a job, she exercises
costly search effort. The search effort is random meaning that although the ex-
pected wage offer is increasing in amount of the search effort exercised, some un-
employed are luckier and receive higher wage offers than others. Consequently,
workers set optimally their reservation wages and reject all the wage offers below
it. Moreover, some employed workers find it optimal to behave opportunistically
and quit their jobs. Thus, workers become ex-post heterogenous with respect to
their employment status, wage income received and savings.
The latter means that there are some jobs in the economy which workers enter
solely in order to build up their saving accounts and (if the policy allows for it)
regain eligibility for the benefits, quit the job short after and search for a better
one thereafter. I refer to this opportunistic behavior as a welfare abuse since if the
search effort was perfectly observable, workers would clearly exercise a higher
effort and so in such a case the policy of entitlement for quitters might be unnec-
essary. Consequently, this moral hazard related behavior results in an excessive
use of the welfare system and thus a higher tax burden on employed workers.
In fact, there is evidence that workers do behave as predicted by the model
employed in this paper. First of all, although quitters in the US are not entitled
to the UI, on average 10% of unemployed workers are job leavers (according to
the CPS data set). Moreover, Christofides and McKenna (1996) studied data from
Canadian Longitudinal Labour Market Activity Survey for 1986/87 and found
a significant increase in the job separation probability in the week right after a
worker satisfies unemployment benefit eligibility. This finding was later con-
firmed by Green and Riddell (1997) and Baker and Rea (1998) who studied the
same data for the year 1990. Similarly, Jurajda (2002) studied the US labor market
and found that entitlement for unemployment insurance significantly increases
the probability of a lay-off. Importantly, these studies do not look explicitly at
voluntary quits. Nevertheless, given that we should not always blindly believe in
a dichotomy between lay-offs and voluntarily quits (as discussed for example by
Feldstein (1976)), it is surely possible for many quitters to pass themselves off as
being fired. However, it also seems very reasonable that there is still a significant
share of quits due to personal reasons of the employees (especially in labor mar-
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kets where quitters receive benefits). In what follows, I am modeling the latter
phenomenon where there is a clear distinction between the two groups.
Furthermore, in the model presented below workers behave opportunistically
in order to improve upon the match quality. Indeed, Tatsiramos (2009) presents
empirical evidence for the role of unemployment insurance in correcting the mis-
allocations in labor markets: he finds that for workers entitled to receiving ben-
efits the subsequent employment spells are longer and that this relationship is
more profound in countries with relatively more generous welfare systems.
Results suggest that, in spite of the associated fiscal costs in form of a higher
unemployment rate and so a higher tax rate, the optimal policy is characterized by
entitlement to UI for quitters. In particular, pursuing a generous entitlement pol-
icy leads to long run welfare gains equivalent to 4.38% of life time consumption.
Importantly, these results should be robust to the possibility of quitters passing
themselves off as being laid-off, as surely not every worker is able to do this and
as firing a worker is associated with non-negligible firing costs (for example in the
US the unemployment insurance tax is experience rated). The intuition for the re-
sult is two-fold. Firstly, as already mentioned, the policy allows for average match
quality improvement. It does so by reducing the income risk associated with quit-
ting a job in order to look for a better one. Secondly, it extracts many long-term
unemployed into employment by increasing the non-wage value of low paid jobs
and so by lowering the reservation wage of those workers.
Interestingly, the results of the model also suggest that the policy studied here
may be a force pushing characteristics of the US labor market towards the Euro-
pean one. Firstly, following the optimal policy generates a higher unemployment
rate. This is due to the fact that next to fired workers, the policy increases the
mass of voluntarily unemployed ones. Secondly, it reduces both the pre- and
after-tax income inequality (i.e. there is no efficiency-equity trade-off). This is due
to two effects induced by the entitlement policy: (i) a significant reduction in mass
of unemployed on social assistance; and (ii) an increase in the budget balancing
tax rate bringing the income of employed individuals closer to the income of un-
employed. Thirdly, the average match quality post-reform is higher, in line with
evidence in Manacorda and Petrongolo (1999) that the labor market mismatch has
grown much faster in the US as compared to Europe.
Moreover, I investigate the assumption of monetary (or non-separable) search
costs which is mostly ignored in the literature. Results show that this assumption
is able to generate the empirically documented spike in search effort at the benefit
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exhaustion. Furthermore, it also generates an initial decrease in search effort at the
beginning of unemployment spell - in line with the recent evidence in Faberman
and Kudlyak (2016). On the other hand, as is already acknowledged in the litera-
ture (see e.g. Krueger and Mueller (2010)), the usually employed in the literature
assumption of separable search costs does not deliver such features. Significantly,
as opposed to the latter assumption, increasing generosity of unemployment ben-
efits in the model with monetary search costs does not necessarily decrease the
search effort. Finally, the model generates important testable implications about
differences in search effort and reservation wage behavior, and so in labor market
outcomes for similar workers differing only with respect to their financial wealth.
My paper builds on a long literature of unemployment insurance. While the
most common rationale for the payment of unemployment benefits is to provide
risk averse workers with income insurance allowing for consumption smoothing,
there is also a smaller strand of research work starting with Burdett (1979) which
does not see the unemployment insurance solely as a serious distortion but rather
argues for the role of insurance as a subsidy to search. In this literature the role of
unemployment insurance is not only to give unemployed the time and resources
to find a job but also to find the right one, i.e. it allows the workers to improve
upon the quality of matches in labor markets. In this paper, I argue for a similar
role of unemployment insurance.
While searching for reasons of labor markets divergence, Ljungqvist and Sar-
gent (1998) argued that although in times of low micro-economic labor volatility
the presence of unemployment insurance system has moderate impact on the un-
employment rate, the systems which are relatively more generous may have a
much more profound effect on the number of unemployed in times of high tur-
bulence. In a more recent contribution, Kitao, Ljungqvist and Sargent (2015) ex-
plain this divergence with higher minimum wages in Europe and human capital
depreciation during unemployment. On the other hand, Marimon and Zilibotti
(1999) used a model with both heterogenous workers and firms, search frictions
and skilled-biased technological change coupled with the assumption of comple-
mentarity between capital and capital-specific-skills to show that the differences
in generosity of unemployment systems may account for the observed discrep-
ancies between the US and European labor markets. In particular, they showed
that although upon the technology-specific shock the economy with more gener-
ous unemployment welfare system has a higher unemployment rate, it is char-
acterized by a higher quality of matches, i.e. a higher growth of productivity per
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worker and a relatively lower wage inequality - a result complementary to the one
in Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998). In this work, I identify a concrete real world pol-
icy which may be a channel of effects similar to these described in Marimon and
Zilibotti (1999).
As I assume perfect distinction between lay-offs and quits, this paper is com-
plementary to Hopenhayn and Nicolini (2009) where they derived an optimal
unemployment insurance design under assumption that principal cannot distin-
guish quits from lay-offs. This assumption generates an opportunistic worker
behavior similar to the one imputed in my paper. Their conclusion is that under
the latter assumption the optimal contract involves conditioning of the benefit
eligibility on worker’s employment history.
Furthermore, the result of no efficiency-equity trade-off derived in this model
is analogous to the one reached by Acemoglu and Shimer (1997) in a general
equilibrium search setup. In their model, unemployment insurance induces risk
averse workers to seek higher paying jobs with higher unemployment risk and so
also induces firms to invest into higher paying technologies. In other words, the
unemployment insurance increases both the output and improves the risk shar-
ing.
Finally, Aguiar, Hurst and Karabarbounis (2013) and other authors mentioned
therein argued that modeling consumption and leisure in a non-separable way is
important for explaining a wide variety of macroeconomic observations in busi-
ness cycle models. Thus, the differences in the worker behavior generated by the
two assumptions are complementary to this literature and suggest that the same
is also true when it comes to explaining workers’ search behavior.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section outlines the theoretical
model together with measures used for evaluating the policy experiments. In
Section 4.3, I calibrate the model to the US labor market. Section 4.4 discusses the
results. Finally, Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Model economy
The economy consists of a continuum of ex-ante identical, risk-averse, infinitely-
lived agents with measure normalized to 1. Workers have access to risk-less sav-
ing accounts and UI system. Time is discrete and in every period an unemployed
worker receives with some probability a wage draw. This probability depends on
the amount of random search effort chosen by the worker. After the draw, she has
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to decide whether to accept the job or not. Employed workers make a decision
about quitting or staying on the job.
4.2.1 Workers
Working does not yield disutility. Any worker can be either unemployed or em-
ployed and is maximizing her discounted life-time utility with respect to (1) sav-
ings a, the level of unobservable random search effort required to find the job q
(when unemployed only, i.e. there is no on the job search - see the discussion of
this assumption in Section 4.4) and then, if she draws a wage offer from some dis-
tribution, whether to accept it; or (2) savings a and the decision about staying on
the job or quitting it in order to search for another. When employed she faces a
risk of an exogenous separation happening at the Poisson rate σ.
Workers have a common instantaneous CRRA utility function U (x) = x
1−θ
1−θ .
When unemployed they exercise search effort q which is subject to convex costs
given by g (q) = αqζ , where q ∈ [0, 1]. The mapping from worker’s effort to
the effective transition probability is governed by an identity function f (q) = q.
Importantly, searching is unobservable giving rise to standard moral hazard of
suboptimal search effort.
In each period an unemployed individual faces a stochastic employment op-
portunity: either she is offered a job opportunity for wage w or not. There are
n different wage offers that the worker may draw and their support is on the
[0, 1] interval. Denote this wage distribution by F. To explain this heterogeneity
in wages, just think of n different technologies and of many firms having access
solely to one of them. Also, I assume that the wage rate received by an employed
worker is constant over time. Finally, monitoring of job applicants is impossible
and therefore a worker who rejects a work opportunity continues to receive un-
employment benefits according to her benefit payment path (for description of UI
see Section 4.2.2).
Apart from the UI, workers have access to risk-less saving accounts with a con-
stant rate of return r. Considering this channel is important as it allows workers
to self-insure against the state of unemployment and so it may have some first-
order effects on the worker’s search and offer acceptance behavior (and so on all
the other equilibrium outcomes).80
Importantly, I assume that the cost of search effort is in terms of consumption,
80See e.g. Abdulkadiroglu, Kuruscu and Sahin (2002) for discussion of the role of self-insurance
for welfare conclusions.
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i.e. worker’s utility function is of the form U (c− g (q)). In this model, the role
of unemployment benefits is not only to insure workers against the state of un-
employment but also to provide them with a subsidy to search so that they can
find the right job. Notice that this formulation introduces wealth and substitution
effects between consumption and search effort. In particular, workers 1) increase
their search effort if the wealth effect dominates; or 2) reduce it (in order to smooth
consumption) if the substitution effect dominates. The wealth effect is especially
strong right before the benefit exhaustion. At that moment workers want to avoid
falling into the badly paid state of social assistance implying a significant increase
in probability of a long-term unemployment lock-in (see Section 4.4 for a detailed
discussion).
Moreover, this assumption is realistic in two ways. First of all, searching for a
job costs money as well as time or physical effort. Any unemployed worker that
wants to find a job has to buy and maintain a suit, travel for an interview, send
out applications on nice paper or get some professional training. Secondly, many
consumption expenditures such as a comfortable car or a home computer with
internet access are complementary to job search. Such a modeling assumption
was employed solely for tractability with CARA utility by Werning (2001) and
also by Shimer and Werning (2007).
Significantly, the mechanics generated by the assumption of monetary search
costs employed here are supported by the empirical evidence documented by
Blau and Robins (1990), Wadsworth (1991) and more recently by Krueger and
Mueller (2014) who found that unemployed workers eligible for unemployment
compensation search more actively than those not eligible. Similarly, as already
mentioned, the assumption generates a spike in search effort at the benefit exhaus-
tion. Nevertheless, there are results speaking against the monetary search cost as
for example Jones (1989) or Krueger and Mueller (2010) who find that higher ben-
efits reduce the time devoted to search among benefit recipients. However, with
unemployment benefits defined as a replacement ratio, such a behavior could
stem from the fact that workers receiving higher benefits (and so having worked
in better jobs) find themselves in a more favorable search environment not requir-
ing that much of a time investment (e.g. due to knowing well connected people).
Finally, note that typically in the literature search effort is modeled using the
separable utility function of the form U (c) − g (q), which can be interpreted in
terms of physical effort. Since there is no research on the degree of substitutabil-
ity of money and time devoted to job search (in the extreme think of wealthy
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individuals employing headhunters), both should be seen as reasonable model-
ing assumptions. Therefore, for comparability with other papers and exposition
of the dynamics induced by the two assumptions, I also investigate all the results
in the model with separable search cost. As I discuss in Sections 4.3 and 4.4, such
a model is not able to match the time profile of search effort documented empiri-
cally. In particular, it cannot generate search effort spike at the benefit exhaustion.
On the other hand, the monetary cost of search can fully explain this behavior.
4.2.2 Unemployment system
The design of the unemployment insurance system together with search fric-
tions and exogenous separations are the source of ex-post heterogeneity among
the workers. It is financed with linear taxes raised by the government running
a balanced budget. The tax distorts the decision about the search effort chosen.
Any unemployed worker whose match was separated exogenously qualifies for
benefits. Note that below I calibrate the model to the exogenous separation prob-
ability of 0.1 quarterly. This implies that in expectation workers are fired once in
2.5 years. This work experience satisfies labor attachment requirement in virtually
every country.
The worker who decides to quit the job voluntarily is eligible for benefits if she
had worked in her last job for at least T̂ periods (policy experiment parameter);
otherwise she receives the social assistance income iSA. The latter value is also
financed by the government and pins down the value of worker’s outside option.
Any unemployed and eligible worker receives the value of b = γw for T periods,
where w is the worker’s most recent wage. From period T onwards, she receives
the income of iSA until she finds a new job.
4.2.3 Recursive formulation
Given Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, each worker’s current state can be captured with a
vector s = (a, t, w, x) of four state variables:
1. Amount of savings a in worker’s account.
2. Worker’s most recent81 wage w ∈ {w1, . . . , wn}.
3. Worker’s current employment status x: if employed x = e, or if unemployed
x = u.
81This state variable also captures the current wage of employed workers.
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4. Time t spent in current stage. Notice that for unemployed workers after the
drop in the benefit schedule from high to low, i.e. in period T + 1, the envi-
ronment becomes stationary due to the benefit schedule being constant from
that point onwards. A similar argument applies to the employed workers.
Therefore, t ∈
{
1, 2, . . . , max
{
T̂, T + 1
}}
. In particular, if a worker has been
employed for t < T̂ periods and decides to quit, she immediately jumps
from the state (a, t, w, e) to the low benefit state (a, T + 1, w, u). However, if
a match is separated exogenously or endogenously after at least T̂ periods
on the job, then the unemployed worker is entitled to benefits, i.e. she lands
in the state (a, 1, w, u).
Therefore, the following Bellman equations hold for unemployed and employed
workers:































where t′ = min {t + 1, T + 1}.













σVu(a′, 1, w) + (1− σ)max
{
Vu(a′, t′′, w), Ve(a′, t†, w)
})}
where t′′ =
1 if t = T̂T + 1 if t < T̂ , t† = min {t + 1, T̂}.
Finally, notice that given the setup, the model possesses the reservation wage
property. Given the design of the unemployment system, the reservation wage
(just as the effort exerted q) depends on the three state variables: savings a, length
of unemployment spell t and last wage w.
Proposition (reservation wage property): Consider a worker exercising search
effort to find a job in the market described in Section 4.2.1 and facing unemploy-
ment system described in Section 4.2.2. Then the optimal job search strategy of
such a worker has a reservation wage characterization conditional upon worker’s
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current state: the worker will accept a job if and only if the wage draw w′ is weakly
greater than her reservation wage, i.e. w′ ≥ w̄ (a, t, w).
Proof. See the Appendix A.
4.2.4 Steady state equilibrium and government
In the steady state, the measure of workers in each of the states is constant over
time. Let Du and De be the cross sectional distributions over the states of all the
(un)employed workers in the economy and let du(a, t, w) and de(a, t, w) be the
mass of (un)employed currently in a given state with ∑a,t,w (du(a, t, w) + de(a, t, w)) =
1, i.e. the two are the associated probability mass functions. Steady state is charac-
terized by an invariant cross sectional distributions D∗ (and probabilities d∗) such
that D∗Γ = D∗, where Γ is the Markov transition matrix defined precisely in the
Appendix E.
Moreover, revenue and expenditures of the government have to be balanced























d∗u (a, T + 1, w)
]
(70)
Equation (70) equalizes the government revenue (equal to the taxable por-
tion of the income of employed workers) with the expenditure of the government
(equal to the measure of unemployed receiving unemployment benefits and social
assistance income multiplied by the expenditure).
4.2.5 Welfare, inequality and unemployment duration measures
In order to rank each policy choice T̂ given a budget balancing tax rate τ, I use a
standard measure of life time consumption equivalent changes in the aggregate
welfare. It shows by how much the agents’ average consumption should change
such that the utilitarian welfare in the no entitlement for quitters scenario is equal
to the utilitarian welfare associated with a given policy reform. Mathematically:
Wel f are =
(
∑a,t,w,x λ1 (a, t, w, x) v1 (a, t, w, x)




where θ is the coefficient of risk aversion, λi is the steady state distribution of
agents and vi is the associated value function with i = 0 standing for the status
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quo of no entitlement for quitters and i = 1 standing for a given policy reform.82
Furthermore, in order to measure (pre- and after-tax) income inequality asso-
ciated with each policy, I use the Gini coefficient given by:
Inequality = 1−
Σni=1P (yi) (Si−1 + Si)
Sn
(72)




yj, S0 = 0 and
yi < yi+1. A coefficient of 0 means perfect equality.





















w′ < w̄ (a, min {t̃, T + 1} , w)
)))
d∗u (a, t, w)
i.e. the weighted (by mass of unemployed workers in given states) average of
expected unemployment duration. Each worker’s expected unemployment du-
ration is given by the sum of products of possible unemployment periods t and
corresponding probabilities of moving into them.
4.3 Calibration
I calibrate the model to properties of the existing UI system in the US. The cali-
bration of the non-separable model described below is later on referred to as the
baseline calibration. I assume a monthly periodicity. The assumed coefficient of the
relative risk aversion is θ = 3. For the exogenous separation probability, I choose
a quarterly value of σ = 0.1 from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey as
in Hall and Milgrom (2008). Moreover, since the model employed here abstracts
from capital, I target the yearly interest of 2%. This is a half of what is commonly
82Note that due to the functional form of the utility function in the separable search costs model,
this metric is no longer valid. The adjusted one reads instead:
Wel f are =
(
∑a,t,w,x λ1 (a, t, w, x) v1 (a, t, w, x) + ∑a,t,w,x λ0 (a, t, w, x) vS0 (a, t, w, x)
∑a,t,w,x λ0 (a, t, w, x) vC0 (a, t, w, x)
) 1
1−θ
where vS0 (s) = −g (q (s)) · 1x=u + β ∑s′ Π (s′|s) vS0 (s′) (the search cost component of the value
function before the reform), vC0 (s) = u (c (s))+ β ∑s′ Π (s
′|s) vC0 (s′) (the consumption component)
and c, q are the optimal decisions.
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assumed for calibration of macro models with capital (see e.g. McGrattan and
Prescott (2005)).
The discount factor is assumed to be β = 0.918. The value is chosen to match
the evidence on savings of unemployed in Gruber (2001) and Chetty (2008) doc-
umenting that 17% of workers entering unemployment report zero gross finan-
cial wealth. However, upon excluding unsecured debt, i.e. looking at workers’
net financial wealth, this number grows to 50% and moreover many workers be-
low have negative positions. Since unemployment is often an unforeseen event,
the second number may be also very relevant for the analysis. Therefore, I aim
to replicate the observation of a number between 17% and 50% of newly unem-
ployed workers with or close to zero savings. Importantly, note that although the
value of β may seem to be relatively low, it should not be seen as invalid because
it is implied by the data. The saving grid consists of 60 equidistant points from
[0, 1.1].
wi 0.0297 0.0383 0.0493 0.0634 0.0815 0.1046 0.1343 0.1724
P (wi) 0.0022 0.0068 0.0182 0.0407 0.0758 0.1181 0.1541 0.1683
0.2212 0.2840 0.3647 0.4686 0.6026 0.7758 1.0000
0.1541 0.1181 0.0758 0.0407 0.0182 0.0068 0.0022
Table 15: Wage offer distribution (pre-tax)
As far as it concerns the wage offer distribution in the US, Hall and Mueller
(2015) approximate it as log-normal, and more importantly they conclude that its
standard deviation is 0.28. However, once they also account for non-wage values,
the dispersion goes up to 0.43. Thus, I pick an average of the two numbers and
so I assume the wage offer distribution F to be log-normally distributed with dis-
persion parameter ρ = 0.35 and µ = −1.7581 (s.t. the support is on [0, 1]). Also,
I assume that there are n = 15 different wages in the market. Noteworthy, if we
think about some of workers in the economy as e.g. managers and waiters, the as-
sumed variance parameter is very large. In real life such workers are facing differ-
ent wage distributions with a much smaller dispersion. Nevertheless, the model
accounts for this phenomenon to some extent by 1) the mechanism of reservation
wages; and 2) the effective restrictions on possible search effort. The resulting
wage offer distribution is presented in Table 15 and the implied equilibrium wage
distribution is presented below in Figure 16. Importantly, the associated with the
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wage distribution “mean-min wage ratio” (as proposed by Hornstein et al. (2011))
amounts to 2.71 (i.e. 0.28400.1046 ). This number falls between 2.54 (i.e.
$38,428
$15,080) and 2.79
(i.e. $42,068$15,080 ) which are the corresponding median-min wage ratios
83 in the US be-
tween 2009 and 2015 (computed using the CPS data and the minimum wage rate
of USD 7.25 per hour as introduced in 2009).
Following the review of the UI system in the US by Pavoni and Violante (2007)
and Moffit (2002), I take γ = 0.6, T = 6 and iSA = 0.15 · w̄. The first number trans-
lates into a replacement ratio of 60% of workers’ last wage, the second number
implies the UI entitlement for a maximum of half a year and then being followed
by the social assistance income iSA set to 15% of the median wage in the steady
state economy. To pin it down, I take first the average social assistance income
in the year 2000 comprising mostly of the Temporary Cash Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF) and Food Stamps and amounting to approximately USD 879 for
a family of three (as documented by Moffit (2002)). After accounting for the fam-
ily size and the median84 personal income in the US in the year 2000 (as recorded
in the CPS), we end up with the social assistance income amounting to 12.8% (i.e.
879
3·2300 ) of the median monthly wage income. I choose a number slightly higher
in order to allow for some increasing returns to scale within a family. Finally, the
baseline calibration to the US implies that quitters are entitled solely to the social
assistance income and, in particular, not to the UI. However, in Section 4.4, I will
look for an optimal value of the re-entitlement parameter T̂.
For the search effort, I choose the grid to consist of m = 30 equidistant points
from the [0, 1] interval. More importantly, in the case of monetary search costs,
parameters (α, ζ) of the cost function g are such that: (i) the baseline model un-
der no-entitlement policy replicates the mean long-run US unemployment rate
since 1930s equal to 7.10%; and (ii) the shape of a ’representative unemployed’
worker’s search effort along the unemployment path resembles the one docu-
mented by Krueger and Mueller (2010) for UI eligible (shown in Figure 11.a). By
’representative unemployed’, I mean here a 7-period average (weighted by steady
states measures of workers in each saving and wage categories) behavior simula-
tion of a newly unemployed worker following her optimal actions conditional on
not having found employment. 85
83The bias stemming from using the mean-min wage ratio would be too big because of the very
rich in the US.
84The bias stemming from using the average would be too big because of the very rich in the
US.
85The cross sectional unemployed worker behavior would amount to looking at the average
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Note that in their work (and as is most common in the literature), the search
effort is measured in job search minutes. Since effort in this paper is in monetary
units and there is no empirical research on this subject, I aim to match the relative
magnitudes of the search effort in different stages of unemployment for eligible
workers. Thus, I look for parameters that give growth and decline rates of the
model-imputed search effort for the representative unemployed worker between
the trough before the benefit exhaustion, the peak at the benefit exhaustion and
the trough one month after the exhaustion which are approximately equal to the
counterpart ratios in Krueger and Mueller (2010) for the weeks 14, 25/26 and 30.
The parameters chosen for the search cost function are α = 0.092 and ζ = 1.09.
Another evidence on the job search behavior comes from Faberman and Kudlyak
(2016). When combined with the one in Krueger and Mueller (2010), it suggests
that the unemployed search behavior until the benefit exhaustion may in fact be
U-shaped, and followed by a decline after. In particular, they study relationship
between search intensity and search duration using a micro data set containing
information on a number of applications job seekers send to vacancies posted
on an online job search website and corresponding unemployment spell lengths.
Figure 11.b presents their main findings: the number of applications sent initially
declines steadily and then starts increasing slowly over time. However, once they
control for fixed job seeker characteristics, the number of applications sent mono-
tonically declines over time. At this point two comments are due. Firstly, their
data come from the period of Great Recession when the UI benefits were extended
to 99 weeks and so it is inapt to capture the spike at benefit exhaustion. Secondly,
the fact that number of applications sent declines does not necessarily imply the
same about the search effort. The latter is true as when workers apply for ever
more jobs, the pool of (relevant) vacancies becomes ever smaller. Notwithstand-
ing, the initial decline in search effort is still very plausible. This is especially likely
given that the data for the first 3 months in Krueger and Mueller (2010) contains
a lot of noise, and so authors report only average estimates.
behavior of all the unemployed workers weighted by their measures in the steady state. I use
the construct of the ’representative unemployed’ in order to control for composition effects in the
cross section.
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(a) Job search (in minutes) by unemployment duration (source: Krueger and Mueller (2010))
Note: To compute the ratios for calibration, one should add the regression mean of 32.1 to
the residuals. Due to noisiness of the data in the first 14 weeks the Figure shows average
time allocated to search, from week 14 on the Figure presents LOWESS-smoothed data
based on residuals after removing searchers’ individual characteristics such as age, sex,
etc.
(b) Job search (number of applications sent) by unemployment duration (source: Faberman and Kudlyak (2016))
Note: Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 11: Evidence on search effort
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parameter interpretation value (NS / S) source/target
β discount factor 0.918 / 0.94 target savings
r interest rate 0.1652% 2% yearly interest rate
θ risk aversion coefficient 3 modeling choice
σ exogenous separations rate 110·3 JOLTS/Hall and Milgrom (2008)
γ replacement ratio for UI 0.6 UI in the US, Pavoni and Violante (2007)
T periods of UI entitlement 6 UI in the US, Pavoni and Violante (2007)
iSA social assistance income 0.15 · w̄ SA in the US, Moffit (2002)
n number of wages 15 modeling choice
m search effort grid density parameter 30 modeling choice
aM savings grid density parameter 60 modeling choice
(amin, amax) savings grid bounds (0, 1.1) modeling choice
F distribution of wage offers log-normal Hall and Mueller (2015)
µ dist. log-scale parameter -1.7581 support of F on [0, 1]
$ dist. shape parameter 0.35 Hall and Mueller (2015)
α search cost f-n g parameter 1 0.092 / 15.22 target U and search profile
ζ search cost f-n g parameter 2 1.09 / 2.65 target U and search profile
Notation: NS - non-separable utility, S - separable utility.
Table 16: Parameter values in the model
However, I do not use the evidence from Faberman and Kudlyak (2016) di-
rectly for calibration since (i) it is difficult to combine this search effort measure
with the other one in Krueger and Mueller (2010); and (ii) for the purpose of this
paper the search effort around the benefit exhaustion is much more relevant. Nev-
ertheless, I show in Section 4.4 that the model with monetary search costs and
savings generates the discussed U-shape behavior.
On the other hand, for the model with separable search costs, I pick different
values for parameters. This is due to the fact that workers are no more facing
search effort constraints and so behave differently. Consequently, I assume β =
0.94 and the search costs to be much higher by choosing α = 15.22 and ζ = 2.65.
Table 16 summarizes the calibration.
Finally, Table 17 presents the targeted empirical moments and the ones implied
by the two models tested. The model with monetary search costs matches the
empirical moments pretty well. In particular, although in the steady state there
are close to nil newly unemployed workers without any savings, there is 23% and
50% of population with savings below 0.09 and 0.19, respectively. The latter two
numbers translate into only 32% and 67% of the steady state mean monthly gross
wage income. The only moment somewhat off the target is the growth rate of
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Moment q growth rate q decline rate U Rate % U liq. constr.
Empirical 54.119.1 ≈ 2.83
54.1
22.1 ≈ 2.44 7.10% 17% / 50%
Non-Separable Model 1.56 2.53 7.19% 23% / 50%
Separable Model 1.26 1.00 9.29% 42% / 79%
Note: Table presents approximate moments of the worker search effort documented in
Krueger and Mueller (2010), of the US long-term mean unemployment rate and of the
percentage of newly unemployed workers who are (close to) liquidity constrained docu-
mented in Gruber (2001) and Chetty (2008) and the corresponding implied moments in
both versions of the model.
Notation: U Rate - Unemployment Rate; % U liq. constr. - share of liquidity con-
strained among all newly unemployed workers.
Table 17: Empirical and implied moments
search effort from the trough when still on UI till the benefit exhaustion.
On the other hand, the separable model performs relatively poorly. Firstly, it
is not able to match the target of 7.10% unemployment rate.86 Secondly, 42.83%
of newly unemployed are with zero savings. While the latter number is close to
the upper bound evidence, having 79% of newly unemployed with savings below
0.09 (and 82% below 0.19) is significantly off the empirical evidence. The reason
for the latter is a low β which effectively governs not only the saving moment, but
also the unemployment rate: the more impatient are the workers, the less picky
they are about the job offers. In other words, the chosen value of β constitutes
a compromise between missing the unemployment rate target and overshooting
the savings target. Finally, the worker search behavior does not match the em-
pirical evidence: although the search effort does grow over the unemployment
spell, it remains at a constant level after the benefit exhaustion (in line with previ-
ous findings in the literature). Section 4.4.1.2 provides a more detailed discussion
of unemployed worker behavior shedding some more light on why the second
model fails.
86I have also tried to calibrate the separable search costs model with a richer mapping of the
worker’s effort to the effective transition probability given by f (q) = ξ (1− exp (−χq)). Nev-




In this section I discuss the results from solving the calibrated model for different
re-entitlement policy experiments. In Section 4.4.1, I discuss the worker behavior.
Section 4.4.2 presents the equilibrium properties of the economy under different
policy settings. In particular, I discuss the potential welfare gains associated with
following the entitlement policy. Section 4.4.3 discusses the feature of omitted on
the job search. Finally, Section 4.4.4 discusses some of differing features between
the European and US labor markets in light of the results discussed here.
Importantly, many of the main conclusions in the separable search cost model
are qualitatively the same. If this is not the case, I discuss these differences in the
due place. Appendix B contains all the twin figures for the separable search costs
model.
Additionally, as a robustness check, Appendix C contains quasi comparative
statics results, i.e. a comparison of the model predictions when one of parameters
changes. For description of the numerical method used for solving the model see
Appendix D.
4.4.1 Worker behavior
Figures 12 and 13 present the behavior of representative unemployed and cross
sectional (across all the wage categories and maximum and minimum saving cate-
gories) employed workers (respectively) in the model with monetary search costs
and both no entitlement for quitters (NE) and with UI entitlement after 1 month
on the job (T̂ = 1). In particular, they show 1) workers’ search behavior, current
saving positions, reservation wage and consumption levels; and 2) quit or stay on
the job decisions. The first part of this Section focuses only on the baseline policy
of NE. The differences between the two policies are discussed in Section 4.4.1.2.
At the end, in Section 4.4.1.3, I discuss some testable implications of the model.
Worker behavior under no entitlement for quitters
Figure 12 with search effort behavior shows that the baseline model replicates
very well not only the empirical evidence of the spike at benefit exhaustion but
also generates a plausible U-shaped path (as discussed in Section 4.3) of the search
effort.87 In particular, as workers enter the first period of unemployment they
87Thus, if the “U-shape conjecture” is true, then the monetary search costs model rationalizes
the worker search behavior.
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have quite some savings, and so the income effect dominates: for a given prob-
ability of finding a good job, the cost in terms of marginal utilities is relatively
low, and so workers want to invest a lot of their resources into finding a good job.
However, as workers deplete their savings, the substitution effect starts dominat-
ing: exercising extra search effort by agents becomes more expensive in terms of
marginal utility. Therefore, we get the decreasing effort in the first 3 months.
Note that between the months 3 and 5 there is a little spike in search effort.
The increase in effort comes about because of workers getting closer to the benefit
exhaustion. Then, the decrease is a consequence of increased savings in the month
5 (note the increase in saving position in the month 6) as a precautionary measure
against falling into the social assistance.
The spike at the benefit exhaustion in the last month of benefit entitlement is
a consequence of workers trying hard to avoid falling into the social assistance
state which may imply kind of a long term unemployment lock-in and so hav-
ing to agree on a much worse job offer than before the exhaustion. The latter is
also reflected by the steady decrease in the reservation wage (behavior akin to
discouragement). In other words, as workers approach the period of benefit ex-
haustion the income effect dominates (the return in form of finding a job jointly
with avoiding the social assistance state in the next period is very high). After
the benefit exhaustion, search effort drops significantly as workers’ disposable
income gets much smaller.
Finally, plots in Figure 12 speak in favor of dynamics generated by the model.
Firstly, the decline of reservation wage over the spell of unemployment is in line
with empirical evidence documented in Krueger and Mueller (2014). Secondly,
the wealth holdings decline steadily along the unemployment spell - as docu-
mented in Gruber (2001). Thirdly, the increase in search effort and decrease in
reservation wage imply together an empirically documented spike in unemploy-
ment exit rate. However, there is still an ongoing debate in the literature whether
this spike is due to a spike in the re-employment probability or rather only due
to workers moving out of the labor force (see e.g. discussion in Card, Chetty and
Weber (2007)).
On the other hand, the worker behavior in separable search costs model fails to
match the empirical evidence (see Figure 18). The search effort neither drops at the
benefit exhaustion nor is U-shaped. Furthermore, the implied savings behavior
is also counterfactual as savings decline over the first 4 months and then increase
steadily. These dynamics are due to the fact that in this model search costs do not
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enter the budget constraint and so workers face no trade-off between exercising
search effort and accumulating savings against the social assistance state.
Notation: NE - no-entitlement, T̂ = 1 - re-entitlement after 1 period on the job.
Figure 12: Representative unemployed worker behavior with monetary search
costs
Furthermore, Figure 13 presents the cross sectional behavior of employed work-
ers across all the 15 wage categories and minimum and maximum savings. In the
model with no entitlement for quitters, the workers with minimum savings quit
all the jobs with w ≤ 0.05. On the other hand, the workers with maximum sav-
ings are much more picky and quit all the jobs with w < 0.22. This means that
the model with no entitlement for quitters is (realistically) characterized by a pos-
itive mass of people leaving jobs: workers with little or no savings find it optimal
to enter some jobs for a number of periods in order to build up their saving ac-
counts and then go back to unemployment and use savings in order to find a
better match. In fact, in the steady state of the model with no entitlement, the quit
rate88 amounts to 0.68%. For comparison, the quit rate in the separable search
costs model amounts to only 0.1%.
88Quit rate is defined as the number of quits during the month as a percent of total employment.
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Notation: 1 stands for staying on the job, 0 for quitting; Min (Max) Sav - behavior of a
worker with minimum (maximum) savings conditional on her current wage; NE - no-
entitlement, T̂ = 1 - re-entitlement after 1 period on the job.
Figure 13: Employed worker behavior with the monetary search costs
According to the JOLTS and CPS data for the years89 2000-2015, the average
quit rate in the US amounted to 1.84%. However, since some quits reflect job-to-
job transitions, this number constitutes an upper bound for comparison with the
model-generated quit rate. In particular, between the years 1980-2015, quitters
constituted on average 10.72% of the unemployed.90 Thus, the ’adjusted’ quit rate
for this period amounts to 0.73% (i.e. 10.72% · 6.42%93.58% ).
Summing up, even tough under the baseline policy quitters are not entitled to
UI, some workers still decide to leave their jobs in order to find a better one and
this is especially true at the lower end of wage distribution. Moreover, the data
and the model-dynamics give strong support to the mechanism presented in this
paper.
Worker behavior under entitlement for quitters
I begin with discussion of the employed worker behavior and then move to the
case of unemployed ones.
The right panel in Figure 13 shows that workers with minimum savings stay
now in all types of jobs. Note that this is obviously not to say that they keep
working until exogenously separated. Similarly as before, they stay on these jobs
89The relatively short period taken is due to data availability.
90This number does not include unemployed workers from temporary jobs or on temporary
lay-offs.
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for some periods in order to accumulate savings and then quit in order to find
a better job and collect their UI. I refer to this kind of worker behavior as being
opportunistic since now workers use some lower paid jobs not only to accumulate
savings but also to receive the welfare payments. Consequently, under the new
policy the quit rate goes up to 1.59% from 0.68%.
Furthermore, the model with separable search costs generates quite different
conclusions about the employed worker behavior (see Figure 19). In particular,
upon the policy reform, both workers with minimum and maximum savings stay
in fewer jobs than before the reform. As search costs are non-monetary, workers
do not spend as much time in their jobs in order to accumulate savings and so
quit those just after the re-entitlement. The quit rate goes up now to 1.91% from
0.1%.
On the other hand, the representative unemployed worker behavior in the case
of T̂ = 1 is not affected much (see Figure 12). This should not be surprising given
that the policy is aimed at the employed workers who would like to quit and so
affects directly the value of being employed, and only indirectly the value of being
unemployed. Nevertheless, the new policy lowers the reservation wages before
the benefit exhaustion. This means that the new policy extracts some workers
from social assistance by making the low paying jobs more attractive due to the
additional re-entitlement value.
However, since the discussion above was about a representative unemployed
worker (constructed across all the states), there may still be some workers who
are affected more significantly. To this end, Figure 14 presents the behavior of a
(truncated-) representative unemployed conditional on91 recent wage w = 0.17
and assets a ∈ [0.35, 1.1]. Post-reform workers from this group enter unemploy-
ment wealthier and so are able to search and consume more. The higher stock of
savings comes from a better (on average) employment history - see the discussion
in Section 4.4.2. Finally, notice the interesting crossing of reservation wage func-
tions. In the first 4 months of unemployment the post-reform workers from this
group are more picky as they have quit their jobs exactly in order to find a better
one. However, once the unemployment spell gets longer, they want to avoid the
long-term unemployment and so are willing to take up some less paying jobs.
Notice that in the model with separable search costs the reform affects the
representative unemployed by much more92 (see Figure 18). Since the value of
91See Section 4.4.2 below for explanation on how this group has been identified.
92For this reason I do not plot the twin of Figure 14 for the separable search costs model.
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the (easy to find) low paying jobs in the post-reform economy is increased (which
translates into the gap between the values of being unemployed and employed
becoming smaller), the workers do not find it optimal to search as hard as before
and so the search profile is shifted down.
Finally, note that the introduction of entitlement for quitters is a form of in-
creasing the overall UI generosity. Thus, the results on search behavior suggest
that an increase in the UI generosity need not necessarily lead to a decrease in
search effort (as was usually found in the literature). I further expand on this
point in the Appendix C.
Notation: NE - no-entitlement, T̂ = 1 - re-entitlement after 1 period on the job.
Figure 14: Representative unemployed worker behavior with w = 0.17, a ∈
[0.35, 1.1] and monetary search costs
Worker behavior and financial wealth
Notice, however, that the above dynamics of unemployed workers were weighted
averaged across the wage and saving positions. To this end, Figure 15 presents
search and reservation wage behavior of poor (with 0 savings) and wealthy (with
maximum savings) worker with the recent wage w = 0.28 in the pre-reform econ-
omy. It can be immediately seen that the worker with less savings 1) is effectively
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searching much less; and 2) is less picky about the job offers. Since workers in the
model are ex-ante identical, these observations deliver important implications that
can be tested empirically. Are similar people differing only with respect to their
financial wealth searching with different intensity? Do they differ with respect to
their reservation wages? And so finally: are they more likely to end up in better
paying jobs?
Notation: Poor - unemployed worker with w = 0.28 and a = 0; Wealthy - unemployed
worker with w = 0.28 and a = 1.1.
Figure 15: Behavior of poor and wealthy unemployed workers with monetary
search costs and no entitlement
Although the separable model delivers qualitatively the same dynamics of the
reservation wage, it differs with respect to the search behavior (see Figure 20).
Now, since workers can adjust their search effort arbitrarily, the poor worker con-
sumes less and so has more incentives to search harder in order to get back to
employment.
4.4.2 Employment, welfare and inequality
In this section, I discuss first the distributional implications of the policy reform.
Then, I move on to analyzing key equilibrium statistics of the pre- and post-reform
economies like the associated welfare, unemployment and inequality rates.93 In
particular, I show that following the policy of entitlement for quitters is associated
with significant welfare gains and reduction in income inequality.
93Based on the computer results for the employed parameter values, the equilibria presented
here are the unique ones.
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Notation: NE - no-entitlement; T̂ = 1 - re-entitlement after 1 period on the job; Mass - a
share of workers in a given category out of all employed or unemployed, respectively.
Figure 16: Distribution of workers’ income with monetary search costs
First of all, Figure 16 presents the steady state distributions of workers’ income
in the two economies with NE and T̂ = 1. The first plot with wages shows that
the reform allows workers to improve upon the average quality of their match. In
particular, before the reform there were 5.88% of workers in jobs paying less than
w = 0.13 and only 1.79% post-reform. Note that the changes in distribution of
unemployment benefits do not follow the ones in wage distribution very closely.
This is because under the entitlement policy T̂ = 1 there are more voluntary quits
in the lower wage categories, bringing the benefit distributions for NE and T̂ = 1
close to each other for wages below 0.2.
Consequently, as the above discussions suggest, the new policy affects mostly
workers at the lower end of the wage distribution. Since these workers have a rel-
atively high marginal utility from consumption, the welfare impact of the policy
reform on this group can be potentially very large. This is confirmed in Figure 17
which presents the state-by-state breakdown of welfare gains94 associated with
the new policy for six wage categories in which there are at least 3% of employed
(these plots cover 90% of employed in the economy with no entitlement). In par-
ticular, we observe that the highest welfare gains equivalent to between 6% and
10% of life-time consumption are for the employed workers (employment state
E) with w ∈ {0.13, 0.17} and some positive savings. These gains reflect the in-
surance value of the policy reform: as the associated risk with being unemployed






becomes lower, workers in low wage categories are now more likely to quit in
order to search for a better match.
Notation: Employment state E stands for being currently employed; employment states
U1 - U7 stand for being either on UI (between 1 and 6) or on social assistance (state 7).
Figure 17: Breakdown of welfare gains with monetary search costs
On the other hand, there are also significant welfare gains for unemployed
workers in all the wage categories depicted. These gains are especially high at
between 2.5% and 3% around the state of social assistance (state U7). This reflects
the additional non-wage value of low-paid jobs which workers are now more
likely to accept in the post-reform economy (recall the worker behavior discussed
above). Moreover, note that: 1) employed workers with higher wages do not
gain much as they are would not want to quit anyway; and 2) virtually no one is
loosing from the reform (discussion below explains why).
All the welfare conclusions in case of the model with separable search costs
are similar (see Figure 22). The only difference is that the welfare gains are spread
more uniformly. This is due to the fact that the optimal post-reform search effort
is shifted down (for reasons discussed above), which consequently reduces the
search costs of all the unemployed workers.
Table 18 summarizes key statistics of the equilibrium unemployment rate,
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budget balancing tax rate, welfare, income inequality and unemployment dura-
tion for both models with non-separable and separable utility functions. First
of all, notice that following the policy of entitlement for quitters is associated
with a higher unemployment rate and so with a higher budget balancing tax rate.
Nevertheless, in both cases of non-separable and separable search effort cost as-
sumptions there is an (overall) welfare improvement associated with following
the entitlement policy (T̂ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 6}) as compared to the actual US policy of no
entitlement (NE). In particular, the policy of entitlement for quitters after hav-
ing worked for at least 1 month (T̂ = 1) results in the highest long-run welfare
gains equivalent to a 4.38% and 3.69% increase in the life-time consumption, for
non-separable and separable models respectively. Consequently, the benefits of
providing search subsidy to workers (in form of insurance for employed and ex-
traction of long term unemployed into employment) outweigh the costs gener-
ated by the moral hazard of rejecting or quitting jobs (in form of a higher tax rate
needed to finance UI spending given higher unemployment rate).
T̂
τ (%) U Rate (%) C.E. Welfare (%) Income Inequality (%) UD (months)
NS S NS S NS S NS S NS Spre-tax after-tax pre-tax after-tax
1 5.84 8.07 7.57 11.18 104.38 103.69 22.82 22.69 20.63 20.33 4.03 6.44
2 5.81 8.01 7.55 11.01 104.35 103.02 22.81 22.69 20.66 20.36 4.05 6.40
3 5.79 7.96 7.54 10.92 104.31 102.84 22.82 22.70 20.68 20.39 4.06 6.40
6 5.74 7.85 7.50 10.70 104.26 102.65 22.83 22.70 20.71 20.44 4.08 6.37
NE 5.65 7.41 7.19 9.29 100 100 23.72 23.61 20.68 20.48 4.21 6.18
Notation: C.E. Welfare - life-time consumption-equivalent welfare increase; U Rate - Un-
employment Rate; UD - unemployment duration, NS - results for a model with non-
separable utility assumption, S - with separable utility, T̂ - required number of months on
the job in order to get eligibility for benefits after quitting, NE - no entitlement for quitters
policy.
Table 18: Main results of the model
To understand the underlying trade-off better, note first that the required in-
crease of 0.19 p.p in the budget balancing tax rate is of a very small magnitude.
Thus, as the currently employed workers barely notice the change in the tax rate,
there is virtually no one loosing from the policy reform and (as discussed above)
there are significant gains for the workers in low wage categories and for the long-
term unemployed.95 This small increase in the tax rate is due to two factors: 1)
95Moreover, the policy reform also serves as an indirect insurance for workers in high wage
categories leading to some gains off-setting the negative impact of the tax increase. This is true
as every worker in the economy faces a positive probability of becoming unemployed and being
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a relatively small increase in the unemployment rate due to a relatively small in-
crease in the quit rate (change from 0.68% to 1.59%); and 2) an improvement of
average match quality leading to a higher average tax revenue per worker.
Interestingly, under both assumptions of separability and non-separability the
model kills two birds with one stone: the re-entitlement policy leads not only
to an increase in efficiency but also in (both pre- and after-tax) equity. First of
all, although unemployment rate goes up, the mass of long-term unemployed
with social assistance income declines sixfold. Secondly, due to the higher tax
rate, the after-tax income of employed individuals gets closer to the income of
unemployed.
Similarly, the optimal policy is characterized by T̂ = 1, as opposed to T̂ > 1,
exactly due to the effects on long-term unemployment. As the parameter goes
up, the non-wage value of low-paid jobs is reduced and so the reservation wage
of workers unemployed for 5-7 periods increases (see Figure 12 with reservation
wage and note that NE corresponds to T̂ = ∞). Consequently, there are more
workers ending up poor (with high losses in marginal utility terms) in long-term
unemployment which they cannot escape easily.
Moreover, as the long-term unemployed workers in the post-reform economy
become less picky about wage offers, the unemployment duration goes down.
Notice that this is not true in the separable search costs model: although also
here the reservation wage is lower under the policy T̂ = 1 as compared to NE,
the level of the post-reform search effort is shifted down (as explained above in
Section 4.4.1.2) leading to opposite conclusions.
Notice that the model delivers realistic dynamics in terms of other untargeted
moments, again speaking in favor of the robustness of results. First of all, the
implied unemployment duration of 4.2 months is just in line with the average
mean unemployment duration in the FRED dataset for the years 1980-2015.
Secondly, the implied budget balancing tax rate of 5.65% is not too unrealis-
tic. Although the average unemployment tax rate in the United States varies (de-
pending on the state) from 0.05% to 2%, as reported by Henchman (2011), these
tax rates are in many cases too low as during many recessions some of the unem-
ployment insurance trust funds became insolvent due to too low fund reserves
and increased unemployment caused by economic downturn.
Finally, the model generates substantial income inequality. Nevertheless, due
unlucky in receiving low wage offers. In such a case, a worker with previously high wage may
end up in long-term unemployment where she would benefit from the reform.
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to the simplifying assumption of worker ex-ante homogeneity, the implied after-
tax income inequality of 23.61% is 14 p.p. below the corresponding Gini index for
the US (according to the OECD).
4.4.3 On the job search
The model (and so the results above) abstracted from an empirically important
feature of the on the job search. Fallick and Fleischman (2004) constructed a
dataset based on the CPS from February and March 1997 and 1999 and report that
out of all the employed people around 4.4% engaged in active on the job search.
After two months, out of those actively searching around 11.3% reported having
a new employer and around 5.6% reported being unemployed.
Moreover, up to 80% of job to job changers in their sample were not actively
searching on the job. Such transitions may be due to various reasons such as 1)
some of the workers having a very short (and so unrecorded in the data) period
of unemployment in-between, 2) due to poaching, or 3) due to having found a
job through their networks. The first case is covered by the mechanism employed
in this paper. Nonetheless, a waitress working in a restaurant may be very likely
poached by another restaurant or get information about a position in a friend’s
restaurant with a slightly higher wage. Obviously, my model is not suited for
the analysis of such phenomena. However, given the discrete nature of the wage
grid employed in this paper, one can think about each wage as representing some
particular job category. With this interpretation in mind, it seems plausible to
think that a waitress may be better-off leaving her job and her current network
in order to focus her search effort on finding a new job (ideally a much better
paid one) as her current network may be unlikely to provide her with such an
opportunity.
Nevertheless, it is easy to see that a standard on the job search extension of the
model would preserve qualitative nature of the results if the difference between
the costs of on- and off-the-job search is large enough. In fact, as has been doc-
umented by Krueger and Muller (2010), the on the job search costs are strictly
greater than searching while unemployed: just think about how much time a
waitress or a management consultant working for 60+ hours per week may be
willing to devote for the on the job search. However, if we think of searching
being costly in terms of money as opposed to time, one should not forget that
going to an interview may require the worker to take one day off (or even more
in case of remote destinations or a series of interviews for more qualified jobs).
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Consequently, apart from the lost output due to worker’s absence, it seems also
possible that an active on the job search may trigger e.g. lower worker output or
loss of employer’s trust. This phenomenon could be captured by a higher firing
rate while doing on the job search translating into higher wage income risk and
so into higher monetary search costs. Interestingly, such cases of firings upon the
loss of trust have been documented96 in interviews ran by Bewley (1999).
Importantly, the data supports the mechanism at the core of this paper. The
variance of the aforementioned quit rate in the US is significant: the quit rate in
government sector amounted to only 0.7% while in retail sector it was already
2.9% and in food services even 4%. Unsurprisingly then, as mentioned in the
literature review, there is some empirical analysis documenting existence of the
type of opportunistic worker behavior analyzed here.
Finally, given that the model-implied quit rate of 0.68% is already slightly be-
low the one in the data, introducing the on the job search would reduce it even
further and so lead to unclear conclusions. Thus, assuming away the on the job
search should not be seen as critical for the results obtained.
4.4.4 Empirical observations vs the model
The labor markets in Continental Western Europe and the United States have been
at odds in many features for many years so far. First of all, since 1980s the unem-
ployment rate for the EU-15 countries has been persistently97 higher than in the
US by 1% to 4.5%, depending on the time period. Secondly, since mid-1980s in-
come inequality in the US has risen much faster than in Europe and since then has
been persistently higher. Thirdly, Manacorda and Petrongolo (1999) show that al-
though the unemployment rate is a more pressing problem in the Continental
Europe, its labor market mismatch levels have not increased as much as in the
US. Finally, the increase in European unemployment rate has been accompanied
by decreasing rates of exit from unemployment resulting in longer duration of
unemployment spells and increase in the number of long-term unemployed.
As documented by Venn (2012), the unemployment insurance systems with
and without benefit entitlement for workers quitting voluntarily are characteris-
tic for many countries in Europe and the US, respectively. The model presented
96These cases might be partially captured by the 5.6% of active on the job searchers being un-
employed in the dataset of Fallick and Fleischman.
97The only exception was the unemployment rate in 2010 when the two got close to each other
for short period of time but then diverged again.
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above abstracts from many important factors that could be equally likely to con-
tribute to the differences in the US and European labor markets and focuses solely
on entitlement to benefits for quitters in order to find whether it may explain at
least some of the empirical evidence.
As I have shown, the model is able to somehow reconcile the first three obser-
vations. The mechanism employed in the model leads to a higher unemployment
rate. Also, following the benefit entitlement policy for workers quitting jobs vol-
untarily (Europe) is associated with 1) a lower income inequality, and 2) a higher
match quality, as compared to the case of US status-quo. Nevertheless, although
the associated with the optimal policy unemployment duration is higher in the
separable search costs model, it is lower in the non-separable one.
Importantly, mind that the model has been calibrated solely to the US labor
market which obviously has different fundamentals than the European. More-
over, characteristics of the latter differ a lot between individual countries. With
this being said, the effects exposed by the model may very well be exacerbated by
other institutional differences among the continents such as e.g. longer UI dura-
tion, more unionization or more stringent Employment Protection Legislation in
the Continental Europe. In other words, this paper is identifying the direction of
effects driving the economy associated with particular policies and does not aim
at trying to investigate whether the differences in policies may account for the ob-
served labor market discrepancies. Given this and other important economic fac-
tors not included in the model, the prevalent in Europe policy of paying benefits
after voluntary quits may account for some but obviously not all of the observed
differences in unemployment rates, match quality and income inequality.
Finally, there is a vast literature discussing reasons for the observed differ-
ence in characteristics of the US and European labor markets. A good review of
possible explanations is provided by Bertola and Ichino (1995). Thomas Sargent
and Lars Ljungqvist ran a major research program that aimed at identifying the
reasons of these differences. Their theory is that generous European welfare sys-
tem combined with a permanent change in the microeconomic labor conditions
led to a sustained and high unemployment rate in Europe. Although the model
presented here also attributes the observed discrepancies to generous welfare sys-
tems, it points exactly at one particular policy which may be partially responsi-
ble for the observed divergence of labor markets. Moreover, it also shows that
economists should not only investigate the reasons of these observations, but also
look at their consequences (e.g. in welfare terms). It might well be the case that
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the higher unemployment rate in Europe does not necessarily represent a huge
waste of human resources and welfare, but to the contrary allows for a better al-
location. To fully address this question, economists need more comprehensive
models taking relevant general equilibrium effects into account.
4.5 Concluding discussion
In this paper, I study a labor model with random search, unemployment insur-
ance, savings, voluntary quits and various labor attachment requirements. In
particular, I look for the optimal unemployment re-entitlement policy for quit-
ters. In order to do this, I embark upon the method accounting for all the benefits
and adverse effects generated by the policy, i.e. the social welfare analysis.
The model is calibrated to the US labor market where quitters are not entitled
to UI. The results raise the question about the observed quitter-related UI policies
differing from country to country and suggest that they may be rather ad hoc
and may be a source of welfare inefficiencies. In particular, upon following the
generous entitlement policy the implied welfare, unemployment rate and match
quality are higher and both the pre- and after-tax income inequality are lower
than in the case of no-entitlement for quitters. Interestingly, given that in Europe
quitters are often eligible for UI, the model with its results identifies a concrete
policy that could partially explain the divergence of the US and European labor
markets.
The intuition for the results is two-fold. Firstly, the policy is insuring the in-
come risk associated with a voluntary quit and although it increases the mass of
quitters (and so the required tax rate to fund the UI), it improves the allocation
of workers in the economy. Secondly, by increasing the non-wage value of low
paid jobs, the policy lowers reservation wages of long term unemployed and so
extracts some of them back into employment.
I find the results in this paper complementary to the literature discussed. First
of all, worker’s opportunism was found in Hopenhayn and Nicolini (2009). I
show that allowing for this opportunistic and seemingly inefficient behavior of
workers quitting jobs in order to find a better one may lead to significant long run
welfare gains. Furthermore, I investigate the consequences of the unexplored as-
sumption of monetary search costs. It turns out that this assumption is capable of
generating search behavior in line with the one documented in the empirical liter-
ature. What is more, the model generates testable implications about differences
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in search behavior, and so in labor market outcomes for similar workers differing
only with respect to their financial wealth. Thirdly, this paper fills an important
gap in the UI literature by analyzing welfare consequences of entitlement to ben-
efits for quitters. Finally, the results presented here hint at the need of new di-
rection of economic research concentrated on (i) studying fully optimal UI design
taking into account the possibility of endogenous quits (given how powerful this
mechanism seems to be); (ii) the relevance of monetary costs and substitutability
between time and money for job search and (iii) the welfare consequences of un-
employment and thus, among others, of the divergence of the US and European
labor markets.
Importantly, the model performs well not only in directions in which it has
been calibrated but also others like implying realistic UI tax rates, unemployment
duration, significant income inequality and generating realistic reservation wage
behavior and endogenous quits after spending some time on the job (even with-
out entitlement for quitters). The model lends itself easily to extensions like more
involved and realistic eligibility criteria (for example labor attachment require-
ment for fired workers), sanctions (suspension periods for quitters), monitoring
(penalties for insufficient search effort) and endogenizing wage distribution.
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4.6 Appendix A: Proof of the reservation wage property
Existence of such a reservation wage w̄ (a, t, w) follows by the fact that being un-
employed is associated with a continuation value which (given the distribution
on wage draws) entails expectation about the wage draws in the future. If the
wage draw today is low, then the value of declining it and being unemployed
until tomorrow may yield greater value to the worker as the draw tomorrow is
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higher in expectation. Thus, it is optimal for the worker to decline such a wage of-
fer. Note that, since I consider only benefits which are strictly smaller than recent
wage and there is no disutility of working, there always exists a wage w in the
support of wage distribution which the worker is willing to accept. By continuity
there exists at least one wage at which the worker is indifferent between accepting
and rejecting a job offer. Let me denote this value by w̄ (a, t, w).
It remains to show that the gain from accepting a job is monotonic in the of-
fered wage, and thus for w′ ≥ w̄ it holds that Ve (a, 1, w′) ≥ Ve (a, 1, w̄ (a, t, w)) =
Vu (a, t, w) and Ve (a, 1, w′) < Vu (a, t, w̄(a, t, w)) for w′ < w̄.
Note that due to the UI design, the value of being unemployed is clearly mono-
tone in wage, i.e. Vu (a, 1, w′) ≥ Vu (a, 1, w). By this and the fact that once accepted
the wage is constant over the employment time until separated, it follows that the
value of being employed Ve, which includes the value of being unemployed at
some point in the future, is also monotone in wage, i.e. Ve (a, 1, w′) ≥ Ve (a, 1, w) if
and only if w′ > w. Therefore Ve (a, 1, w′) ≥ Ve (a, 1, w̄ (a, t, w)) = Vu (a, t, w̄ (t, w))
for w′ ≥ w and conversely Ve (a, 1, w′) < Vu (a, t, w̄ (a, t, w)) for w′ < w̄, where the
monotonicity and definition of the reservation wage is used. This establishes the
reservation property.
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4.7 Appendix B: Figures with results of the separable utility model
Notation: NE - no-entitlement, T̂ = 1 - re-entitlement after 1 period on the job.
Figure 18: Representative unemployed worker behavior with separable search
costs
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Notation: 1 stands for staying on the job, 0 for quitting; Min (Max) Sav - behavior of a
worker with minimum (maximum) savings conditional on her current wage; NE - no-
entitlement, T̂ = 1 - re-entitlement after 1 period on the job.
Figure 19: Employed worker behavior with separable search costs
Notation: Poor - representative unemployed worker with w = 0.28 and a = 0; Wealthy -
representative unemployed worker with w = 0.28 and a = 1.1.
Figure 20: Behavior of representative poor and rich unemployed workers with
separable search costs and no entitlement
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Notation: NE - no-entitlement; T̂ = 1 - re-entitlement after 1 period on the job; Mass - a
share of workers in a given category out of all employed or unemployed, respectively.
Figure 21: Distribution of workers’ income with separable search costs
Notation: Employment state E stands for being currently employed; employment states
U1 - U7 stand for being either on UI (between 1 and 6) or on social assistance (state 7).
Figure 22: Breakdown of welfare gains with separable search costs
4.8 Appendix C: Scenario comparison
In this Appendix, I perform a quasi comparative statics exercise in the model with
monetary search costs. In order to do so, I solve the model for different values of
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a parameter of interest while holding everything else constant. Note that the pur-
pose of this exercise is to perform a robustness check of the model’s behavior and,
in particular, not to find a fully optimal UI schedule (which goes beyond the scope
of this paper). Importantly, due to very long computational time required, I solve
here the re-calibrated model98 with hand-to-mouth workers. Table 19 provides
results of this exercise, i.e. the qualitative total effects of changes in the level of
replacement ratio and the length of unemployment benefits payments on reserva-
tion wages, search effort, unemployment rate, tax rate, welfare and inequality.
Consider first the effect of an increase in the replacement ratio99 γ. As unem-
ployed workers receive higher benefits, they become more picky about the jobs
they are willing to accept - firstly due to the outside option having a relatively
higher value, and secondly due to having possibility of exercising higher search
effort and effectively facing a better wage distribution.
Furthermore, the average search effort goes up. The main reason for it is the
assumed here monetary cost of search - as more resources are available to search-
constrained workers, they take advantage of it in order to escape the unemploy-
ment state and the prospect of falling into the unemployment lock-in after benefit
exhaustion. However, once the tax rate needed to finance the reform but its effect
is less significant. This comparative statics finding is to the contrary of standard
findings in literature as e.g. in Shavell and Weiss (1979), where with a separable
utility there was no binding search constraint and so higher benefits reduced the
gap between the values of employment and unemployment and thus lowered the
search effort. The separable utility version of my model confirms its robustness
by replicating this standard observation (not shown in the table).
Although the average search effort increases, the reservation wage increase
dominates and so the unemployment rate goes up. This implies a higher tax rate
needed to balance the government budget. This implies that the welfare will be
hump-shaped: when γ is too high, the welfare improving effects associated with
better the match quality are dominated by the welfare abuse.
Similarly, the inequality is also hump-shaped: for γ small enough, the increase
in the replacement ratio and the tax rate bring the income from unemployment
benefits closer to the wage income and so the inequality in the economy decreases.
However, once γ is large enough, although more workers access the top-paying
jobs, the distribution of employees across lower wage categories does not change
98This alternative calibration is obviously targeting the same moments (apart from the saving
moments) as the model with savings. For space saving reasons, I do not discuss its details here.
99Obviously, I assume that γ ∈ [0, 1].
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dw̄ dq dU dτ dWel f are dInequality
dγ + + + + ? ?
dT + - + + ? ?
Note: Table shows scenario comparison of total changes in key statistics on impact of
change in parameters
Table 19: Scenario comparison
much leading to a net increase in inequality.
Consequently, the welfare is maximized at γ = 78%. The associated unem-
ployment rate increases from 7.10% to 8.62%, the tax rate almost doubles going up
from 4.09% to 8.01% and the Gini coefficient goes down from 17.55% and 17.41%
to 16.43% and 16.33%, respectively for pre- and after-tax.
As the length of the benefit entitlement period is increased, workers stick
longer to their initial reservation wage (which is the highest over the unemploy-
ment spell) and so the average reservation wage goes up. Moreover, given that
workers expect to receive the UI for longer, the average search effort declines. As
a result, the unemployment rate increases. For similar reasons as above, the tax
rate on employed workers increases. However, the effect on inequality is ambigu-
ous. For T low enough, the relationship between inequality and this parameter
is negative - higher tax rate on employed reduces net wage income and redis-
tributes it to the unemployed. However, once T is large enough this relationship
is no longer clear for reasons similar to the ones discussed above.
Similarly as above, the impact on inequality is hump-shaped. As the entitle-
ment gets longer, the policy saves more people from entering the social assistance
state and so the inequality is reduced. However, above some high value of T
these effects become much smaller and so further increases in T start increasing
the inequality.
Consequently, the welfare is maximized with UI entitlement for 1 year. The
associated unemployment rate increases from 7.10% to 10.09%, the tax rate goes
up from 4.09% to 7.26%, the Gini coefficient goes down from 17.55% and 17.41%
to 16.53% and 16.24%, respectively for pre- and after-tax.
4.9 Appendix D: Computation method
The model is solved numerically for a steady state equilibrium. In order to do this,
I use an iterative method of successive approximations. First a policy parameter
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T̂ is chosen and a tax rate τ is guessed. Given the two, value function iteration is
used to solve the functional equations (68) and (69) for optimal choices of con-
sumption, saving, search effort, reservation wages and quit decisions. Next, the
invariant distribution G∗ is computed using a transition matrix Γ for given opti-
mal decisions. Finally, the invariant distribution is used to evaluate the govern-
ment budget balance. If it is significantly different from zero, a bisection method is
used to bracket the root and the steps described are repeated until an equilibrium
is found.
In order to solve for optimal decision rules, I use the standard technique of dy-
namic programming for infinite horizon case. The first step involves discretizing
the action space by choosing a grid of feasible search efforts and saving decisions:
it is chosen sufficiently fine such that adding more grid points does not affect
the results. Thus, given the description of the model above, the whole model is
discretized. Then, optimal decision rules for each state are computed by starting
with an initial approximation of the value function in (69) and computes the right
hand side of it in order to obtain a subsequent approximation. This procedure is
repeated until convergence of the value function is achieved.
4.10 Appendix E: Markov transition function
Given the model, the worker’s employment opportunities state, s, follows a n×
aM ×
(
T̂ + T + 1
)
-state Markov chain. If s = {u, a, t, wi} i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, she re-
mains unemployed for that period, receives unemployment benefit according to
the benefit payment path (pinned down by t and wi), has savings a and may re-
ceive a wage offer w′ after setting the optimal search effort q. After having re-
ceived a wage offer she makes a decision about her reservation wage w̄ and thus
pins down her transition probabilities to states tomorrow. Furthermore, she can
be employed on a job with the one of the n possible wages: if s = {e, a, t, wi} she is
still employed and has worked for a wage wi for t periods so far. While on the job,
based on comparison of Vu and Ve, the worker makes a decision about quitting the
job or staying in it which determines her transition probabilities to other states in
the next period.
Therefore, the transition function for the employment opportunities state given
worker’s decision function is a
[
aM · n ·
(




aM · n ·
(







, where i, j ∈
{
1, 2, ..., aM · n ·
(
T̂ + T + 1
)}
.
For instance, ΓT̂+1,2(T̂+T+1)+1 = P {st+1 = {e, 0, 1, w3} | st = {u, 0, 1, w1}} is
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the transition probability to employment with wage w3 and 0 assets conditional
on being unemployed for 1 period, receiving unemployment benefits tied to the
most recent wage w1 and having 0 assets. As there is no on the job search, the ef-
fort exerted will only affect probabilities of transition from unemployment to em-
ployment. Figure 23 presents example of transition probabilities for unemployed
and employed workers.
State {u, a′, t′, wi}
{




e, a′, t†, wn
}
{u, a, t, wi}
1− f (qt)∑w≥w̄ P (w)
{
f (qt)P(w1) w1 ≥ w̄
0 otherwise · · ·
{
f (qt)P(wn) wn ≥ w̄
0 otherwise
{e, a, t, w1}
{










1− σ otherwise · · · 0
...
...
... . . .
...
{e, a, t, wn}
{





0 · · ·
{





Note: Each row contains probability of transition from current row-state to a pos-
sible column-state. Notice that the agents make a decision about the state a′ so
all the transition probabilities are conditional on the decision a′ being optimal in
a given state.
Notation: {e, a, t, wi} - employed for t periods at wage wi with savings a, {u, a, t, wi}






T̂, t + 1
}
if previously x = e
1 if previously x = u
t′ =

1 if previously x = e and t = T̂
T + 1 if previously x = e and t < T̂
min {T + 1, t + 1} if previously x = u
Figure 23: Transition function for workers in states {u, a, t, wi} and
{
e, a, t, wj
}
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